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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
PIRATES, EXILES, AND EMPIRE: ENGLISH SEAMEN, ATLANTIC EXPANSION, 
AND JAMAICAN SETTLEMENT, 1558-1658 
by 
Amanda Joyce Snyder 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Sherry Johnson, Major Professor 
A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy, 
despite the brand of “outlaw” and the fear of prosecution.  At various times throughout 
history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution, 
licensing men to work as “privateers” for the state, supplementing naval forces.  This 
practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) 
significantly altered this tradition.  Recognizing her own weakness in effectively 
prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth 
began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war.  
This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging 
Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire. 
 By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth’s 
privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American 
outposts they had developed in the previous century.  Now exiles, no longer beholden to 
the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy.  The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases 
for these rover communities.  In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-
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1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies.  Determined to demonstrate his 
authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to 
Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish 
Jamaica.  Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men’s 
efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one 
of England’s most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean 
empire. 
 Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and 
demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern 
piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World.  
European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with 
significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the 
development of Atlantic empire. 
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CHAPTER I 
PIRACY AND THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1540-1650 
 
 
Piracy is no novel trade.  As long as there have been ships in which to sail, there 
have been pirates.  Over the centuries, the nature and practice of piracy have changed, as 
have the ways in which governments address piracy.  More often than not, governments 
label pirates as criminals and seek their prosecution.  There are times, however, when 
these so-called criminals find a legitimate place in society as patriots.  In the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, as England and Spain expanded their colonizing missions in 
the Caribbean, the continuation of state-sponsored piracy became an increasingly 
contentious political debate. 
 “Pirates, Exiles, and Empire” explores how changing English piracy legislation 
affected Anglo-Spanish imperial competition during the development of the Atlantic 
World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  The dissertation traces the transition of 
English mariners from European pirates, to Atlantic privateers, to Caribbean exiles, and 
finally, to English citizens once more with the establishment of an English colony at 
Jamaica in 1655.  Piracy and privateering became the vehicle through which England 
established an Atlantic presence and challenged the dominance of the Spanish Empire in 
the New World. 
Under the last Tudor monarch, Queen Elizabeth I of England (1558-1603), and 
the Commonwealth leader, Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658), pirates served 
the state as “privateers” to bolster these rulers’ authority at home and abroad.  Between 
these two rulers, during the reigns of James VI/I (1603-1625) and Charles I (1625-1649), 
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privateers lost favor with the crown and became exiles, forging new careers and 
communities in the Atlantic World.1  English policies and the activities of English 
seamen threatened traditional Spanish colonial hegemony.  Successive Spanish 
governments under Philip II (1556-1598), Philip III (1598-1621), and Philip IV (1621-
1665) struggled with the diplomatic complexities of confronting English piracy while 
simultaneously trying to avoid war and maintain control of vast Spanish territories. 
Numerous scholars have highlighted the important role of piracy in the early 
Atlantic world but the dissertation’s argument for the deliberate use of piracy legislation 
by the English Crown is new.  Historians have vigorously debated the legitimacy of 
privateers, seen as pirates by all but the English, and their role in the Anglo-Spanish war 
of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,2 yet scholarship in this vein has not 
considered the domestic social conditions that paralleled diplomatic tensions with Spain.  
A study of Elizabethan proclamations and correspondence shows a distinct change in 
privateering policy as Elizabeth realized she could not combat piracy on her shores, but 
                                                          
1.  Crowned heads did not make policy completely by themselves.  Numerous councilors, 
secretaries, and advisors helped construct official state polices which were then issued and 
published under the name of the king or queen.  In the case of the rulers discussed in the 
dissertation, letters of the rulers are also considered in determining the policy assigned to a 
specific ruler.  The dissertation does not delve into the councilor debates over each 
proclamation—other scholars have done this at length.  The dissertation is more concerned with 
the diplomatic ramifications of policy and the correspondence between the kings and queens and 
diplomats. 
  
2.  Kenneth Andrews remains one of the preeminent scholars on Elizabethan privateering, 
however, his focus remains overwhelmingly domestic and discounts the wider, global impact of 
these policies.  Elizabethan Privateering: English Privateering During the Spanish War, 1585–
1603, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1964).  See also R. B. Wernham, Before the 
Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485–1588 (New York, NY: Harcourt, 1966); 
Wernham, After the Armada: Elizabethan England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588–
1595 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University, 1984); and Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and 
Foreign Policy, 1558–1603 (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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could perhaps find use for these pirates.  Coincidentally, this change in policy also helped 
increase her royal prerogative and gain the support of a previously untapped, fairly large 
social group.  Scholars further disagree as to whether this policy constituted a proactive 
foreign policy on the part of the queen or whether Elizabeth simply experienced a 
“remarkable reversal of alliances.”3  However ad hoc some scholars may paint 
Elizabeth’s piracy solutions,4 this dissertation demonstrates that her decision to promote 
privateering was both conscious and calculated.  Even if Elizabeth initially constructed 
her new policies as a short-term reaction to the problems she faced, the ways in which 
she expanded and improved upon those policies constituted a departure from established 
maritime practices and diplomacy, thus becoming new and distinct methods of foreign 
                                                          
3.  R. B. Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558–1603 (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1980), 23. 
4.  Many scholars debate whether Elizabeth had any proactive foreign policy at all.  Charles 
Wilson is chief among these scholars claiming that historians have simply “[rationalized] into 
policies ex post facto” a succession of shifts and “muddles” that the Queen faced.  Charles 
Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands (London, UK: Macmillan, 1970), 6.  
Wernham also claims that Elizabeth experienced a “remarkable reversal of alliances” more than 
she fostered any “diplomatic revolution.”  Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 
23.  Though Elizabeth may have fallen into a foreign policy that capitalized on existing practices 
(piracy) as a short term reaction/solution to the problems she faced, the way that she expanded 
and improved upon that policy constituted a departure from established maritime practices and 
diplomacy thus becoming a new and distinct method of foreign policy.  G.J. Marcus supports the 
idea that these policies became a factor of state policy and Elizabeth expanded them on an 
unprecedented scale.  G. J. Marcus, A Naval History of England (I-The Formative Centuries) 
(London, UK: Longmans Green, 1961), 49.  During wartime, piracy was generally state-
sanctioned, but Philip Gosse claims that Elizabeth’s policies were new in the fact that she 
“connived” at piracy while England was at “peace with the world.”  Philip Gosse, The History of 
Piracy (New York, NY: Tudor, 1946), 113.  Andrews denies that Elizabeth’s policies were in any 
way planned or deliberate and remained a private practice for Englishmen, never a governmental 
initiative.  Andrews, “Elizabethan Privateering: The Harte Lecture, 1985,” in Raleigh in Exeter, 
1985: Privateering and Colonisation in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Papers Delivered at a 
Conference at Exeter University on 3–4 May 1985 to Mark the Four Hundredth Anniversary of 
the First Attempt to Settle English People in North America, ed. Joyce Youings (Exeter, UK: 
University of Exeter, 1985), 4; Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 6+, 17. 
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policy.5  Few modern studies have discussed at length how Elizabeth’s promotion of 
piracy factored into official state policy and the unprecedented scale under which her 
government enacted laws that legitimated privateering as a means to state ends. 
 A crucial recurring theme of the study is that because the English government 
could not effectively prosecute piracy, they embraced it.  Thus, Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation argues that the English courts used a series of legal precedents to justify 
English authority over piracy cases, thereby allowing the English government to expand 
its privateering support with legal justification.  These legal precedents allowed the 
English to enter into competition with Spain in the burgeoning Atlantic World, using 
legal precedent as a shield.  English legal arguments led to the establishment of an 
internationally-recognized maritime law court that frustrated the Spanish government.  
The resulting imperial conflicts eventually led to war at the end of the sixteenth 
century—twenty years after the implementation of the first privateering policies.  
While most studies of piracy either focus on a revived culture of piracy in the 
eighteenth century, or predominately discuss the more wealthy and well-known 
Elizabethan privateers known as the “Sea Dogs,” the dissertation—while accounting 
briefly for the Sea Dogs—instead contends that the making of English privateers was a 
much more widespread practice, becoming an integral part of Elizabethan foreign policy.  
This foreign policy directive comprised a series of conscious decisions on the part of the 
queen, not just a haphazard series of events, as many political historians have argued.  As 
these historians note, channeling piracy into privateering did initially grow out of English 
officials’ inabilities to police piracy.  Yet, as the dissertation argues, the crown soon 
                                                          
5.  Marcus, A Naval History of England, 49. 
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realized the usefulness and profitability of these practices in supplementing an English 
navy in disrepair and avoiding direct war with Spain. 
Similarly, lawmakers in the early Elizabethan state compensated for the general 
political and imperial weakness of the English courts by positioning themselves as the 
arbiters of international maritime disputes between Spain, England, the Netherlands, and 
even France and the Venetian Republic, as outlined in Chapter 3.  The legal 
developments they promoted allowed England to gain jurisdiction over maritime cases in 
the English Channel, and in time, the Atlantic.  As a result, English privateers expanded 
into the Atlantic and played dramatic roles in transforming European political conflict 
into imperial competition for the New World.  Chapter 3 explores the nature of this 
imperial competition.  English mariners conducted raids on Spanish shipping and ports.  
These seamen sought to establish supply bases on Caribbean islands and at the edges of 
Spanish La Florida from which to attack Spanish ships.  Their bases were more informal 
than many contemporary Spanish settlements and were, therefore, less expensive for the 
state to maintain, they were not initially formal English colonies.  The Spanish, at the 
receiving end of these seemingly constant raids, focused on fortification to rebuff English 
attacks.  In a very short time, the Spanish felt the pinch of this ongoing endeavor and of 
the losses to English piratas. 
 Chapter 4 transitions to the more predominately Spanish section of the project, 
and demonstrates that Atlantic imperial competition in the Caribbean played an important 
role in sixteenth-century European diplomatic negotiations.  The struggle for the Atlantic 
prompted changes in each imperial power’s naval policies, resulting in full-blown war 
towards the end of the sixteenth century.  The chapter compares Spanish politics and 
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naval policies to English naval policies of the time.  Indulging in some of the Black 
Legend history of Spain, the chapter claims that Spanish mismanagement of resources led 
to decline at the turn of the seventeenth century.  The Spanish crown and government 
received numerous communications from the colonies about forming a Caribbean 
Armada and fortifying islands like Jamaica, but the government either ignored those 
requests or never followed through on the few plans it did approve. 
The struggles of the seventeenth-century Spanish Empire in the case of Jamaica 
frame Chapter 5, which demonstrates that Jamaica was not simply a backwater with little 
value to the Empire, but was instead a crucial geopolitical bone of contention in Spain 
and England’ competition for imperial dominance.  Many modern scholars have 
downplayed the value and importance of Jamaica in the early modern Caribbean, but the 
dissertation shows how the island became the center of Anglo-Spanish imperial 
competition in the seventeenth century.  Under Spanish control from Columbus’ second 
voyage until 1655, Jamaica is important for the study in a number of ways.  Building on 
the archival work of noted Spanish historians like Irene Wright and Francisco Morales 
Padrón, this study illustrates that Jamaica was not simply a backwater with little value to 
the Empire.6  Padrón’s Jamaica Espanola, written 50 years ago, is the last book to be 
published on Spanish Jamaica and Irene Wright’s compilations were published twenty 
and thirty years prior to that.  
Archival research for the dissertation shows that Spanish officials, settlers, and 
                                                          
6. Francisco Morales Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle, 2003).  
Originally published as Jamaica Española, 1953; Irene Wright, Spanish Documents Concerning 
English Voyages to the Caribbean, 1527-1568, (London, UK: Hakluyt Society, 1929); Wright, 
Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580, (London, UK: Hakluyt 
Society, 1932). 
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the island’s governors wrote to Spain regularly about the need to fortify the island 
because of the amount of resources on the island that attracted pirates, and the amount of 
Spanish trade regularly passing by the island to Tierra Firma.  Regular correspondence 
and requests, for example, noted that fortifications in Jamaica would ensure the safe 
passage of the Spanish Plate Fleets and keep other nations from attempting an attack on 
the island.  These letters argued that losing Jamaica would be detrimental to Spanish 
trade and the empire.  Eventually, the Spanish crown took note and sent orders to fortify 
the island.  The Crown also wrote and approved plans for a permanent Caribbean 
Armada.  Unfortunately, continued English raids on Spanish shipping coupled with a 
number of internal Spanish domestic problems (exacerbated by financial difficulties 
stemming from English Atlantic raids) kept Spain from fully realizing these plan.  Also, 
in the mid-seventeenth century, former privateers played an important role in settling 
these areas and used their years of expertise and knowledge of the Atlantic waters to aid 
in the successful establishment of these colonies.  During this time, Spain continued to 
struggle with financial difficulties and internal uprisings, and saw continued English 
encroachment on their New World empire.  The English, meanwhile, used their naval 
skills and resources gained from decades of privateering and raiding to establishment 
settlements in Virginia (Jamestown, 1607), Bermuda (1609), St. Kitts, (1623), and 
Barbados (1625) to name but a few.  
Jamaica also occupied an important place in English policy in the 1650s.  As 
discussed in the final chapter of the dissertation, formally English seamen well knew the 
island in the middle of important Spanish trade routes, having established bases around 
the Caribbean from which to attack the island and the traders passing by.  Elizabeth had 
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supported privateers, but her Stuart successors had not.  Thousands of English seamen 
migrated to the New World, many choosing Caribbean exile and continued piracy over 
service in the Stuart navy.  These exiles were particularly important for the establishment 
of Jamaica as an English colony under the Interregnum government during the 
seventeenth century.  Rover communities also existed on the island itself in some of the 
harbors that proved too difficult for Spanish ships to navigate.  Without adequate 
protection on the entire island, these communities managed to remain on parts of the 
island, taking advantage of the natural resources to survive.   
When England’s new revolutionary leader, Oliver Cromwell, gained power in 
1649 and crafted his “Western Design” in 1654, he was aware of these existing 
communities and the importance of establishing an English colony in the heart of the 
Spanish Caribbean.  Like Spanish historians, many English historians downplay the 
importance of Jamaica to imperial aims.  These scholars consistently malign Cromwell’s 
politics, largely ignoring his forward-thinking imperial and naval policies, and continuing 
to paint his Western Design as a complete failure.  The dissertation shows how 
Cromwell’s Design refurbished popular Elizabethan policies and had a significant impact 
on Caribbean imperial competition.  In order to build his New Model Navy, Cromwell 
garnered support from the same types of men who had once aided Elizabeth’s navy.  
Cromwell reversed the Stuart policies of rejecting privateers as illegitimate to assert state 
control and resuscitated Elizabeth’s far-sighted and ambitious policy of promoting, 
legitimating, and embracing privateering for the furtherance of state interests.  In so 
doing, he recruited the same types of men forced into exile by Elizabeth’s successors and 
the same types of men who had created rover communities throughout the Caribbean 
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during Elizabeth’s reign.  Cromwell, echoing Elizabeth’s maritime imperial policies, 
embraced privateers in order to use them to further his imperial ambitions in the 
Caribbean, and especially in Jamaica.   
This study thus seeks to rehabilitate Cromwell’s Western Design.  The 
dissertation does so by using a framework similar to that of work on the Roanoke and 
Providence Island colonies, a conceptual approach that employs “failure” as a means to 
illuminate important political, strategic, and economic decisions made by the English 
government in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century pertaining to Caribbean 
settlement.7  Scholars often pay lip service to the much-touted truism that “history is told 
by the victors,” but this near-clique has a seed of truth.  Scholars have argued that 
Cromwell’s Western Design largely failed.  The dissertation refutes that contention, and 
instead argues that the endeavor to take a Spanish Caribbean island and expand English 
influence in the Americas was not a failure after all.  Indeed, Cromwell’s Western Design 
had important implications for the future British Empire.8  As the navy sailed initially for 
                                                          
7.  Karen Kupperman remains one of few historians who have studied the Providence Island 
colony and its role in English Atlantic settlement.  The dissertation’s argument regarding the 
“failure” of the Western Designs draws from Kupperman’s argument that by examining failure, 
historians can better understand success: “only through looking at what failed ventures lacked can 
we understand the ingredients of stability and growth.  If the vital components are isolated, then it 
becomes clear that all successful colonies shared key attributes, and the regional differences are 
less fundamental.”  Karen Kupperman, Roanoke: The Abandoned Colony (Totowa, NJ: Rowman, 
1984); Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630–164: The Other Puritan Colony (Cambridge, UK, 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 18-19. 
 
8.  Menna Prestwich, “Diplomacy and Trade in the Protectorate,” The Journal of Modern 
History 22, no. 2 (June 1950); Trevor Burnard, “European Migration to Jamaica, 1655–1780,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly 53, no. 4 (October 1996); Carla Gardina Pestana, The English 
Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); 
Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” Early American Studies: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal 3, no. 1 (Spring 2005).  Pestana does acknowledge that Jamaica became 
an important possession for the English through sugar production in the late eighteenth century. 
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Spanish Hispaniola, Cromwell gave his generals orders to stop at various Caribbean 
islands to recruit any able-bodied seamen, including men engaged in extralegal maritime 
activity.  Scholars have vastly understudied this part of English naval history.  Bernard 
Capp, for one, still one of the foremost English naval scholars, does not even discuss the 
New Model Navy in the Caribbean.9  His only concern is that the majority of the king’s 
navy rebelled and joined Cromwell, securing the Thames and English coastline for the 
Interregnum rule.   
Overall, historians have ignored the entire English Civil War in the Caribbean.  
As prominent Civil War historians have begun to point out, for the last thirty years many 
historians have also largely ignored the 1650s, the early years of the Interregnum.10  By 
exploring the Civil War in the Caribbean, the project thus makes a new scholarly 
contribution.  By rehabilitating Cromwell’s Western Design and reassessing maritime 
policy in the early interregnum, the study promises to add even more credence to its 
claims   that reexamining the importance of the early modern Caribbean in European 
affairs is critical to understanding Anglo-Iberian imperial competition in the Caribbean.  
The experiences of Caribbean settlers during the English Civil War differed from their 
metropolitan counterparts with significant consequences for the development of political 
ideas in the Atlantic versus in Europe. 
In a paradoxical, under-examined, yet vitally important coda, Cromwell’s forces 
lost the battle for Spanish Hispaniola yet took Jamaica as a consolation prize.  Spain 
                                                          
9. Bernard Capp, Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660, (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
 
10. See for instance Jason McElligott and David L. Smith, eds., Royalists and Royalism During 
the Interregnum, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2010). 
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understandably downplayed the significance of the island and did not expect the English 
to succeed there.  England was not initially sure of what they had won.  The army 
constantly complained of the heat and disease, but the naval officers and rovers who 
joined their forces easily settled into Port Royal.  In 1655, Cromwell issued an official 
charter for the city of Port Royal, making it an English city and claiming the colony for 
his new regime.  This chartering also served as a reward to the many rovers and exiles 
who aided the English occupation of the island.  Plantation designs initially begun by 
Cromwell, eventually made Jamaica one of England’s most lucrative sugar colonies.  
Scholars have not fully examined nor fully acknowledged the importance of Cromwell’s 
conquest Port Royal—which was, after all, nicknamed the “Sodom of the New World.”  
The conquest of Port Royal and the settlement of Jamaica were important as a 
convergence of a century of English piracy legislation, Anglo-Spanish imperial 
competition, and a place where outlaws once again found a place within the English state.  
In the struggle for control over the expanding Atlantic World, pirates operated within a 
liminal legal space—used by the government in times of need and prosecuted in times of 
prosperity.  The fine lines of criminality and citizenship established by these legal 
practices and the way in which life in the far-off Caribbean affected these lines, shaped 
the European, and an emerging Caribbean, identity. 
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CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW 
PIRACY AND THE EXPANSION OF ENGLISH ADMIRALTY COURTS FROM 
HENRY VIII TO ELIZABETH I 
 
 
A study of early modern piracy encompasses discussions about diplomacy, 
economics, and most importantly, the laws and legal systems created to define and, 
occasionally, prosecute piracy.  In sixteenth-century England, piracy became the vehicle 
through which a disputed queen and relatively weak government asserted themselves in 
international politics.  Through piracy and subsequent privateering, England inserted 
itself into the competition for influence in the New World.  Domestic rivalries between 
England and Spain intensified imperial competition throughout the Atlantic.  Exploring 
the importance of piracy and the legal methods through which England established itself 
as sovereign of the early modern Atlantic World, this chapter argues that Elizabeth and 
the English Admiralty Court constructed a solid legal case for sovereignty based on 
established precedents—precedents recognized by the various European powers 
involved. 
Developing piracy legislation under Elizabeth I (1558-1603) largely drew on the 
Admiralty Court expansion of her father, Henry VIII (1509-1547), and the organization 
of Henry’s Navy Board.  Elizabeth’s admiralty courts relied heavily on fifteenth- and 
early sixteenth-century precedents and used the debates surrounding piracy and 
privateering legislation to establish the English court as the first attempt at an 
international maritime law court.  A court system that began as a domestic bureaucracy 
and source of revenue developed into a diplomatic and legal tool for Elizabeth.  The 
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courts’ precedents regarding piracy trials allowed England to claim jurisdiction over 
much of the sixteenth-century Atlantic World.   
 
 
The Early Court 
 
 
Piracy had been a problem for the English government for decades.  With the rise 
of commerce and exploration in the New World came a rise in piracy and the need of 
ways to control that piracy.  Originally created in 1260, the Admiralty Court of England 
attended to all manner of maritime concerns from fishing rights to piracy.  Theoretically, 
at the inception of the court, all maritime rights belonged to the Crown.  Every wreck, 
every piece of wreckage, and any fish or bird caught off the coast belonged to the king.  
The king also held the responsibilities of regulating fishing, collecting port dues, and 
maintaining ports.1  Despite the power the courts held in this early stage, and came to 
wield under Elizabeth I, the admiralty courts lost much of their rights and influence in the 
intermediate centuries.  By the sixteenth century, many of these rights had passed into the 
hands of private corporations and private individuals through grants from the Crown. 
Wherever sufficient need of a maritime court existed, that borough or district then 
applied for a “fee farm” from the Crown.  Similar to the medieval practice of burgage, a 
fee farm was essentially rented land and rights from the Crown.2 In the case of English 
                                                          
1.  Edwin Welch, Ed, The Admiralty Court Book of Southampton, 1566–1585 (Southampton, UK: 
Southampton University, 1968), xi. 
2.  “Fee farm” generally refers to the medieval practice of burgage or burgage tenure.  Based on 
custom or a sort of ‘common law’ occupation of land, English could rent certain areas of land 
from the king.  With this rent, came jurisdiction over said land.  Though more traditionally used 
for renting of farmland, under Henry VIII, the practice extended to include the creation of coastal 
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coastal boroughs, officials paid rent for the right to have a royal court and collect 
revenues within that borough.  The revenues collected by borough courts went to 
maintaining their ports and enforcing the king’s admiralty laws.  Thus the king gained 
revenue, and coastal boroughs gained authority through the court.  In many cases, this 
handing over of rights to local parties often led to the corruption of the courts of 
admiralty.  Without a national court to answer to, local officials blurred the letter of the 
law to suit their particular situations.  For a period during the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth centuries, Englishmen regarded the admiralty as a source of profit more than a 
body of law enforcement.  Henry VIII, known for his bureaucratic and opportunistic 
nature, aimed to correct this situation. 
Henry looked to the English coastlines as one possible solution to increase Crown 
control and revenue.  In 1536, in need of money to pay for his annulment hearings and 
the creation of the Anglican Church, Henry also needed to find ways of maintaining his 
royal prerogative and currying favor with those citizens who opposed the “King’s Great 
Matter.”  In that same year, Henry issued the first “Act of Piracy.”  The act created the 
position of the “Vice-Admiral of the Coast” who was to “proceed in matters of 
piracy…according to the order of the laws.”  Also in 1536, Henry added statute laws and 
courts to eliminate the “complications and contradictions” of existing civil and common 
law.  Dissatisfied with the way in which his officials dealt with “Traytors, Pirates, 
Thieves, Murtheres and Confederates upon the Sea,” Henry and his Parliament passed an 
act claiming that in the future all such offenses were to be tried by new commissioners 
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appointed by the Crown.  These new offices included that of Lord High Admiral, his 
lieutenant or deputy, and three of four other “substantial persons.”3  These reforms did 
not completely eradicate corruption.  Henry’s desire to regulate and reorganize the courts 
was, in this case, as with so many others during his reign, hampered by his constant need 
to raise revenue and create support for his reign.  Offices created by administrative and 
legal reforms often wound up in the hands of the wealthy and powerful.  The office of the 
Lord High Admiral was no exception.  Eight Lord High Admirals served under Henry, 
only three of whose careers lasted ten years or longer.  The Lord High Admiral changed 
as political allegiances shifted and as noble purses opened wider in an effort gain political 
favor.  Even so, the expansion of royal borough courts increased the efficiency of the 
admiralty courts and brought them more under the jurisdiction of the King than they had 
been in almost two centuries.  Henry also established the largest and most permanent 
English navy yet.  Only the fleets of the Mediterranean could equal his naval 
advancements and administration. 
Such efforts did not go unnoticed.  Portuguese, Spanish, French, and Dutch sailors 
and diplomats appealed to the English courts to arbitrate and settle maritime disputes 
                                                          
3.  Act 28, Henry VIII, 1536, EEBO 
They were: John de Vere, thirteenth Earl of Oxford: 1485-151), Sir Edward Howard, second 
Duke of Norfolk: 1513, Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey: 1513-1525, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of 
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since the 1490s.4  Compared to the Habsburg, Burgundian, and Venetian dynasties of 
Europe, the new, and often-labeled ‘illegitimate’ Tudor throne held relatively little power 
in European political affairs.  England as a power did begin to grow by leaps and bounds 
under the Tudors, but it was precisely the relative weakness of the early Tudor dynasty 
that encouraged the European nations to seek arbitration of maritime disputes in English 
courts.  Also, despite the initial lack of a cohesive admiralty court system, relying instead 
on the local “fee farm” courts, England still possessed one of the more extensive 
admiralty court systems in early modern Europe. 
Many of the early cases brought to English courts concerned slave-trading rights 
along both the African and Spanish American coasts.  Diplomatic correspondence 
between England, Spain, the Netherlands, and Venice attest to the precedents being set 
for the expansion of English maritime jurisdiction during this period spanning the short 
reigns of Elizabeth’s brother, Edward VI (1547-1553), and sister, Mary I (1553-1558).  
English merchants had established trade with countries like East Friesland, one of the few 
areas outside of Spain’s jurisdiction.  Most of the expansion of English trade, however, 
took merchants to the New World and to Africa—areas over which Spain claimed rule 
and/or in which they claimed trade rights through their Portuguese alliance.  From the 
1530s through the 1550s, English merchants established direct trade with Portuguese 
Brazil and Morocco.5  The English also had a significant trade market in West Africa, 
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Evidence of Their Wills (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 
5.  Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 11.  
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operating out of the Portuguese port of Elmina, Guinea.  In the African port, the English 
set a significant legal precedence set in 1555. 
The correspondence between Portuguese officials in Elmina and the English 
crown illuminates a critical juncture in Anglo-Spanish maritime debates.  At this time, 
prince of Spain and Lord Regent of the Netherlands Philip II (1555-1598), soon to be 
King of Spain (1556) served as king consort to English Queen Mary I.6  Numerous letters 
from the Portuguese officials complained to their Spanish ally about English traders 
interfering in the trade around Elmina, Portugal’s West African trade headquarters.  In 
December of 1555, Portuguese officials wrote specifically to Mary and Philip that 
English merchants “should be ordered to refrain from departing [to Elmina].”  The 
officials complained of the damages caused by such interference, likening the actions to a 
sort of piracy.7   
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The circumstances of this case, involving an English queen, a Spanish king-
consort, and a Spanish ally deferring to an English admiralty court’s decision about 
piracy and contraband activity of supposedly English ships and seamen, makes the 
court’s decision significant for a number of reasons.  As the Portuguese ambassador 
offered no direct proof as to the nationality of the ships, the English court ruled that 
“nothing should be tried which is contrary to justice or impedes the amity which has long 
existed between this realm [England] and Portugal,” and did not advise the king to stop 
the trade.  If such trade was hindered, “it would injure the fortunes of many distinguished 
merchants of [Philip’s] city of London.”8  This complaint, however, was only nominally 
about piracy.  “Contraband” and “piracy” were highly flexible terms in this period, for 
both the accusers and the judges.  In this particular instance, the accusation of contraband 
was used in an attempt to force trade bans on the English and reinforce Portuguese 
authority.  The complaint and the precedent set by the decision held important 
implications for the argument about trade rights and sovereignty over various trade 
routes.  This case demonstrated that “free trade” did not exist, yet questions still remained 
about which country could claim sovereignty over any particular trade route or port of 
trade and how best to regulate such claims.  Furthermore, rather than deal with these 
grievances locally or in a Portuguese court, officials brought the case to an English 
council and debated it in the English courts.9  With far-reaching consequences for the 
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Anglo-Spanish contest soon to follow further west in the Atlantic, cases such as this one 
show how European nations sought English decisions over maritime matters hoping to 
gain sovereignty for themselves, but ultimately recognizing English sovereignty over 
such matters. 
England and Spain had debated nations’ rights to trade for years.  Elizabeth had 
never accepted Spanish sovereignty on the seas and had begun to assert sovereignty over 
the ‘English’ Channel.  The English argued that the seas were free and Englishmen had 
the right to trade “where there was water to float [their] ships.”  Spanish authorities 
continued to cite centuries-old papal bulls, royal proclamations, and the theory of 
occupation to affirm their sole right to trade with their possessions overseas.10  In 1561, 
Philip’s ambassador informed him that Cecil, Elizabeth’s secretary, had claimed that 
“The Pope had no right to partition the world and to give and take kingdoms to 
whomever he pleased,” echoing the statements of Henry VIII and his government a 
generation prior.11  This statement again expressed English disregard of Spanish claims 
when it came to trade for as the ambassador also wrote Philip: “Nothing will bring these 
people to their senses.  They claim to have a right to go to all lands or provinces 
belonging to friendly states without exception.”12  Philip felt he had a right to deny all 
other nations trade in his domain.  After all, he had the pope’s blessing to do so with the 
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1494 Treaty of Tordesillas.  Court decisions regarding piracy under Mary helped Philip 
uphold the papal ruling, but Elizabeth felt no such obligation to Spain as did her sister.13   
Even more galling to Philip was Elizabeth’s refusal to police piracy against Spain 
in the colonies and throughout the Atlantic also directly challenged the authority he had 
claimed for himself in “all the territories in the Western ocean, island or mainland, 
discovered or undiscovered” in the Treaty of Crépy in 1544.14  Philip’s ambassador in 
London wrote in 1558 that the King “deeply resented being interfered with” in his 
western “navigations.”15  On 29 January 1559, in discussing English negotiations with 
France,  Cecil related that: “as to the reports made by Spaniards concerning a treaty 
[Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty] whereby the realm of England rests bound to them, 
[Elizabeth] (thanked be to God) remain[ed] a free prince and owner of her crown and 
people.”16  Elizabeth broke with tradition as her father had broken away from Rome by 
relying on precedents set under none other than her Catholic-crusading sister.  
Aside from the above mentioned 1555 case, the English also answered earlier 
Portuguese ambassadors who complained about Englishmen trading along the coast of 
                                                          
13.  Paul Gottschalk, ed., The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America: The Papal Bulls of 
1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, trans. Paul Gottschalk (Berlin, Germany: P. Gottschalk, 
1927); Christine Shaw, Julius II: The Warrior Pope (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993). 
14.  Herbert Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University, 1953), 7. 
15.  A.F. Pollard.  The Political History of England: From the Ascension of Edward VI to the 
Death of Elizabeth, 1547-1603, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 305. 
16.  Joseph Stevenson, ed., Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1559, Calendar of 
State Papers (London, UK: H.M.S.O, 1863), vol.  I, 107.  Hereafter identified as CSP, Foreign, 
Elizabeth, I. 
   
21 
 
Africa with the argument that only effective occupation meant the English could not trade 
in a particular place.  So long as English traders stayed away from forts and traded with 
independent parties, they could go wherever they pleased.  Further establishing English 
legal precedents, on 25 February 1563, special commissioners of the Admiralty Court 
heard a number of complaints from Spanish subjects seeking return of goods and reprisal 
for spoiled goods and ships.17  The English Court ruled that Spaniards seized other goods 
“contrary to [the Queen’s] proclamation” and they therefore forfeited their goods stated 
in this particular case.18  Such proceedings did not satisfy Spain and in 1564, Philip sent 
an ambassador to propose a conference at Bruges to discuss maritime jurisdiction.  Philip 
objected to the English “constituting themselves judges of the seas as the high seas were 
common property.”19 
Recognition of the English court’s authority also occurred a decade prior.  While 
debating the Portuguese case, Spanish plaintiffs quarreled with the French over a similar 
situation.  Spain proposed the English Admiralty Court as a “suitable tribunal” to try the 
case as England possessed the most extensive maritime court system in Europe.20  In this 
1554 case, a French man-of-war captured a Venetian ship bound for Antwerp.  At the 
time, Charles V (1516-1556), also Charles I, Holy Roman Emperor (1520-1556), ruled 
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Spain and warred with France.  Venice was not part of Charles’ Italian holdings but the 
French still captured the ship on the grounds that it carried vital supplies to Spanish 
troops in the Netherlands.  After the French seized the ship, Dutch pirates then captured 
the French.  Spanish and French authorities appealed to the English courts as to Dutch 
legal claims to the goods.  The courts ruled that the Venetian ship was never a lawful 
prize to the French, therefore the Dutch could not retain it.  Venice recovered its goods.21  
This case served to legitimize English maritime courts’ authority yet again.  Philip’s 
father recognized English maritime jurisdiction once and the English continued to argue 
in favor of the precedent for such claim since they had held such jurisdiction since the 
reign of Henry VIII.  Under Henry, English jurisdiction generally only included the 
waters immediately surrounding England but with this particular 1544 case, the courts’ 
rule expanded and supported the Elizabethan argument for maritime jurisdiction.   
 As English jurisdiction expanded, so did the realm of English pirates.  
Opportunities to broaden their operations and attack every avenue of the African, West 
Indian, and New World trade increased.  English Admiralty court records duly note the 
corresponding rise of Atlantic piracy, often under the veil of privateering.  Some scholars 
have noted the fine legal distinction between piracy and privateering,22 but few have 
connected early domestic English Admiralty courts and legal documents to the 
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development of a global maritime court and establishment of English jurisdiction in the 
Atlantic that supported English privateers.  Elizabethan political scholars largely ignore 
the ramifications of Atlantic piracy on English law and policy.23 The studies of this 
period of piracy, privateering, and expansion become overwhelmingly studies of Sea 
Dogs, the Armada, and diplomatic wrangling.  These are the ‘hot-button’ issues of the 
early Elizabethan reign, but there is more of the story to tell.  The bureaucratization and 
expansion of English Admiralty courts under Henry created the system that allowed for 
and enticed foreign claimants to petition English courts for address of grievances and 
prosecution of trade-interlopers that developed into a burgeoning international maritime 
court of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
“The whole Channel...is infested...”24 
 
In a letter to Philip II in 1570, the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Gerau 
Despes wrote about the infestation of pirates in the English Channel.  He claimed that 
pirates and rovers attacked any and every ship they came across, taking the captured 
ships as their own, thereby ever increasing the size of the English fleet.  Through this 
means, he told Philip, the queen intends “to make war on [your] majesty...without costing 
her anything and under the specious pretence that she is not responsible.”25  Despes knew 
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his subject well.  Tudor England experienced periods of significant naval growth and 
periods of stagnation and decline.  Elizabeth desired to build as her father had, but she did 
not possess the funds to initiate ship-building plans.  In reality, she barely had enough 
money to repair England’s existing fleet.  Historically, ships taken as prizes became a 
part of the captor’s fleet.  Pirates followed the same principal.  Elizabeth, knowing her 
own weaknesses and her fleet’s needs, rarely questioned how a captain obtained his ship.  
When Spanish officials like Despes complained about seizures, Elizabeth, as always, 
referenced her piracy legislation and court precedents.  If the ship was taken as a reprisal, 
it was a legal prize.  The captain then applied for a privateering license and his ship and 
men effectively joined the English fleet at no cost to the government.  This was in large 
part the way in which cash-strapped Elizabeth built her navy. 
 Edward VI does not figure into this particular study beyond his limited 
continuance of Henry VIII’s ship-building plans.  Mary I built a few ships of her own, but 
did not pay a great deal of attention to the workings of the admiralty courts and the Navy 
Board.  She used the courts on occasions when Philip brought cases to her, but she made 
no active effort to expand the courts, let alone maintain them.  Mary did follow a harder 
line against piracy in the last few years of her reign.  This interest of the queen came 
more from her husband than herself.  Philip and Spain had many more ships at sea than 
England and had surprisingly little physical protection for their otherwise intimidating 
galleons.  Stringent piracy laws and effective enforcement of those laws meant a great 
deal to a man looking to protect his treasure-laden fleets.  Elizabeth began her reign by 
prosecuting these same pirates, but her policies towards these men changed quickly.   
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As the sixteenth century progressed, accusations of piracy throughout the Euro-
Atlantic World flooded the courts.  Elizabeth initially used this court system to combat 
domestic piracy rather than influence foreign affairs.  Elizabeth transformed domestic 
piracy into international, state-sponsored privateering during the late 1500s.  Struggling 
to rebuild her father’s navy, and as pirate activity continued fairly unabated, Elizabeth 
began to take note of the profits gained by those practicing the trade.  Through a series of 
proclamations beginning in 1569, she began offering licenses and reprisal letters to those 
men previously prosecuted as “pirates.”  With official license, Englishmen believed that 
they enjoyed every right to seek reprisal from treasure-laden Spanish galleons and other 
Atlantic trade ships.  Philip II and preyed-upon captains appealed to the English courts 
for justice, thus continuing to recognize English authority.  With this support, English 
claims for jurisdiction over naval matters increasingly expanded over Atlantic maritime 
cases.  Anglo-Spanish conflicts ranging geographically from the Carolinas south through 
New Spain appeared in English coastal Admiralty Courts.  In the 1580s, especially, 
mirroring her father’s designs, Elizabeth sponsored a significant expansion of Admiralty 
circuit courts to hear these cases.26 
Many of these early piracy trials did not necessarily center on English pirates.  
The nature of piracy implies a lack of national belonging and sovereign loyalty.  Though 
many of the pirates appearing in the trials operated out of England and neighboring 
Ireland and Scotland, few cases labeled them as “English” pirates.  As lawless rovers—
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without license—they remained simply men of the sea, not of a particular national 
belonging in the eyes of the law.  Though plaintiffs, like Philip, certainly believed many 
of these pirates to be of English origin, the legal proof of such matters was harder to 
ascertain.   
Even Elizabeth’s Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, Julius Caesar, questioned 
the legality of some of these letters.  As the Commissioner for Piracy Causes in 1581, 
Caesar lamented the network of aiders and abettors to piracy throughout the English 
coast.  He claimed that “private warrants or letters [were] in truth not warranted by the 
law,” and that men who illegally obtained them “blunted and disgraced” the letters’ 
authority and purpose.27  Caesar’s zeal for prosecuting pirates earned him his eventual 
appointment to Judge of the High in 1583, but the Queen and her Privy Council 
constantly interceded in Caesar’s cases to make sure that privateers escaped execution or 
extensive prosecution.28  While Caesar did not always agree with the Queen’s policies, he 
readily admitted that the licensing of privateers brought England more than £200,000.29  
Dissenters within Elizabeth’s own government recognized the profit possible from her 
policies.  With Caesar’s appointment, Elizabeth could also show Philip that she 
(superficially) took his complaints into consideration. 
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Only when Elizabeth and the courts began issuing official licenses to these men 
did they become “English” and then, they served the Queen as legal privateers, not as 
lawless pirates.  They held legal reprisal and exploration licenses, thereby once again 
giving them legal authority for their actions against other ships.  The English already 
established their jurisdiction over such maritime matters, now they simply extended that 
authority and jurisdiction, building ever more on the precedents of the preceding 
centuries.30  
Scholars discuss the legal knowledge and language of pirates in the “emerging 
regulatory order of the Atlantic world” in the eighteenth century,31 but too often ignore 
the sixteenth-century roots of that language.  The circumstances of pirates’ and 
privateers’ legal posturing and subsequent jurisdictional claims in the eighteenth century 
differ very little over the course of two centuries.  Such claims cannot be made in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but with the creation of official legal systems whose 
(almost) sole purpose was to deal with these particular maritime cases and claims 
beginning with Henry VIII and reaching an apex under Elizabeth I, English jurisdictional 
claims over domestic maritime and Atlantic matters are important in the same vein that 
scholars make for later periods and various other parts of the sprawling British Empire.  
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Whatever the reasons for reforming and expanding English admiralty courts, and 
no matter the character of the men most present in the cases heard there, the English 
government and crown actively cultivated a legal maritime culture.  Maybe the argument 
should simply be that English explorers and privateers were better educated in “legalese,” 
thus making their claims more successful.  French, Dutch, and Spanish sailors, officials, 
and even crowned heads, helped to establish this authority of the English courts.  In this 
case, it is certainly true that these courts operated and gained their power from the 
“shared understandings of the law of nations” and the need to have a legal order to 
counter the lawlessness of new and expanding territories.32 
If Spaniards did not recognize the authority of the English in these matters—
based on English precedent as well as previous Spanish acknowledgement of English 
right to rule in these cases—then the English claimed the right to question Spanish legal 
authority in colonial Spanish America.  Spain established extensive law courts throughout 
much of their territories including Inquisition courts and consulados, to handle local 
disputes.  The English found themselves subject to these courts on numerous occasions.33  
One example, in 1569, concerned men captured from the “troublesome voyage” of John 
Hawkins.  When both the Spanish civil and Inquisitional courts around San Juan de Ulúa 
tried the men, the English government did not intervene in the proceedings.34  Spain held 
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land jurisdiction in their territories.  The English saw no reason not to claim jurisdiction 
over one of the few territories they could Spanish authority—the Atlantic Ocean.  As 
legal and colonial scholars have begun to point out, these cases are not all that different 
from one another.  Explorers and pirates alike drew on much of the same legal language 
and colonial custom.  The English, for example, did not try to colonize Spanish La 
Florida.  The Roanoke expeditions went to the edges of Spanish North America, 
recognizing effective Spanish occupation.  This implies mutual acknowledgement of 
certain customs, yet Spain refused to concede to the expanding maritime jurisdiction 
being establish by England. 
Elizabethan legislation drew important distinctions between piracy and 
privateering.  Reprisal letters, proclamations, and court rulings all followed specific 
language to uphold these distinctions.  English lip-service did little to quell complaints.  
Numerous Spanish complaints flooded the English courts and Privy Council and 
Elizabeth answered them.35  In the same vein as her 1558 proclamation, her 1560 
proclamation remained moderate in treatment and language towards pirates by offering 
clemency to those willing to come forward.  On report from “some of the subjects of her 
good brother the king of Spain,” Elizabeth acknowledged the large number of pirates 
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operating along her shores despite “the severity of Justice” her Majesty’s courts 
prescribed for the offenses.36  This wording is again important.  Elizabeth’s 1558 
proclamation provided for only mild punishments of pirates, but she claimed that she 
meted out severe penalties for piracy.  Spanish mariners and the Spanish Crown did not 
likely believe the severity of these punishments, but Elizabeth did technically respond to 
Spanish complaints.  In the 1560 proclamation she reiterated the invalidity of “certain old 
letters of reprisals” issued before 1558.37  This proclamation also called for a registration 
of pirates, including their names, where they operated, and even a list of their exploits.38  
If seamen followed these orders, the Admiralty Court issued them pardons from court 
proceedings they would have faced if captured by the Queen’s ships.  Once again, in 
closing, the Queen charged her officers to “have a diligent and carefull eye” for any such 
piratical offences “as [officials] will answer for the contrary at their utmost peril.”39  
Elizabeth acknowledged Spanish complaints and made political overtures to address the 
subject of those grievances.  Before issuing any more “severe” punishments for piracy, 
Elizabeth first gave all pirates an opportunity to turn themselves in and legalize their 
exploits.  Submission to Elizabeth’s royal authority was emphasized over actual 
                                                          
36.  Declaration 1560/1, EEBO. 
37.  Declaration 1560/1, EEBO. 
38.  The proclamation read, “Before her Majesty will extend her force of arms or Justice against 
any of these sundry Pirates, her Majestie warneth them all to return with speed, either to their 
dwelling places, or to the next port that they may attain unto after the notice hereof, and there to 
geve knowledge of their names and dwelling places, and of all their enterprises done either by 
themselves, or by such in whole company they were, while they were upon the Seas.”  
Declaration, 1560/1, EEBO. 
39.  Declaration 1560/1, EEBO. 
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punishment.  With this legislation Elizabeth thus began to draw the thin line between 
pirates and privateers. 
As in the previous document, Elizabeth remained very conciliatory towards 
pirates in her realm.  She offered them a way to escape prosecution simply by returning 
to port and admitting their transgressions.  Records of identified pirates could also serve 
as a pool of potentially useful privateers in the future.  If pirates did as suggested, “her 
Majesty [would be] content to show [them] favor and mercy.”40  Should they not take this 
opportunity, they would suffer “extreme punishments as they deserved, to the example of 
all others” though none of these “extreme punishments” were specified.41  Matters of 
religion within England, especially during the first years of Elizabeth’s reign, often 
overshadowed any of these proclamations on piracy and Admiralty Court issues and 
thereby also overshadowed any efforts to enforce such legislation.  This situation affected 
the careful crafting of the language of the documents.  Elizabeth did not have the time 
and resources to effectively deal with these problems.   
Some scholars claim that only weak rulers with inadequate naval forces had to 
“tolerate” piracy because “it was the only naval power available.”42  Previous English 
rulers attempted to use piracy for national profit and witnessed a general spike in piracy 
                                                          
40.  Declaration 1560/1, EEBO. 
41.  Declaration 1560/1, EEBO. 
42.  N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (New 
York, NY: Harper Collins, 1997), 116. 
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in the absence of an effective Royal Navy,43 but Elizabeth hoped that by enticing pirates 
to gain new letters and turn in other pirates with the promise of pardon for their own 
actions, she might be able to remedy the problem to some extent.44  Whether Elizabeth’s 
original intention or not, the jurisdictional frameworks and legal procedure these acts 
began to “foster” proved beneficial and significant in the following decades.  Most 
importantly, other European powers soon recognized these declarations and legal 
procedures. 
 The Admiralty Court grew substantially under Elizabeth.  With the expansion of 
English maritime endeavors into the Atlantic, English courts saw it as only natural to 
extend their jurisdiction to all maritime affairs affecting English property and subjects.  
Rising tensions with Spain, especially, contributed to the issuance of yet another piracy 
proclamation on 31 July 1564.  The opening of this proclamation asserted the Queen’s 
“good and perfect peace with all Princes and Countreys” and her desire “with the 
assistaunce of almighty God, to continue in the same.”45  Elizabeth commanded that “all 
manner of ships and vessels armed for war…shall with all speed return from the Seas and 
                                                          
43.  In the thirteenth century, Edward I, for one, also issued royal license to “pirates.”  Edward II 
and Edward III continued the practice to some extent.  The Edwards also began the practice of 
summoning royal councils to address English naval affairs.  Under Edward III, in 1338, only 14 
of 361 ships in English service belonged to king—a situation Elizabeth also experienced during 
her early reign.  Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 116–18, 124–28.  Hence Elizabeth’s more 
favorable attitude towards piracy and privateering as a supplement to her official navy. 
44.  Elizabeth also employed (whether knowingly or not) some of the tactics of the fabled Henry 
V (1413-1422).  Henry actively pursued the building of a navy, recognizing the possible 
advantages of naval warfare in an infantry-centered world.  Henry, unfortunately, did not have the 
court system to follow up attacks on pirates that impeded his progress and threatened his 
authority.  See Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, 221ff.  This system only began to blossom under 
Tudor rule. 
45.  1564 Proclamation, EEBO. 
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unarm themselves.”46  The English claimed the right to seize ships that came into English 
ports or threatened the Channel with guns unless they had “already given good and 
sufficient surety not to offend any of the Subjects of the Kings and Princes with whom 
her Majesty [was] in amity.”47  Just how many men followed this order, and how many 
the Queen fully expected to do so, is debatable.   
Events in the Spanish Caribbean in 1568 changed the nature and importance of 
Elizabeth’s earlier proclamations concerning piracy.  As of a result of English pirate 
activity, Spain lost numerous shipments of gold and silver from its colonies meant to 
finance Spanish efforts in subduing the Dutch.  Hawkins’ “troublesome voyage” 
produced, arguably, the first official acts of war from both England and Spain.  The 
Spanish viceroy in San Juan de Ulúa ordered the seizure of Hawkins’ ships docked in the 
port for repairs.  Some of the crew escaped, bringing word of the attack swiftly back to 
England.  In disguised retaliation, Elizabeth allowed the seizure of a Genoese ship 
carrying money for Spanish troops in the Netherlands.  The ship, part of a fleet carrying 
bullion supposedly amounting to almost £150,000 to pay troops under the Duke of Alva 
in the Netherlands, took shelter from bad weather in the Channel in English ports.48  
English authorities, eager to seize this opportunity, and in full knowledge of Spain having 
loaned the money from Genoese bankers, instantly raised questions about the ownership 
                                                          
46.  1564 Proclamation, EEBO. 
47.  1564 Proclamation, EEBO. 
48.  Amount of the loan stated in Allan Crosby, ed., Vol. IX, Foreign Series, of the Reign of 
Elizabeth I, 1569–1571, Calendar of State Papers (London, UK: H. M. S. O., 1874); Pollard, 
Political History, 284. 
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of the bullion.  Legally, the money still belonged to the Genoese as the loan did not 
become effective until the money reached Antwerp.  The English exploited this technical 
loophole.  As a “precaution against theft,” English authorities unloaded the treasure.49  
Ambassador Despes believed that Elizabeth confiscated the treasure for the express 
purpose of damaging Spanish efforts in the Netherlands.50  Despes was likely correct in 
this assumption but the seizure of the Spanish bullion was also in response to the recent 
attack at San Juan and the gold became a hostage for reparations.   
Existing treaties stated that an arrest of English goods required a formal complaint 
of grievance and denial of redress.51  Spanish authorities rarely followed such process 
before confiscating English goods.  For this reason, Elizabeth could technically claim “a 
breach of treaty and unwarranted aggression” which gave her justification for seizing 
Spanish goods in England and placing Despes under house arrest for his part in the 
affair.52  Since Brussels consorted with the Spanish government in this matter, Elizabeth 
claimed the right to seize their goods abroad as well.53  On 6 January 1569, England 
suspended all trade with Spain and Spanish territories.54  Elizabeth’s subsequent 
                                                          
49.  James Williamson, The Age of Drake, (London, UK: Adam and Charles Black, 1938), 99. 
50.  G.D. Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands: The End of the 
Antwerp Mart, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 1986); 103. 
51.  MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 188–95; Geoffrey Parker, The Grand 
Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1998), 156; Williamson, The Age of 
Drake, 99; Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants, 90–111. 
52.  MacCaffrey, Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime, 188–95; Williamson, The Age of Drake, 99. 
53.  Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants, 90–111. 
54.  Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5: 15–17. 
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proclamation referred to “circumstances relating to the arrest of her subjects, and their 
goods in the Low countries” and protested that their seizure “was done in retaliation of 
the stay of certain Spanish ships and money [and] was not correct.”55  Citing her earlier 
legislation, this proclamation further claimed that “the said [Spanish] vessels were 
protected from the French.”56  Asserting her authority, Elizabeth also stated that: “by all 
lawful custom and usage she had a right to borrow the said money, it being the property 
of private merchants, and being saved from the perils of the sea on her territory.”57  
Again, the language of this proclamation is extremely important especially 
considering the rising tensions in the Netherlands.  This proclamation proved crucial to 
English maritime policy in a few very short years from its publication.  In asserting the 
English right and practice of protecting not just English subjects, but all of the subjects of 
England’s allies from attack and spoil at sea, Elizabeth claimed the right to protect 
shipping and prevent threats upon the Netherlands as the Dutch were subjects of the 
Spanish king.  Elizabeth and her “good brother” Philip claimed alliance and therefore no 
grounds existed for arguing against this legislation.  After all, Elizabeth claimed she was 
protecting his subjects.  Presaging the arguments of seventeenth-century lawyer and 
scholar, Hugo Grotius, Elizabeth upheld ancient law and custom by showing herself 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Three days prior, Dutch merchant Jan Heermans wrote to his colleague, Jan den Vackerren that 
“there [was] great talk about a war between the King of Spain and this Queen [Elizabeth].”  
Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 4:9. 
55.  Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5. 
56.  Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5. 
57.  Crosby, CSP, Elizabeth, Foreign, 1569–1571, 5. 
   
36 
 
willing to “submit to arbitration” and to “help the weak and innocent.”58  Once again, 
Philip found himself constrained by English jurisdictional claims and diplomatic 
maneuvering.   
Many factors affected Philip’s actions, or lack of action in this case.  At the time, 
Spain faced mounting Turkish preparations in the Mediterranean, Dutch unrest, and the 
ascension of the new, non-Catholic English Queen.  With these distractions, Philip first 
attempted diplomacy with England.  In fact, some scholars argue that Philip’s somewhat 
restrained responses to Elizabethan maritime policy came from a strange protection of the 
Queen.  Letters from Philip show his apologies for not responding promptly to some of 
the Queen’s letters, asking her to keep in communication with him.  As one historian 
notes, these letters show that, in the early years, Philip missed his best chance to exploit 
England’s weakness and keep the Queen dependent on him.59 
Philip did not necessarily acquiesce to the authority of the English courts, but he 
did not challenge them directly.  Dealing with long-distance communication and the rash 
actions of his ambassador Despes, while constantly teetering on the brink of war, Philip 
reached out to the Duke of Alba in the Netherlands, and even to Mary Stuart, Queen of 
Scots.  Alba’s inclusion meant one more opinion to consider.  Mary Stuart’s involvement 
meant further degrading Philip’s relationship with Elizabeth as Mary helped plot a 
                                                          
58.  Hugonis Grotii, Mare Liberum Sive de Ivre Quod Batavis Competit an Indicana Commercia, 
Dissertatio [The Freedom of the Sea Or, The Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in 
the East Indian Trade], trans. Ralph van Deman Magoffin, Carnegie Endowment for 
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serious of treasonous plots against Elizabeth.  A series of victories for the Dutch inspired 
Alba to advise Philip against opening another warfront against England at the time.  
Philip’s acquiescence to Elizabethan claims over the Genoese seizure came as much from 
the strain of ruling his empire as from the legitimacy of the arguments.60   
Elizabeth made a conscious, calculated decision to embrace piracy.  She and her 
government did not support all piracy.  Proscribed punishment became more severe and 
even “aiders and abettors” became subject to prosecution.  In all fairness, despite the 
increasing of punishment for such offenses, the wording of the laws by the 1570s and 
1580s actually allowed for increased practice of “piracy”—so long as pirates channeled 
their attacks in the right direction, meaning away from English concerns.  In these years, 
the number of actual prosecutions of pirates decreased while the number of now 
“privateers” steadily increased.61  
As to the privateering licenses themselves, men certainly found illegal ways of 
obtaining licenses.  The issue of criminality and using criminals to promote settlement 
and law offers an intriguing avenue through which to study the development of authority, 
and eventually empire itself.  Not only did pirates themselves become the subject of 
discussion, but also the aiders and abettors and the corruption of courts and governments 
that issued or ignored illegal licenses.  Certainly, men forged some of these papers, but 
                                                          
60.  This incident is discussed by Conyers Read, “Queen Elizabeth’s Seizure of the Duke of 
Alva’s Pay-Ships,” Journal of Modern History, v (1933), 443-464; Ramsay, The Queen’s 
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men could fairly easily obtain letters through legal channels.  If seamen acquired these 
letters through such official means, the pirate can be viewed in much the same light as the 
colonized South American Indians—“subaltern”62 groups who found ways to work 
within the colonizing government that meant to police and control them.  If 
historiography then praises the “manipulation” of Spanish court systems by these 
marginalized groups, then pirates deserve some rehabilitation and praise for their 
ingenuity of exploitation and adaptation.  
 Perhaps one of the reasons that English legal posturing proved so successful is 
that Elizabeth’s piracy and privateering legislation was much more conciliatory than 
persecutory.  This argument is not entirely new that there was a very fine line between 
piracy and privateering, but the particular posturing and language of royal declarations 
and admiralty law deserves greater analysis.  Even if the decision to create privateers 
from pirates was initially ad hoc, the English crown and government established a 
concrete and detailed system to surround that decision.  This decision was not simply a 
‘quick-fix,’ but rather developed into an integral part of Elizabethan legislation and 
foreign policy.  Men, pirate or privateer, who strayed from the law faced prosecution.   
                                                          
62.  I use the term “subaltern” here for the sake of argument.  Based on readings and conference 
presentations I have attended, I find a fairly significant disconnect between European historians’ 
definition and use of the term “subaltern” and that of Latin American historians.  For European 
historians, subaltern largely means “minority voice.”  The Latin American context of the word is 
much more complicated.  Following Gayatari Spivak’s arguments, I tend to argue that a true 
subaltern does not even exist.  Minorities’ voices, or “oppressed groups” as Spivak labels them, 
certainly exist, but are they necessarily subaltern?  It is an issue that certainly needs further 
developing between the two historiographies.  Gayatari Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in 
Postcolonial Studies Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft, et al (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006 
(reprint)), 27–35.  See also Matthew Restall, “A History of the New Philology and the New 
Philology in History,” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 113–34. 
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 The “fine line” symbolized a series of distinctions and laws surrounding 
privateering and drawing clear distinctions from piracy.  As evidence of dissemination of 
these ideas, William Shakespeare’s plays also draw distinctions between the criminal 
pirate and the loyal privateer.  Pirates, noted through their dress, speech, and port of 
origin, are starkly contrasted to loyal soldiers who go “cheerly to the sea” for their 
country and sovereign.63  Shakespeare describes base pirates as “white-livered and red-
faced,” villainous, and unmanly.64  Pirates remained borderless criminals subject to the 
full punishment of the courts.  Privateers were subjects of the crown with recourse to 
appeal. 
                                                          
63.  This description comes from Henry V, 2.2, ll. 201.  Shakespeare, Henry V, Barbara Mowat 
and Paul Werstine, eds., (New York, NY: Washington Square Press, 1995).  Printed for the 
Folger Shakespeare Library.  Henry V was first performed in 1586 and published in 1600. 
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CHAPTER III 
FORTIFICATION, SUPPLY, AND FINANCE: ANGLO-SPANISH COMPETITION IN 
THE NEW WORLD 
 
 As England began constructing their international maritime court and justification 
for extending their maritime jurisdiction into the Atlantic World, Englishmen envisioned 
the possibility of an overseas empire to rival their Spanish neighbors.  Sixteenth-century 
legal practices encouraged English seamen to explore, venturing farther into Atlantic 
trade routes, by offering them a degree of protection as privateers.  The nature of English 
imperial expansion, built upon privateering, differed markedly from that of the 
established Spanish colonial power.  Spain built and held its empire through the 
Requerimiento,1 provincial courts, and fortifications.  England’s empire grew out of the 
establishment of supply bases along the American coastline from which to strike Spanish 
Atlantic fleets.  Controlling supplies meant prosperity.  Fortifications did little good if not 
adequately supplied.  English maritime strategy in this contest for imperial dominance 
resulted in English colonies in North America and the Caribbean, and the decline of 
Spanish colonial power. 
Some Englishmen made voyages into and across the Atlantic in the fifteenth 
century, but those expeditions largely failed.  England, and most of Europe, hoped to 
emulate the success of Spain.  Columbus’ 1492 arrival in Hispaniola first established the 
Spanish presence in the New World.  Within decades, Spanish influence spread 
throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America.  Tudor England desired its 
                                                          
1.  The “requirement” informed indigenous groups about the Spanish right to colonize based on 
religious right.  See, for instance, Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession: Europe’s Conquest of 
the New World, 1492-1640, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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own such dynasty.  As the English ventured into the New World, the English and Spanish 
crowns found themselves focusing more and more on their Atlantic policies.  Spain began 
building fortifications in La Florida and Mexico to combat English privateers.  The 
disruption of wealth to Spain and profit made by England through these endeavors and 
their methods of finance, led to a changing power structure back in Europe and in the 
New World.  
By 1497, the English also sent ships across the Atlantic.  The English sailed north 
to avoid crossing into Spanish territory.  Pope Alexander VI issued the Treaty of 
Tordesillas in 1494 dividing the world between the Spain and Portugal and, as England 
remained Catholic at this time, they sought to avoid conflicts with their brethren by 
respecting the treaty.2  Sailing the northern route, John Cabot discovered Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland in 1497.  The following year, he sailed down the American coast, but got 
lost around the Chesapeake.  Englishmen hold that with these voyages, the English 
discovered America first while the Spaniards occupied themselves with the Indies.  3  
Columbus did not actually reach North America until his later voyages.  Cabot’s son, 
Sebastian, continued his father’s mission and, in finding Hudson Strait, thought he had 
discovered the North-West passage to the Pacific.4 
Such amicable relations with Spain would not last long.  By the 1530s, Henry 
                                                          
2.  Pope Julius II revised the treaty’s provisions in a papal bull of 1506.  See Paul Gottschalk, 
editor and translator, The Earliest Diplomatic Documents on America; the Papal Bulls of 1493 
and the Treaty of Tordesillas, (Berlin: P. Gottschalk, 1927).  For Julius II, see Christine Shaw, 
Julius II: The Warrior Pope, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993). 
 
3.  A.L. Rowse, The Elizabethans and America: The Trevelyan Lectures at Cambridge, 1958 
(New York: Harper Colophon, 1959), 3-4. 
 
4.  Rowse, Elizabethan in America, 3-4. 
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VIII, the former “Defender of the Faith,” decided to annul his marriage to his wife, the 
Spanish princess Catherine of Aragon, in order to marry an English courtier, Anne 
Boleyn so that he might finally have a male heir.5  The Pope, trying to balance his 
decision within the power struggle among the papacy, the Spanish monarchy and the 
English monarchy, would not issue Henry an annulment.  Therefore, in 1534, Henry 
issued the Act of Succession formally creating the Church of England and officially 
severing English ties with Rome and Catholicism.  This act also made the young Mary, 
daughter of Henry and Catherine, illegitimate and nullified the young princess’ 
engagement to Charles I/V (1500-1558), King of Spain (1516) and Holy Roman Emperor 
(1530).6  Diplomatic ties between England and Spain were shattered. 
In the years following the Act of Succession, England found itself too occupied 
with court intrigue, Henry’s numerous divorces, and religious matters to focus any 
significant attention on colonizing the New World.  Issues of trade and authority on the 
seas would become an issue again as Mary ascended the English throne in 1553 and 
finally married a Spanish king in Charles’ son, Philip II, in 1554.  Mary, a Catholic 
herself, allowed her husband almost free reign in matters concerning the sea.  
Charles almost single-handedly negotiated his son’s marriage treaty to the Tudor 
Queen.  Philip, a decade younger than his proposed Queen, objected to his father’s initial 
treaty.  Only after the parties agreed on provisions of the treaty, did Charles present his 
son with the offer.  Ever proud, the soon-to-be Philip II (1555) objected to certain aspects 
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6.  Statues of the Realm, (London, UK: G. Eyre and A. Strahan, 1810-1828), iii, 471.  Printed by 
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of the treaty including provisions that any heirs produced by the union would remain in 
England, and that those heirs would lay claim to the Low Countries.7  The official 
language of the treaty stated that “the Most Serene Prince Philip will enjoy the style, 
honor, and kingly name of the realms and dominions pertaining to the said Most Serene 
Queen…while preserving the rights, laws, privileges, and customs of the same realms 
and dominions.”  Mary, first and foremost a Tudor, would not give away complete 
control of her kingdom, despite her long-held desire to return England to Catholicism and 
rejoin England to her mother’s Spain.  Even so, Mary recognized Philip’s objections to 
specific terms of the treaty.8   
Though Charles did write to his son that, “as to the secret matter,” the Queen 
agreed with Philip, in reality, Philip had little to disagree with in the treaty.  All in all, the 
treaty assured him a fairly equal place on the English throne provided he not promote 
foreigners or take munitions from the realm.9   
Aside from religious unease, many Englishmen worried that this marriage would 
result in England becoming a Spanish province and be dominated by Spanish concerns 
not often in alignment with, or in the best interest of, the politics of the English realm.  
Soon after the marriage took place, those concerns were realized as the Spanish 
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8.  Copia de la capitulación de la casamiento, AGS Estado 807, fol. 36, 2 and Philip’s objections 
in escriptura ad cautelam, AGS Estado 807, 36, 1, 4 January 1554. 
 
9.  Kamen and Loades agree that Philip did not object too strongly to the treaty.  Kamen, Spain’s 
Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763, (London, UK: Penguin, 2002); D. 
M. Loades, England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce, and Policy, 1490-1690, (Harlow, 
UK: Longman, 2000). 
44 
 
 
connection brought England into the Franco-Spanish conflict of the 1550s.  Though the 
marriage treaty stated that “England shall not be entangled with the war between the 
emperor [Charles V] and the French king,” Mary did indeed join the fray.  England and 
France had long been enemies and Mary was eager to please her husband.  The marriage 
treaty further stipulated that: “Philip, as much as he can, shall see peace observed 
between France and England, and give no cause of breach, but may assist in defense of 
his lands and revenge of his injuries.”10  On this last statement came the justification for 
English involvement according to Philip and his Catholic wife. 
This last provision of the marriage treaty also allowed for Philip to assert control 
over English seamen, traders, and, most importantly, plunderers and pirates.  In June and 
September of 1556, the council to the king, and the king writing to Mary from Ghent 
addressed the presence of and attacks by pirates.  Mary immediately sent out ships 
against the pirates.11  Mary’s pursuit of these errant seamen began English intervention 
for the Spanish cause.  On 9 June 1557, Mary and Philip issued a proclamation licensing 
privateers.12  The proclamation allowed subjects to: “equip ships at their own charges for 
the annoyance of the French…without penalty.”13  Despite this licensure and its proposed 
purpose, the ships were not to be armed, nor munitions taken from any ship.14  Following 
Mary’s earlier appeasement of Philip’s entreaties for the discontinuation of English 
                                                          
10.  Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 279-280; TNA, CSP 11/11, no. 24.   
 
11.  Knighton, CSP Domestic, Mary, 124, 239-240; TNA, CSP 11/9, nos. 13, 33. 
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attacks on his ships and their disruption of Spanish trade,15 this proclamation addressed 
not only trade in the English Channel (largely to the Netherlands), but extended 
prohibitions of trade to include all areas of Spanish trade and also allowed Spain, through 
England, to trade in even more parts of the world. 
English merchants established trade with regions like East Friesland, one of the 
few areas outside of Spain’s jurisdiction.  Most of the expansion of English trade, 
however, took merchants to the New World and to Africa—areas that Spain claimed rule 
over under the Treaties of Alcáçovas and Tordesillas.16  As early as the 1530s and 1540s 
Englishmen traded goods through Spain to America.  During these decades the practice 
of trading directly from England to Brazil also grew.  Iberian traders in England helped to 
establish direct English trade with Morocco as well.17   
Some merchants even began trading with Guinea in West Africa in the 1550s, but 
Mary I banned commercial voyages there in response to Philip’s numerous protests.18  On 
27 October 1555, the council to the king wrote that the Portuguese ambassador 
complained often of English ships trading at Elmina in Guinea.  As the ambassador 
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offered no direct proof as to the nationality of the ships, the council, “[thought] it fair 
nothing should be tried which is contrary to justice or impedes the amity which has long 
existed between this realm [England] and Portugal,” and did not advise the king to stop 
the trade.  If such trade was hindered, “it would injure the fortunes of many distinguished 
merchants of [Philip’s] city of London.”19  This correspondence came as a response to 
Philip’s agreement during the previous months to meet Portuguese objections to English 
designs on the Guinea trade.20   
By December, the situation changed.  On 18 December 1555, the council wrote 
instead that, after much discussion, they felt that Philip should order English merchants to 
“refrain from departing, as was commanded in the names of your majesties at the start of 
last summer.”21  The council wrote further discussed the case of one merchant, Antonio 
Guarras, who sought to trade in Guinea, a Spanish-allied port.  In a statement to Philip, 
they warned the king of the harm caused to the king because of English licensing 
practices.  By granting licenses too easily, the English Crown exempted these men from 
paying the taxes owed in the Guinea trading ports, and to the Crown for trading rights.  
Playing upon the diminution of “his majesties’ taxes” thereby, the council sought “to 
avoid many deceits always done under pretext of these licences” and urged the queen to 
recall these licenses.22  By bowing to Spanish influence in the region and to the concerns 
of Philip’s exchequer, Mary and her council supported Philip’s arguments that he 
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possessed the power and right to deny all other nations trade in his domain.  After all, he 
had the pope’s blessing to do so.  The king, with support of his English queen, thus bound 
English subjects to the Treaty of Tordesillas.  Even though the treaty officially 
recognized Portuguese control of Guinea, Portugal remained a Spanish ally.  Upholding 
Portuguese claims against English encroachment, also gave Philip grounds to expand his 
support of the treaty for Spanish lands.  Furthermore, in 1556, Philip also convinced 
France to end their trade to the West Indies unless under special license from him.23  
Needless to say, such license became more difficult to obtain. 
In 1558, Philip lost his English ally with the death of his wife, Queen Mary.  
Protestant Princess Elizabeth succeeded her sister.  While Elizabeth well understood her 
new and uncertain position in international politics, she felt no obligation to Spain or to 
much of her sister’s political agenda.  Elizabeth paid little regard to the Treaty of 
Tordesillas or to the papal bulls surrounding the treaty that divided the New World 
between Spain and Portugal.24  Even more galling to Philip was Elizabeth’s refusal to 
police piracy against Spain in the colonies and throughout the Atlantic that directly 
challenged the authority he claimed for himself (and the King of Portugal) in “all the 
territories in the Western ocean, island or mainland, discovered or undiscovered” in the 
Treaty of Crépy in 1544.25  Philip’s ambassador in London wrote in 1558 that the King 
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For Julius II, see Christine Shaw, Julius II: The Warrior Pope, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993). 
 
25.  Quoted in Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 7. 
48 
 
 
“deeply resented being interfered with” in his western “navigations.”26  On 29 January 
1559, in discussing English negotiations with France, William Cecil, hereafter referred to 
as Lord Burghley, related that: “as to the reports made by Spaniards concerning a treaty 
[Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty] whereby the realm of England rests bound to them, 
[Elizabeth] (thanked be to God) remain[ed] a free prince and owner of her crown and 
people.”27 
England and Spain had debated nations’ rights to trade for years.  The English 
argued that the seas were free and Englishmen maintained the right to trade “where there 
was water to float [their] ships” while Spain continued to cite centuries-old papal bulls, 
royal proclamations, and the theory of occupation to affirm their sole right to trade with 
their possessions overseas.28  In 1561, Philip’s ambassador informed him that Lord 
Burghley, Elizabeth’s secretary, claimed that “The Pope had no right to partition the 
world and to give and take kingdoms to whomever he pleased.”29  This statement again 
expressed English disregard of Spanish claims when it came to trade for as the 
ambassador also wrote Philip, “Nothing will bring these people to their senses.  They 
claim to have a right to go to all lands or provinces belonging to friendly states without 
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exception.”30   
The English answered earlier Portuguese ambassadors who complained about 
Englishmen trading along the coast of Africa with the argument that only effective 
occupation meant the English could not trade in a particular place.  So long as English 
traders stayed away from forts and traded with independent parties, they could go 
wherever they pleased.31  This would certainly be their opinion in the New World as well. 
Little heeding Philip’s protests, amid the growing tensions between Spain and the 
Netherlands just across the English Channel, Elizabeth increased her promotion and 
encouragement of privateering even more in the 1560s and 1570s.  Her piracy and 
privateering policies in the 1560s were in their infancy, but were by no means a novel 
enterprise.  But the year 1568/9 would prove a turning point in both these policies and 
English and Spanish New World “policies” as well.  In that year, John Hawkins made his 
third voyage to the West Indies.  Hawkins had been a trader (notably a slave trader) under 
the reign of Mary and Philip and continued his enterprise under Elizabeth.   
Hawkins’ amity with Spanish traders, strained as it was with the growing Anglo-
Spanish tensions in the Atlantic as well as in Europe, reached a violent end in 1568 on his 
third “troublesome” voyage.  32  In the summer of that year, Hawkins’ fleet sailed for the 
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New World to sell slaves acquired from the African coast—a trade Philip explicitly 
denied to Englishmen based on the Treaties of Tordesillas and Crépy.  Elizabeth paid 
little heed to Philip’s declarations and did not discourage individuals from pursuing 
various trade missions.  She even lent Hawkins two 700-ton ships to undertake the 
voyage.33  With royal ships as escorts, such voyages lost their peaceful appearance and by 
setting out armed seemed almost “designed to fight.”34  As the fleet began to sail back to 
England, a hurricane battered the ships and forced them down the Mexican coast.  
Limping along outside of San Juan de Ulúa, the entrance to Vera Cruz, one of the great 
silver export towns of the Spanish Empire, Hawkins’ requested a truce with the Spanish 
officials there for a period of a few days in order to repair and supply his broken ships.35   
                                                          
33.  After delivering and selling his slaves at the port of Santa Marta and various other ports 
along the Mexican coast, Hawkins’ fleet began the trip back to England in August, 1568.  A 
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the Spanish port of San Juan de Ulúa.  Having claimed the sole right to this trade, the Spanish 
highly resented the flagrant disregard of their authority—especially since Hawkins’ shipments 
created a price competition in what had been a Spanish monopoly.  Philip Gosse, Hawkins: 
Scourge of Spain, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1930), 12. 
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Once in harbor, however, the truce quickly fell apart.  The newly-arrived Spanish 
viceroy ordered an attack on Hawkins’ fleet.  San Juan de Ulúa was one of the better 
equipped forts in the Spanish Empire.  Guarding Vera Cruz, the launching point for the 
plate fleets, San Juan de Ulúa had to be well-equipped.  Therefore, a number of Spanish 
ships and men stood ready to arm against their Anglo enemies.  The English discovered 
the plot, but not with enough time for escape.  Following the skirmish, only two of 
Hawkins’ ships limped back to England.  Francis Drake, Hawkins’ cousin and second in 
command, managed to make his way back to England on 20 January 1569.  Hawkins 
arrived at Plymouth on 15 January 1569 and reached London on 4 February 1569.36   
The news they brought (and the news that preceded their arrival) prompted 
seizures of ships in English ports waiting to transport Spanish monies to the Netherlands.  
In response, Margaret of Parma, Philip’s sister in charge of the Netherlands, issued 
embargoes on English shipping.37  Following these events, Elizabeth opened her letter to 
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Philip with an expression of her sorrow for the “turbulent conditions” of the Netherlands 
that required such loans, though closed the letter with a complaint that Alva’s seizure of 
English goods and men “were in direct violation of different treaties.”38  She then signed 
the letter expressing her “good will and desire for keeping peace.”39  Despite Elizabeth’s 
and Philip’s contrivances at peace, they unofficially declared war one another by 1569.40 
Philip’s ambassador in London, Don Gerau Despes, whom Elizabeth placed on 
house arrest following his conniving with Alva, wrote to Philip that the English “demand 
[that they] shall enjoy their liberties…that they shall be free to go with merchandise to 
the Indies, and neither in Flanders nor in Spain shall they be molested in person or 
property for their heresies.”41  According to Despes, these were “absurd pretensions,” just 
as the previous arguments of the English to trade rights upon the sea were fallacious and 
illogical.42  Philip also thought it absurd that the English ambassador expected to follow 
his own religion in Spain since the Spanish Inquisition's purpose was to make the 
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position of heretics intolerable in Spanish dominions.43  Philip expanded his restriction to 
Spanish colonies thus attaching religious justification to his prohibition of English trade 
“on pain of death.” 44  Spain insisted on the altruistic, missionizing aims of its actions in 
the New World, bringing religion directly into the discussions about New World and 
foreign policy.   
At least, Philip tried to make it appear so.  Philip even went so far as to expel 
Elizabeth’s ambassador, Dr. John Man, or “that dogmatising scamp” as Philip referred to 
him, from Seville.45  These actions “provoked the counter-resolve to make an end of 
Spanish dominion” whenever and wherever possible.  Increasingly aggressive English 
commercial expansion assumed a “character of a political and religious contest” lacking 
elsewhere for the English (particularly referring to the Netherlands).46  Even so, English 
maritime expansion remained more political than religious.  Englishmen could use 
religious beliefs as justification for encroaching upon and raiding Spanish shipping but 
anticipated revenues outweighed religiosity.   
Increasing imperial competition and heightened political debates spurred changes 
in English and Spanish New World policies.  At the very least, competition and debate 
made New World considerations a staple of domestic negotiations between Spain and 
England.  For one, the English intensified and expanded the licensing process for 
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privateers.  They also began making plans for more permanent supply towns along the 
North American coast to help aid and offer repairs to privateering fleets operating in the 
Spanish Atlantic.  In response, the Spanish government increased their funding for the 
building and equipping of fortresses along the Mexican, Florida, and Caribbean 
coastlines.  The events at San Juan de Ulúa and Elizabeth’s response also demonstrated 
the inevitable intertwining of the issues of maritime law and foreign policy.  Spain, who 
attempted to establish their claims in the New World with effective occupation in all 
areas, proceeded to address English encroachments on those territories.   
In the early sixteenth century, Spain expanded into the southern parts of the 
United States from Florida but did little to nothing to solidify their claim there for nearly 
twenty years.  As diplomacy failed, Spain looked to fortify its New World territories, 
quadrupling the amount of money sent there for defense.47  Previously, in 1562 and 1564, 
the French established posts at Port Royal Sound in South Carolina, and Fort Caroline in 
Florida.  French presence spurred Spaniards to action.  By 1565, Philip sent orders to rid 
La Florida of the French settlers there, eventually ousting the French after a serious of 
skirmishes.  In this early incident, some part of the Spanish religious fanaticism still 
existed, as seen in a soldier’s response to the killings: “Men killed them rather by divine 
inspiration than by suggestion of any human intelligence.”48  Religion did not completely 
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disappear from the Spanish justification, but economics and imperial politics dominated 
Spanish concerns. 
Spain contemplated their own colonies along the North Carolina coast, on the 
northern borders of Spanish La Florida in the mid-sixteenth century.  Plate fleets, the 
common name given to Spanish Atlantic cargo fleets, leaving late from the Caribbean 
often encountered hurricanes during their biannual crossings, scattering Spanish ships 
and men as far north as Cape Hatteras.49  Such posts would serve as salvaging operations 
and protection from Indians for the marooned crew.  Reports concerning English attempts 
at settlements in the Carolinas and the Chesapeake further convinced Spanish officials of 
the necessity of maintaining the Florida garrisons.  They had reason to worry.  Thomas 
Stukely proposed a mission in 1563 to found a post in South Carolina not far from Port 
Royal and Hawkins had visited and supplied the troublesome French post in Florida in 
1565.50 
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The English did not just try to wrestle the Americas from Spain.  England, more 
so than anything, aimed to strike at the heart of Spain.  Through privateering, the English 
obstructed the flow of wealth from Spain’s colonies to Europe.51  Fears of increased 
English speculation in these areas with the intensification of privateering following 1569 
renewed the necessity of establishing control in these areas.  In 1571 and 1572, three 
English ships also attacked St. Augustine.  Scholars debate who commanded these ships.  
Few believe Hawkins occupied the post despite his connection to the earlier French raids 
and rumors he plotted his own raid on St. Augustine in 1570.  Spanish commander Pedro 
Menéndez de Avilés eventually drove the ships off, though the English put up a fierce 
fight.52  Unfortunately for Spain, the shores of the Carolina coast with its many barrier 
islands, reefs, and shoals made maneuvering and anchoring large warships impossible.  
The numerous light craft that needed to patrol the area proved too expensive an endeavor 
for an already thinly stretched Spanish treasury.  The smaller, lighter, and more navigable 
English ships held the advantage along the northerly coastlines.  Further south, Francis 
Drake harassed Spanish ports in the Caribbean and Central and South America.   
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Taking Drake’s Caribbean raids as a prime example, the impact of the privateers 
as a means of policy becomes clear.  A fiery, unabashedly anti-Spanish sailor, Drake 
accompanied his cousin John Hawkins in 1568.  He used his experience at San Juan de 
Ulúa as a launch point for his personal privateering campaign in the Caribbean against 
Philip II from 1571-1573.  In 1571, Drake raided the towns of Nombre de Dios and Venta 
de Cruces near modern Panama.  Spanish General Diego Flores de Valdés managed to 
keep the French and English pirates outside of the cities at bay in early 1571.53  By 
March, Valdés handed command over to his Admiral, Gerónimo de Narváez.54  The 
French gave up trying to take Venta de Cruces because of Valdés, but Drake paid close 
attention to the new general, recognized his impotence, and made the decision to raid the 
town.  A 1575 Spanish list of raids states that in 1571, “franciso drak” stole over 50,000 
ducats worth of goods.55  This amounts to almost fifty percent of Spanish militia 
expenditures in the Caribbean at the time.56  Drake searched for places to sell some of the 
merchandise and slaves that he acquired from this raid as his ships could not bear the 
immense load.57 
Drake’s raids and the gold and goods obtained during them benefited English 
coffers, harried Spanish forces, and exacerbated the imperial conflict between the two 
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powers.  On 24 May 1572, Drake sailed once again for Nombre de Dios.58  Much more 
care and planning went into this mission than Drake’s previous, minimally successful 
raids in Panama.  Not deterred for long, Drake prepared for a raid on Nombre de Dios in 
1573—specifically the mule trains there that would be loading and unloading the Spanish 
Plate Fleet’s stores of gold and silver.  Drake received news that the Spanish fleet arrived 
on 5 January 1573.59  As Drake camped outside of Panama City planning his next move, 
he made alliances with local runaway slaves (cimaroons).60  This relationship proved 
very beneficial to Drake.  The cimaroons supplemented his dwindling manpower and 
held valuable knowledge of the land that aided his planning.  Though a number of men 
were lost in this attack, the fleets made off with a good deal of gold and silver equaling 
approximately £20,000, an amount approximate to half the contemporary national debt of 
England.61  What they could not carry they buried to recover at a later date.62  Passing 
Cartagena on his way out of the Caribbean, Drake rode boastfully in front of the Spanish 
ships there, sailing with his flag of St. George proudly displayed and every streamer, flag, 
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and sail flying.63     
 Drake’s voyages and subsequent expeditions inspired by him during these years, 
helped to contribute to the bankruptcy of Spain in 1575.64  Drake caused constant 
disruption in Philip’s finances and communications.  During the course of his Panama 
raids from 1571-1573, Drake reportedly netted almost £40,000.65  By 1577, Elizabeth 
approved Drake’s proposed voyage to the East Indies that resulted in his 
circumnavigation of the world.66  Drake’s circumnavigation “stimulated enterprise, 
showed a contempt for Spanish strength, and raised the reputation of England throughout 
Europe and made the various princes wonder whether Spain were not vulnerable.”67  
Upon Drake’s triumphant return to England, he amassed a fortune worth over 
£1,500,000, an unheard of sum at the time.68  With such a fortune, Drake could have 
financed at least three East India Companies.  Drake’s raids along the journey outraged 
Philip and Bernadino Mendoza, Spanish ambassador to England, who demanded 
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punishment of the corsair.  When Drake arrived in England, Elizabeth took Mendoza 
with her to Drake’s ship the Golden Hind, where she proceeded to knight this Sea Dog 
and “Master Thief of the Unknown Sea,” as Mendoza referred to Drake.69  
Back in the Carolinas, in 1578, and again in 1582, Sir Humphrey Gilbert proposed 
voyages to reconnoiter the Carolina and Florida coastlines and establish the colonial base 
that Spaniards so feared.  Mendoza constantly wrote to Philip reporting Gilbert’s 
proposals and opinion towards the project.  Elizabeth denied Mendoza’s requests for a 
hearing to protest the voyage but he still did his best to sabotage it.70  Gilbert’s mission 
failed, but Spanish anxiety rose again in 1584 as Sir Walter Raleigh took the reins of a 
Carolina voyage.  Spanish intelligence about this expedition suffered as Elizabeth 
dismissed Mendoza in 1584, expelling him from the country.  At this time as well, Philip 
and his first Armada Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Álvaro de Bazán, 1st Marquis of 
Santa Cruz de Mudela, began preparations for an “Enterprise of England.”71 
Anglo-Spanish competition for Atlantic dominance had a direct impact on 
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domestic policy.  The domestic English problem of piracy that, once transformed into 
privateering, allowed England to weaken Spanish dominance in the Atlantic World, made 
the problems of sustaining an empire even clearer to the metropolitan Spanish 
government, prompting plans for a Spanish invasion of England proper.  As Spain began 
building a fleet to send against England, the government funds to send to existing 
Spanish posts in the New World for fortification and armament dwindled.  Drake once 
again took center stage in 1585.  After the attack on the English ship the Primrose in 
Seville, official war opened between Spain and England.72  Elizabeth gave Drake a 
                                                          
72.  The Primrose, a merchant ship under the command of Captain Foster, found itself under 
attack from the Spanish in Seville on 26 May 1585 when Spanish officials seized any and all 
ships in Spanish harbors.  As early as 30 January 1584, Francis Walsingham received the 
following letter: “Report by Jacob Whiddon of great preparation in the fitting out of a large fleet 
at Lisbon and the collecting of large ships in other parts of Spain and Portugal for the making of 
the hugest army by sea that ever was set forth by Spain.  To be commanded by the King in 
person, to accomplish some acceptable service to God by the subversion of religion in England.”  
Sir Geoffrey Carey to Walsingham.  Lemon, ed, Calendar of State Papers Domestic, Elizabeth, 
1581-1590, (London,UK: H. M. S. O., 1856), 156.  Walsingham was Elizabeth’s Secretary of 
State between the Cecils, from 1573-1590. 
 
Andrews does not believe that Elizabeth decided to accept war after the Seville attack.  He claims 
that merchants who lost goods in Spain, upon examination by the Admiralty and with sufficient 
proof of losses, received individual letters of reprisal to set forth armed vessels for the capture of 
Spanish goods at sea.  Issuing individual letters acknowledged the attacks in Seville as “private 
wrongs” according to him, not “an act of war.”  Elizabethan Privateering, 3.  In light of the 
Queen’s orders to Drake, I have to disagree with Andrews’ assessment.  Elizabeth had known for 
years that war would eventually come with Spain though she tried to delay and avoid outright war 
for years.  She had seen that despite her best efforts to maintain an outward show of neutrality 
and compromise, her acceptance and continuance of support for privateering endeavors—coupled 
of course with her support for the Dutch—had pushed Philip to action.  Philip had to deal with 
constant attacks on his Indies shipping which undermined his authority, weakened his finances, 
and brought criticism upon him from all of his Catholic allies who constantly badgered him to use 
his vast resources to squash the insolent English.  Elizabeth’s privateering policies had now 
provided her a formidable “navy” with which to act. 
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commission to seek out and attack Spanish ships in Spain and the Caribbean.73  Drake 
sacked Cadíz and Seville, then made his way to the Caribbean and Santo Domingo which 
he caught completely by surprise.74 
Overall, Drake’s raids succeeded and though the investors in the expedition and 
the sailors received a relatively small return, this expedition did much to discredit Philip 
financially as well as militarily.  Still hoping to avoid war, Elizabeth sent Philip a letter of 
apology for Drake’s conduct saying that she had sent him orders to avoid any hostility.  
She expressed her inability to disarm her ships or to prohibit her subjects from trying to 
recoup their losses by reprisals so long as Philip made plans to invade England.75   
Commenting on the state of Spanish finances after Drake’s raid, the Venetian 
ambassador Paravici wrote to Walsingham on 11 September 1587, about the larger 
implications of Drake’s success.  Paravici expressed his opinion that the “disturbance, the 
loss and diversion of the enemy” impaired Spain’s ability to make war just as much as the 
“booty” taken aided the English.  He further writes that the constant loss of revenues for 
Spain, combined with Philip’s increased expenses to compensate for the losses, ensured 
that “one year of War in the Indies will cost the Spaniards more than three in the Low 
                                                          
73.  Within days of the Primrose’s return, Elizabeth commissioned Drake to organize a fleet to 
rescue the other English ships seized by Spain.  By 1 July 1585, Elizabeth’s council had 
convinced her to broaden the scope of Drake’s mission in order to “cripple” the King’s invasion 
fleet before it was ready.  The Queen accordingly signed a new commission for Drake.  
Woodroofe, Enterprise of England, 164-165. 
 
74.  One Spanish letter stated that “the city was entirely unprepared” for the raid.  Quoted in 
Cummins, Francis Drake, 149. 
 
75.  Richmond, Navy as Instrument of Policy, 20. 
63 
 
 
Countries.”76  By 1586, losses to English raids and subsequent Spanish borrowing for 
armies in the Netherlands and for Armada preparations resulted in the bankrupting of the 
bank of Seville and Valencia.77  Atlantic conflict affected continental war preparations 
and forced Spain to redirect their attentions. 
A large portion of Spanish funds to the Netherlands stopped at this time and 
money to the Indies dwindled dramatically as Spain poured what little wealth made it 
back to Spain from the Indies into their Armada preparations—preparations which were 
set back over a year by Drake’s burning of ships in the harbor of Cadíz in April 1587.78  
Drake rushed into the harbor “with more speed and arrogance than any pirate as ever 
shown.”79  The damage reported on the Spanish coast reached 300,000 ducats, equaling 
                                                          
76.  H. Paravici to Walsingham, 11 September 1587 (CSP Spain, 1586-7) as quoted in Richmond, 
Navy as Instrument of Policy, 18. 
 
77.  Spain experienced periods of bankruptcy throughout the later sixteenth century and into the 
seventeenth century.  Philip II declared bankruptcy in 1557, defaulting on loans from the German 
Fugger lending house.  Other periods of bankruptcy followed resulting in defaults on Genoese 
loans as well.  Stanley Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1973), vol. 1, 291-294.  Numerous scholars discuss this, including Pierre and J. 
H. Elliott, The Old World and the New, 1492-1650, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970); Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, (London, UK: Penguin, 1963); Parker, Grand 
Strategy; Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of 
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1972); Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith, eds., The General Crisis of the Seventeenth 
Century, (London, UK: Routledge, 1978); Woodrow Wilson Borah, New Spain’s Century of 
Depression, (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1951). 
 
78.  See Garrett Mattingly’s definitive work The Armada, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959);  
Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 54.  See also Parker, Army of Flanders. 
 
79.  As related by customs office Agustín de Horozco of the fort of Matagorda opposite the 
channel from Cadiz.  Quoted in Cummins, Drake, 167. 
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approximately 30,000£.80  If Philip thought Drake audacious and bold before, this attack 
on Cadíz convinced him of that fact.81 
 After this attack, which delayed Spanish Armada preparations, Spain could little 
expect to send forces out against Atlantic privateers now really concern themselves with 
the American coastline.  How could they expect to protect lands an ocean away, when 
Spain itself was under attack?  Englishmen reveled in this.  An Elizabethan lawyer and 
writer, John Hooker, wrote that “Drake’s voyage in September 1585 inflamed the whole 
country with a desire to adventure unto the seas, in hope of the like good success [so] that 
a number prepared ships, mariners and soldiers and traveled every place where any profit 
might be had.”82  As Drake prepared for his voyages, Philip approved a reconnaissance 
mission along the coast of Florida as the Casa de Contratación had sent warnings about 
English raiders.83  Santa Cruz tried to assemble a fleet to send out against Drake’s 
                                                          
80.  Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement, 53.   
 
10 ducats equal 1£.  This conversion is based on various charts from Francis Turner, “Money and 
Exchange Rates in 1632,” compiled by Roy Davies, History of Money Project, Exeter University, 
(http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/current/howmuch.html) and the Medieval and Early 
Modern Data Bank compiled by Rutgers University, (http://www2.scc.rutgers.edu/memdb/).  
These university projects draw from a number of scholarly sources and indexes of early modern 
currency across the globe. 
 
81.  In 1588, Don Diego Pimentel, a senior Armada commander captured by the English, told his 
captors that: “The reason why [Philip] undertook this war [against England] was that he could not 
tolerate the fact that Drake, with two or three rotten ships, should come to infest the harbours of 
Spain whenever it pleased him, and to capture its best towns in order to plunder them.”  Quoted in 
Parker, Grand Strategy, 176.  This certainly was not Philip’s main reason for going to war, but 
the voyages of Drake did contribute significantly to the Spain’s final break with England and the 
decision to go to war. 
 
82.  Quoted in Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 4. 
 
83.  Diego Fernández de Quiñones to Philip II, 12/22 June 1585, from Quinn, “Spanish 
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expedition in 1585, but could spare and equip only two ships and the ships left Spain very 
late in the season.  Even though in December 1587 Philip “[had] the plans in his room” 
for “three or four forts in La Florida,” these plans never materialized owing to the failure 
of the Armada campaign soon thereafter.84 
With Spain otherwise occupied, many English privateers intensified their imperial 
schemes.  Ralph Lane, for one, sailed to the Carolina coast in 1586, where he established 
a post at Roanoke, in the Outer Banks of modern North Carolina.  Lane brought with 
him, among others, the artist John White, Thomas Cavendish, an Oxford professor and 
several students.  Largely romanticized over the years as the “Lost Colony,” the Roanoke 
settlement disappeared a year after its founding.  As much as Spain remained occupied by 
its Armada preparations, England also felt the strain on its ships and resources.  While 
encouraging settlement during Spanish absence, the English too needed a certain number 
of ships standing ready for defense of the realm.  Supply ships did not return to the 
colony as needed and the settlers either died or left the area.85  When Raleigh finally 
visited to the colony in 1587, he found practically nothing, but he re-established an 
English post there.  This part of North Carolina was particularly important for English 
operations into the Spanish south because it was not only close to La Florida, but the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Reactions,” 10. 
 
84.  Battista Antonelli, 2/12 December 1587, CSP Venice, 1581-91, 329. 
 
85.  Little is known about what happened to the settlers though scholars conjecture that many of 
the settlers who survived starvation and disease probably went to live with nearby Indian tribes.  
See David Durant, Ralegh’s Lost Colony, (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1981);  Kupperman, 
Roanoke; David Quinn, The Lost Colonists: Their Fortune and Probable Fate, (Raleigh, NC: 
America's Four Hundredth Anniversary Committee, North Carolina Dept. of Cultural Resources, 
1984) 
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currents and weather of the area provided better harbor for ships than most areas.  The 
area also proved better suited to the smaller English vessels able to slip in and out of the 
shoals.   
When the Duke of Medina Sidonia took over the command of the Armada fleet in 
1588, one of his first orders including sending orders to Spanish forces at St. Augustine 
to attack the English in the neighboring area and in the Carolinas.  Armada campaign 
plans interfered once again and Medina Sidonia sent no reinforcements or further orders 
for this expedition.86  A Spanish ship did though slip into the Outer Banks in 1588 before 
Raleigh arrived there, finding evidence of an English settlement there.  The existence of 
English settlement worried the Spanish empire.87 
The Armada campaigns of the next decade occupied a great deal of both England 
and Spain’s naval resources.  England called back many privateers and directed 
practically all of its much smaller naval force to the coming battle in 1588.  Colonization 
efforts in America fell into the background for a time out of necessity.  Spanish defeats 
left the country financially destitute.  Spanish New World settlements did not fail in this 
atmosphere, but Spanish dominance in the Atlantic diminished greatly and the crown 
could not fortify posts there as they would have liked to do.  Constant losses from pirate 
raids left the defense of the Indies in poorer condition than the first half of the sixteenth 
century as decreased finance and supply resulted in “inoperable” galleys.88 
  At the turn of the seventeenth century, the English revived plans for a fortified 
                                                          
86.  Pedro Menéndez Marqués to Philip, 7/17 July 1588, from Quinn, “Spanish Reactions,” 15. 
 
87.  Quinn, “Spanish Reactions,” 16. 
 
88.  Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 223.   
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settlement in the Chesapeake and in 1607, John Smith founded Jamestown.  Atlantic 
competition led to the creation of English settlements on the fringes of Spanish North 
America and to an increased division between the empires.  English victory in the 
English Channel prevented Spanish forces from establishing any more forts north of La 
Florida, providing the English with an open door to settlement in those “unclaimed” 
areas.89  James, who came to the throne in 1603, though completely against privateering, 
continued Elizabeth’s expansionist and colonialist aims.  After founding Jamestown in 
1607, Englishmen soon expanded their settlement mission, taking control of Bermuda in 
1609, St. Kitts in 1623, and Barbados in the last year of James’ reign, 1625.90 
Another significant outcome of the English privateering ventures came in the 
form of trading companies.  Resulting from the return of Drake’s circumnavigation, the 
Levant or “Turkey” Company received its charter in 1581.  Elizabeth invested in Drake’s 
voyage and, with the resulting sum of £42,000 pounds, created and invested in the Levant 
Company after paying off the entire national debt of England.91  Though not as popular as 
some of its successor companies, the Levant Company made great profits.  Mediterranean 
ports took more English goods than other ports and, by 1612, English merchants 
established twenty business houses in Constantinople, while the traditionally dominant 
                                                          
89.  “Spanish Reactions,” 20. 
 
90.  These Caribbean colonies of the British generally grew out of existing colonies of privateer 
exiles.  When James had enacted the new piracy laws of 1603 and 1605 a number of British 
seamen relocated their operations to the Caribbean rather than be pressed into service in the 
Royal Navy. 
 
91.  Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement; Cummins, Drake, 125. 
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Venetian depots had dwindled to five.92  The profits from the Levant Company in turn 
financed the East India Company, one of the most successful trading companies in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century.93  The connection of the Atlantic and the Levant 
offered England a steady increase of profits for financing Atlantic expeditions and naval 
repairs.  Such innovations of these companies by the English coupled with the “rent-a-
fleet” policies of Elizabethan privateering, unlike the Spain’s policies of the government 
financing fleets and fortifications, led to vast differences in the nations’ financial policies 
and post-Armada economies. 
English piracy and privateering in the New World caused Spain and England to 
focus their diplomacy on the New World and develop new policies and strategies for 
colonization.  The debt of Spain, helped along by Drake and his raids throughout Mexico 
and the Caribbean, severely hampered Spain’s ability to fulfill its plans to fortify 
America.  On the other hand, the English used the profits of such missions to fund and 
encourage further missions to the New World, keeping Spain constantly on edge and 
helping to justify Spain’s decision for the Enterprise of England with the Armada 
campaign of 1588.  After the Armada, Spain’s dominance of the seas declined and the 
English expanded their dominion throughout the known world during Spain’s distraction. 
                                                          
92.  Paul Coles, The Ottoman Impact on Europe, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 
137-138.  The Levant Company also appointed consuls to Smyrna and Aleppo to help handle the 
increasing trade.  Christopher Lloyd, English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast, (London: William 
Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1981), 83. 
 
93.  See Alfred Wood, A History of the Levant Company, (London, UK: Frank Cass and Co., 
1964).  In 1600, Elizabeth granted the “Honourable East India Company” a monopoly by Royal 
Charter on all trade with the East Indies.  Mortimer Epstein, The Early History of the Levant 
Company, (New York, NY: Durtton, 1908); T.S. Willan, "Some Aspects of English Trade with 
the Levant in the Sixteenth Century" English Historical Review, vol. 70, no. 276, (July 1955),  
399-410. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EUROPEAN ENTANGLEMENTS, IMPERIAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND NAVAL 
POLICIES 
 
 
 
In the sixteenth century, the Spanish empire reached its pinnacle.  Centuries of 
Habsburg marriage alliances joined eastern and western Europe from Bohemia to 
Burgundy to Portugal.  The story of this accumulation has oft been told, and the figure of 
Charles V of Spain/Charles I, Holy Roman Emperor marks the beginning and end of a 
‘universal’ monarchy unparalleled in the modern world.  Charles’ son, Philip, did his best 
to maintain and extend the western part of the empire left to him after his father’s 
division of the universal monarchy, but Philip and his successors faced ever-mounting 
obstacles to their authority.  While recent historians have fought to avoid ‘Black Legend’ 
histories of Spain’s colonial history and decline, this chapter will argue that some such 
views cannot be entirely avoided.  The Caribbean was a stage set for Spanish domination 
of the New World, but miscommunication, bureaucracy, and increasing financial 
problems, aside from imperial competition and diplomatic entanglements, created missed 
opportunities and military failures that resulted in the loss of Spanish Caribbean 
dominance. 
Countries’ and empires’ allegiances constantly shifted in this increasingly 
connected, yet ever-expanding world.  Such considerations in Spain brought the 
formation of a universal monarchy, dual/dueling empires, and constant external threats.  
For the purpose of this work, Charles V/I (1500-1558) begins this story.  Charles was the 
grandson of Holy Roman Emperor Maximillian I of Austria and Mary of Burgundy, and 
of the famed Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain.  Charles’ father, Philip the Handsome, 
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became the first Habsburg prince of Spain, marrying Joanna “the Mad” of Castile.1  At 
the tender age of six, Charles inherited the Netherlands from his father.  Under the 
regency of his aunt, Margaret of Parma, Charles remained in the Low Countries until his 
coronation as Charles I, King of Spain in 1516.  Acknowledged as the first modern king 
of a united Spain, Charles gained election as Holy Roman Emperor in 1530, ruling over 
the traditional lands of the Holy Roman Empire including Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
Bohemia, and the Netherlands.  Charles’ dominion included his Spanish inheritance of 
Spain proper and the many Spanish colonies of the New World as well as Habsburg and 
Spanish holdings on the Italian peninsula and Mediterranean islands.  Ruling over such 
vast territories proved a daunting task.  Therefore, in 1555, Charles abdicated his thrones 
and split them between his son, Philip, and his brother, Ferdinand.  Charles arranged for 
the election of his brother as Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor, while his son became 
Philip II of Spain. 
This background is essential for understanding the complex relations Spain had to 
manage during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Spanish kings, in their traditional 
alliance with their Austrian family, found themselves embroiled in wars and uprisings 
throughout Bohemia, the eastern Mediterranean, central Europe, and the Netherlands.  
The Dutch conflict holds the most relevance for this study. 
                                                          
1.  Philip the Handsome was the son of Maximilian I and Mary of Burgundy and Joanna the Mad 
was the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella.  R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1550–1700: An Interpretation (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford University 
Press, 1979); Paula Sutter Fichtner, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1490–1848: Attributes of Empire, 
European History in Perspective (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); E. M. Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg, (Vienna, Austria, 
Schaumburg and Cie Publishers, originally published1843); Andrew Wheatcroft, The Habsburgs: 
Embodying Empire (London, UK; New York, NY: Viking, 1995). 
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As religious tensions across the English Channel continued to mount in the 1560s 
and 1570s, the Elizabethan government could not escape the Protestant rebellion in the 
Netherlands or Spanish attempts to maintain control in those provinces while conquering 
the New World.  Spain continuously struggled to sustain its hegemony in European 
politics.  All of Elizabeth’s efforts to establish the authority of the Church of England 
made England both a sought-after ally and a threat.  Catholic Spain, already dealing with 
Protestant discontent and uprisings in the Netherlands, certainly did not welcome the 
Protestantization of England, while the Dutch hoped that religious affinity would 
persuade the English to help the Dutch emancipate themselves from Spanish rule.  
Apprehensive of another Catholic neighbor but also wary of provoking Philip’s anger 
should she declare support for the Dutch, Elizabeth had to carefully weigh her options 
and the opinions of her advisors and Parliament.  Elizabeth did not approve of rebels even 
on the grounds of religion, but she could not allow Spain to regain its foothold across the 
English Channel.   
William Cecil shared most of the queen’s moderate views.  He was willing to 
compromise when necessary to ensure peace and stability and authored much of 
Elizabeth’s official policy and correspondence.2  Elizabeth’s court officials had their own 
ideas about religion and how to approach foreign policy, but under Cecil, they commonly 
deferred to decisions that would benefit England as a whole—not just to further their 
particular interests.  This is not to say that there was never any dissent within Elizabeth’s 
                                                          
2.  MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 12–18; Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary 
Cecil and Queen Elizabeth (London, UK: Cape, 1955), 120–30. 
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council, because opposition certainly existed among the councilors.3  The Queen fielded 
numerous requests and plans of her councilors.  Much of the praise of Elizabeth’s 
political acumen comes from her ability to promote compromise and find common goals 
amongst her council.4  However, the “hottest” opposition to Elizabeth’s policies came 
from Parliament.  Fairly militant anti-Catholic sympathizers made up the Elizabethan 
Parliament.  These men wanted decisive, aggressive action against Catholics and official 
military support and approval for Protestant rebellions such as that in the Netherlands.  
During pulpit debates from 1569 to 1571, men like theologian Thomas Cartwright called 
for “the full and whole deliverance” of Protestants everywhere.  Parliament remained 
divided.   
The “politique Machiavels” that had helped bring about the shift towards 
Protestantism, focused their attentions on England’s international situation and how that 
affected the future of their religion and power.  They also saw the need to suppress 
political dissidence within English borders.  The “hot Gospellers,” as they were known, 
remained overly concerned with specific doctrine and forms of church government.5  
                                                          
3.  Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil, 131–133. 
4.  For more details about the particular relationship of Elizabeth and her council and amongst her 
councilors, see, for example, the classic works of J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 
(London, UK: J. Cape, 1953-1957), 2 vols.; Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham and the Policy of 
Queen Elizabeth, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1925); and Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil. 
 
5.  MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 16–18.  The Lord Keeper Bacon, for 
example, opened the Parliament of 1563 with a speech concerning the lack of discipline within 
the Church and the “lax regard” for ceremony.  MacCaffrey, Making of Policy, 1572–1588, 42. 
 
It can be argued that Elizabeth’s council, by attempting to create compromises between the 
factions of Parliament, saw less the need to push their own agendas and beliefs and more the need 
to secure domestic stability from that experience.  For instance, Knollys, “the most reform-
minded” of Elizabeth’s councilors, put aside his own agenda to constantly warn members of 
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These divisions within Parliament and between Parliament and the court obviously led to 
periods of inefficient governance.  Elizabeth could get few bills pushed through 
Parliament because she also refused to choose either side of the argument.  So, facing a 
wall in Parliament, Elizabeth found circuitous means to get what she wanted until such 
time as she and her council came into accord.  What she wanted, and desperately needed, 
was money and encouraging the development of a privateering fleet gave her that as well 
as greater military defenses.   
In this situation, her policies towards pirates and privateering gained importance 
and quickly became a cornerstone of her Dutch-Spanish diplomacy.  English pirates 
attacked Spanish ships carrying supplies and monies meant to fund the Spanish armies in 
the Netherlands, conveniently aiding the Dutch without the need for any formal 
declarations of war on Spain or support for the rebels.  
As Charles had vast and diverse territories under his control, he left much of the 
governance of the Netherlands, a fairly quiet set of provinces, to the customary rule of 
local assemblies.6  By the sixteenth century, the city of Antwerp in the northern portion 
of the Netherlands had become one of the most important trading centers in Europe, 
making it a favorite destination of merchants, intellectuals, and opportunity-seekers alike.  
With the influx of so many immigrants and traders, Antwerp also became an intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Parliament whose speech intruded on royal prerogative.  MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the 
Making of Policy, 60–63. 
 
6.  Richard Dunn, Age of Religious Wars, 1559–1715 (New York: Norton, 1979), 40–41.   
Charles had put down a revolt in Ghent in 1539, but the uprising did not affect the Netherlands 
outside of Ghent and Charles “crushed” it.  Charles Wilson, The Transformation of Europe, 
1558–1648 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 138. 
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capital as the city’s population remained more open-minded and compromising in order 
to keep and continue to encourage trade there.  Protestantism found a home in this 
environment.  During the Reformation that was sweeping through Europe during this 
period, merchants were usually the first groups to embrace Protestantism, and Antwerp 
overflowed with merchants.  By allowing the exiting Dutch government, the States-
General, to retain much of their control of Dutch affairs, Charles thereby allowed the 
increase of Protestantism in the Netherlands through his leniency. 
When Philip II succeeded Charles in 1556, he found his rule unwelcome in the 
Netherlands.  Under a new king, the States-General decided to test their power and voice 
their discontent with Philip’s plans for more direct control in the Netherlands.  Dutch 
nobility censured Spain’s war continued wars with France over religion and in 1558,7 the 
States-General insisted on their right to appoint their own tax commissioners.8  Philip 
ignored these measures.  In addition to disregarding these political assertions of the Dutch 
assembly, Philip did not indulge the Protestant faith in his territories as his father had.  
Upon the failure of his personal inquisition in the Netherlands in 1559, Philip reorganized 
the Church there and pushed Catholic absolutism.9  Philip also sanctioned the Inquisition 
in Flanders again in 1570.10  Almost instantly, Dutch Protestants began to organize 
                                                          
7.  These Wars of Religion, also referred to as the Italian Wars or the Habsburg-Valois Wars (the 
French ruling family hailed from the House of Valois), occurred from1494-1559.    
 
8.  Wilson, Transformation of Europe, 138. 
9.  J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620, (London: Fontana, 1985), 18-
19; Philip also sanctioned the Inquisition in Flanders again in 1570.  CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, 
no. 135. 
10.  CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, no. 135. 
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against Philip and to solicit aid and support from Elizabeth, the strongest Protestant 
leader in Europe.   
Elizabeth had reason to aid the Dutch not just because of some religious affinity, 
but also out of fear of growing Spanish power across the English Channel.  Philip reigned 
over a very rich empire that encompassed numerous colonies.  In 1559, as a condition of 
the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which ended the long war between France and Spain, 
recently-widowed Philip also married the Princess Elisabeth of Valois, the daughter of 
the French Catholic King Henri II.11  This Catholic alliance certainly spurred debate in 
England.  Elizabeth had to begin assessing her resources and reevaluating her domestic 
and foreign policies based on these developments. 
In the Netherlands, the Catholic regent Margaret, Duchess of Parma and half-
sister to Philip II, made her dislike of Protestant England known.  The illegitimate 
daughter of Charles V, Margaret gained official recognition from her father in 1553 at 
age eleven, thus allowing her to take the Habsburg family name of “Margaret of Austria.”  
Philip appointed her as regent of the Netherlands in 1559.12  During her rule, Margaret 
presided over the Dutch governing council and actively made decisions about taxes and 
religion within the provinces.  Most of the time she followed her brother’s advice, but she 
increasingly came under the influence of Philip’s commander, the Duke of Alva. 
                                                          
11.  During a tournament meant to celebrate this union, Henri received a fatal wound.  His son 
Francis II succeeded him.  Frederic Baumgarter, Henry II, King of France, 1547-1559, (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1998).   
12.  In 1567 she resigned her post to the Duke of Alva on Philip’s orders.  Alva also had charge 
of the Spanish militia in the Netherlands to quell the Dutch Revolt.  Felix Rachfahl, Margaretha 
von Parma, Statthalterin die Niederlande, 1559-1567, (München, Deutschland: Drud und Berlag 
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76 
 
Hoping to strike at England economically, Margaret issued an embargo on all 
English trade in 1563.13  Margaret claimed that her actions were in response to English 
merchants’ protection of heretics and English acts of piracy in the Channel.14  But Philip, 
preoccupied with Ottoman threats in the Mediterranean, and without ample evidence of 
such claims, ordered Margaret to lift the embargo “unconditionally” in 1565.15  Besides, 
the embargo had proved ineffective.  When Antwerp closed, English merchants found 
various other outlets for their trade. 
The wars and jurisdictional debates of the mid to late 1500s created a (fairly) 
dramatic power shift in Europe.  These seeds sowed the foundation for an even more 
significant change in the makeup of the seventeenth-century Caribbean.  Whereas the 
English engaged in a process of bringing the army and navy under state control, Spain did 
not.  In numerous instances, the Consulado of Seville actually rejected plans for an armed 
fleet to secure regular Atlantic trade.  The Councils of State and of the Indies objected to 
this dismissal, pointing out the defensive deficiencies of the ships making these 
voyages.16  The vulnerable convoy system remained the Council’s preferred method of 
transport.  Occasionally, armed ships accompanied trade fleets, but this did not constitute 
standard practice at the time.17 
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Despite the intricate bureaucracy of the Spanish government, Spain lacked an 
effective naval strategy or control over many of her own ships.  Elizabeth rented out her 
dilapidated ships, but Philip had very few ships of his own/belonging directly to Spain.  
According to some figures, nearly two-thirds of Spain’s Mediterranean galleys belonged 
to private owners in the mid-sixteenth century.18  Kamen even claims that the crown “had 
no vessels at all” for much of the century.19  Spain did have some ships, though other 
countries and princes owned the majority of ships in Spanish fleets.  According to 
Venetian reports, the Mediterranean squadron had eight large ships and six galleons from 
Spain.  As for the rest of the fleet, twenty-six galleons came from Naples and Sicily, and 
eighteen from various other Italian princes.20  These numbers are in contrast to other 
scholars who claim that by 1547, Spain had 150 galleys, and over 200 galleys to fight at 
Lepanto.21   
If the government had no official warships, it stands to reason that there was no 
official navy—simply soldiers serving on ships and slaves in the galleys.  Spanish galleys 
transported goods and monies to and from the colonies.  Because of their size and 
generally outdated technology, galleys were not readily equipped for the combat awaiting 
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them at the hands of pirates.  For much of the sixteenth century, these fleets had little 
protection.  The lack of a protective naval policy meant continued threats on the sea.  
Spanish kings relied too heavily on outdated papal edicts and the sheer right of settlement 
to keep their many overseas possessions.  Either that, or the kings believed that the 
treasures of the Americas would always fund the hiring of ships from private owners.  
While the government did take in significant revenue from the taxing of merchant trade 
to the Atlantic, the government did not see the advantages of state versus private trade to 
the Indies.   
Spaniards constantly lamented the presence of pirates and bandits.  Armed men 
first sailed with merchant convoys to the Caribbean in the 1520s, but, again, private 
merchants conducted this policy, much like English policy.  Forty years later, the Spanish 
government took strides to make this sort of armament standard for the Armada of New 
Spain.  The Armada de la Guardia de la carrerra de las Indias, according to official 
communication, generally consisted of eight galleons and three smaller pataches 
(dispatch ships).  Approximately 1,000 seamen and 900 soldiers served aboard these 
ships.22  Official plans did not always mean effective deployment. 
As at numerous other times, international conflicts hampered domestic efforts.  In 
response to continued attacks throughout Spain’s Atlantic colonies and the worsening of 
diplomatic relations between Spain and England, especially, Philip II passed numerous 
decrees limiting the amount of foreigners allowed to travel to and reside in Spain and her 
territories.  In 1559, 1568, and 1571, decrees stated that all foreign travel would be 
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restricted to Spain and the Spanish Low Countries, punishable by confiscation of all the 
travelers’ property.23  One source states that Englishmen found Spain “even more 
impenetrable than Italy.”24  These policies continued into the reign of Philip III (1598-
1621) and Philip IV (1621-1665), resulting in a dearth of foreign communities, merchant 
or otherwise, and extended into a lack of ambassadorial invitations to Spain as well.   
Increased tension resulted from the Spanish Company of Merchants in Spain.  
The company consisted of English traders with special license to operate in Spain, one of 
the few official exceptions to the policies mentioned above.  Even with exception, this 
company only operated from 1577-1585, and then again from 1604-1606.  During the 
years of Philip II’s marriage to Queen Mary I, this company operated with little 
opposition on either side, but the succeeding years, saw a significant rise in animosity and 
distrust.  English trade to the Low Countries represented approximately one half of all 
English trade during the mid-sixteenth century, but the Spanish Company ran a close 
second.  One of the largest trading companies in England, the Spanish Company 
employed “many good ships and a great number of sufficient mariners,” aside from the 
various independent merchants who operated alongside the company.25  English ships 
carried practically all of this commerce for the Spanish Company.26  Eventually, this fact 
piqued the anxiety of the Spanish ambassador as he wrote about the “great profit [the 
English] make by the Spanish trade,” and how the English “[built] ships without 
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cessation...thus making themselves masters of the seas.”27  The English used their 
position in Spain to springboard their expansion into the Levantine and North African 
trade at the end of the sixteenth century, further harrying Spanish trade.  This trade 
afforded the English significant advantages in the experience of sailing and the training 
of sailors.  Though many of these merchant ships did remain privately owned, Elizabeth I 
made a concentrated effort to keep merchants under the English flag, investing in their 
ventures and renting state ships to accompany such merchant ventures.   
The navy occupied a very different place in the Spanish political strategy than it 
did for other European nations.  Naval service in England, under the Tudors and 
Cromwell, offered men of lower social status an opportunity for wealth and advancement.  
Spanish men could find fame and prestige in the army, but a naval commission did not 
hold the same prestige.28  As Spain proper found itself in more conflict with its provinces, 
this fact became a crippling weakness for the empire.   
Philip II did develop some maritime policies in regards galley schedules and 
trade.  In order to regulate Atlantic trade, Philip developed the system for the twice-a-
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year Plate Fleet crossings to the New World.  The problem still remained that many of 
these pilots did not come from Spain, besides the Basques.  Many Belgians and 
Portuguese served aboard these fleets.29  Castilian pilots knew the Mediterranean well, 
but contemporaries write that they had practically no knowledge of the western seas, 
when they deigned to serve in the navy in the first place.  Even when the Great Armada 
sailed for England, Spain had to recruit French pilots because they could not even find 
suitable Portuguese pilots.30  Spain certainly needed knowledgeable pilots, however, they 
also needed pilots loyal to Spain.  Should the Luso-Spanish alliance end, Spain had no 
guarantee of these pilots’ allegiance.     
Spanish sailors considered New World sailing posts a means to an end rather than 
an inroad to a naval career.  Once in the New World, large numbers of sailors deserted 
hoping to establish themselves as farmers or merchants in this new economy.  The same 
could easily be said of men of most nations, but Spain offered its men less incentive to 
see the navy as an adequate career choice.  The government did not even see the navy as 
something permanent in the early years based on the little attention paid to constructing a 
national navy.  Occupation as a sailor was also more open to men of varying social and 
even racial backgrounds.  Crews supplemented their numbers with second sons, poor 
jobless men, and the occasional drunk.  Many a young or ruined man could find 
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employment and “an earthly paradise...[at] the ends of the earth” when he stepped aboard 
a ship.”31    
Sailor, merchant, and Captain General of the Navy and Fleet of New Spain 
(1595), Juan de Escalante de Mendoza (1529-1596), claimed that two sorts of men took 
to the sea.  The first included those second sons and poorer men who have not the means 
or ability for other careers.  “Restlessness” and a desire to do “something else” than stay 
the course their fathers may have set for them constitute the second class of sailors.32  
While some scholars argue that shipboard discipline was particularly harsh, this was not 
always the case.  In the official Spanish galleons, the government sentenced criminals to 
work the ships galleys.  Such policies uphold this idea of particularly rigid order onboard.  
For other ships, and especially merchant vessels, as the distance widened between the 
ship and metropole, discipline and working conditions relaxed.33   
Galleon fleets did not necessarily constitute a navy—at least not a sustained naval 
force.  Galleons used for transporting New World goods were occasionally equipped for 
battle, but Spain did not have a permanent naval fleet.  To prepare for battle, Spain 
loaned ships from her allies and had to undertake building projects.  The only truly 
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effective naval battle fought by the Spanish fleet occurred in 1571 at Lepanto.  
Continuing tradition, Italian ships constituted the bulk of the Spanish fleet, especially 
since the Battle of Lepanto took place in the Mediterranean to stop the advance of the 
Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans had conquered much of Bohemia and even marched on 
the city of Vienna by 1570.  Expanding their dominions also meant expanding their 
influence over trade.  Venetian trade dwindled as the Turks took over all trade routes east 
to Asia and India.  Practically all of Europe had depended on and/or benefited from the 
Venetian-Asian trade.34  On 7 October 1571, Philip’s Armada under the command of his 
half-brother Don Juan of Austria sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean and defeated the 
Turkish forces at Lepanto.35  The victory earned the Armada the title of “the Invincible 
Armada” and made Philip the true defender of the Christian Faith in the eyes of 
Catholics.  While Philip gained even more prestige through this venture, he also gained 
more responsibility and yet another cause to uphold.  Philip found himself stretched thin 
trying to review all of his council’s domestic business combined with the 
correspondences of his foreign ambassadors.  All of this, on top of the rebellion in the 
Netherlands, the harassment of Spanish ships in the Atlantic by English privateers, and 
constant pressure from the Pope for an “Enterprise of England,” kept Philip and Spain too 
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distracted to deal with any one issue.  Though Lepanto had been a resounding success for 
the Spanish forces, the victory was short-lived.  By 1574, the Turks mounted an 
impressive offensive that reclaimed much of the territory lost to Don Juan between 1571 
and 1573.36 
As Anglo-Spanish tensions increased, each nation established various embargoes 
throughout the 1560s, 1570s, and 1580s.  Evidenced in the letters of English and Spanish 
merchants, an increase in piracy and mercantile predation followed the proliferation of 
privateering licenses during this period.  Looking at the Spanish Merchants Company, 
English traders entered into agreements with their Spanish partners more than in any 
other trade.  On the high seas, English traders and pirates operated more freely.  In Spain, 
however, this group of merchants, having established themselves as a community within 
Seville, even complained to the Queen about predatory English ships.  Merchants 
complained that letters of marque and reprisal would destroy the Iberian trade.  The 
merchants remained more concerned that the continuance of piracy and maritime 
violence meant the seizure of English ships in Spain.37  Occasionally, predatory ships 
attacked English ships, but with proper papers, the officials allowed the attacked ship to 
go about its business.    
Some scholars claim that numerous court cases show that English merchants 
offered assistance to many Spanish ships and merchants by handing over licenses issued 
to them by the English government, arguing that English merchants took up Spanish 
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goods in French ports to carry them into England.38  This does not constitute substantial 
proof of even Englishmen’s disdain for piracy against Spain.  Some merchants may have 
proceeded for these reasons, but English merchants ‘helped’ the Spanish simply because 
this meant an assurance that their own [English] goods made it to market.  Even though 
this small group of merchants occasionally helped Spanish traders, more often than not 
English mariners attacked Spanish shipping.  As mentioned in previous chapters, these 
attacks took the form of court-sanctioned reprisals, privateering, or outright piratical 
attacks. 
Some scholars argue that England could little afford to antagonize Spain because 
of the wealth of trade the English enjoyed with Spanish Habsburg lands.39  As the 
Levantine trade steadily increased and English merchants and sailors realized their 
advantages in seamanship over Spanish sailors, the English had less and less to fear from 
angering Spain.  Tension and suspicion between the two nations even resulted in travel 
restrictions for any and all visitors.  Philip II allowed citizens to travel abroad only for 
educational purposes in the 1560s.  Elizabeth restricted all travel to Spain or the Spanish 
Low Countries on threat of confiscation of the traveler’s property.40  After Philip II’s 
death in 1598, Philip III continued these practices as in 1599, Spanish officials even 
seized a number of German students in Spain on the suspicion of their being English 
traitors.41 
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These policies escalated as the Anglo-Spanish War drug on throughout the turn of 
the seventeenth century.  The “Great Armada” of 1588 only began the Enterprise of 
England.  Subsequent Armadas sailed to Ireland and the coasts of the British Isles 
continuing to attempt an invasion of England.42  Only under truce with James VI/I in 
1605, did resident English missions reappear in Spain after forty years of suspension.43  
The return of Englishmen to Spain also meant the return of English merchants and 
sailors.  Though technical peace existed by terms of treaty, the first English ambassador 
to return to Spain commented on the “uncharitable and unfriendly” nature of restored 
Anglo-Spanish relations.44  Naturally, Atlantic conflict exacerbated these internal 
conflicts. 
West Indies navigation remained intertwined with Anglo-Spanish negotiations 
over the Dutch territories into the seventeenth century.  These negotiations brought into 
discussion not just English aid to Dutch ‘rebels,’ but also Spanish aid to Irish ‘rebels’ 
against the English and trading rights to the West Indies.  Both sides kept the Indies as a 
final talking point.  England obviously did not want to give up such a lucrative and 
promising trade, and Spain certainly did not enjoy having their authority threatened on 
yet another front.  Military campaigns to end English navigation in the Indies had failed 
his father, so Philip III attempted to make gains through diplomacy instead.  Many of his 
aims remained the same as his father’s: to defend Catholicism everywhere, to preserve 
his Habsburg inheritance, and to regain total control of the West Indian trade.  Philip III 
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even contemplated retracting his demands for reparation from English privateering 
attacks, if, and only if, the English suspended their western navigations.45  Atlantic and 
continental concerns constantly intertwined, requiring Philip to make difficult decisions 
about compromise with England, expansion of his empire, and upholding the reputation 
of his crown and country. 
One of Philip’s audiencieros (legal advisors) believed that England and Spain 
could agree to peaceful terms, but, in 1600, the two sides’ biggest concession concerned a 
neutral location for their peace talks.46  Both sides continued to look for ways to create 
two-front wars for each other, despite their diplomatic show.  England continued to attack 
Spanish shipping throughout the Atlantic and to aid the Dutch while Spain proposed 
armadas to Ireland.  The Spanish Council of State did not believe Elizabeth and her 
secretaries ever meant to cease their aid to the Dutch, even if they did sign a peace treaty.  
Certainly, Elizabeth’s lip-service and covert actions throughout her reign justify the 
Council’s fears.  The Council further proposed that peace would only benefit the English 
by allowing them to rest and rebuild their forces with the prizes won from attacking 
Spanish ships.47  When Spain and England negotiated the Treaty of London (1604), the 
English believed the peace would only benefit Spain for the same reasons the Spanish 
had given for English benefit in 1600. 
                                                          
45.  Paul Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2000), 37. 
46.  AGS Estado, 617:163, 1600. 
47.  AGS Estado, Consulta, 2511, 9 Sept 1600. 
   
88 
 
As much as Spanish officials never trusted the English government to follow 
through on the peace provisions, the Spanish government did not intend to do so either.  
Spain sent an armada to Ireland in 1601, planning to create a base at Kinsale from which 
to invade England.  Following a decisive victory over this armada, England called off all 
further negotiations for nearly a year.  When negotiations began again, the English made 
no attempts to hide their distrust of the Spanish by continuing extensive naval 
preparations.48  Zúñiga, writing from England, declared that Spain had no choice but to 
continue supporting the Irish rebels and attempt another Irish Armada.49  He saw this as 
the only way to hamper the continued naval preparations of the English after Kinsale.   
Privateering promotion remained a part of these preparations after Kinsale.  Just 
months after Zuñiga’s letter, English privateers attempted an attack on a Spanish plate 
fleet on its way to Portugal from the Spanish port of San Lúcar.  The English presence 
around traditional Spanish ports like Cadíz had prompted the more regular use of smaller 
Spanish ports.  Under a guard of eleven galleys, the plate fleet still suffered the sinking of 
two galleys and enough dispersal of the remaining galleys that the English 
commandeered a carrack50 accompanying the fleet.  This incident was a victory and 
defeat for both sides.  For the English, though Spain tried to make little of the prize won, 
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this was not the case.  The haul from the carrack, estimated at £40,000, constituted an 
entire year’s budget for the English Navy.51  Considering the size of the plate fleet’s 
cargo, generally equaling around ten times this amount, the carrack’s haul seems quite 
small, yet proved significant for the English government.  The incident showed that 
English maritime forces successfully and consistently threatened Spanish fleets on both 
sides of the Atlantic, but could not completely destroy them.  For much of her reign, 
Elizabeth relied on such tactics as official strategy—to keep Spain occupied and 
weakened wherever possible since she herself could not mount an official force equal to 
the size of the Great Armada.  In this respect, English tactics represented a long-term 
maritime siege or guerilla warfare. 
For the Spanish side, the skirmish weakened the English squadron enough that its 
commander delayed his plans for a full blockade of the Spanish-ruled Portuguese coast in 
order to ensure the safe conduct of the carrack back to England.  The King also still 
received his three million ducat share of the plate fleet’s eleven million ducat cargo.52  
Considering that only roughly thirty percent of the plate fleet’s considerable cargo 
actually stayed in Spain speaks for the enormous foreign expenditures of the Spanish 
government that hampered Spain’s ability to keep England out of the New World, or 
even out off of the Spanish coasts so close to home.  Eight million ducats could have built 
many a West Indian or Latin American fort or a permanent Caribbean armada.  Philip’s 
councilors’ fears were certainly justified that the empire could not withstand fighting on 
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so many fronts for so long a time, nor could such a large empire survive just by defensive 
measure.53  Diplomacy and negotiation became increasingly important for Philip III.  
Fortunately for Philip, the soon-to-be crowned James VI/I shared these ideas. 
England and Spain spent the better part of five years in direct negotiation over the 
Dutch situation.  Terms of the proposed treaty always hinged on the West Indies.  
England refused to give up their rights of trade and navigation, and Spain bristled at their 
refusals and their constant aid to Dutch rebels.  Elizabethan holdovers like Walter 
Raleigh again forwarded the opinion that peace with Spain would only give the empire 
time to “fortify [its] weakness” and begin pushing England out of the Indies.  Under 
Elizabeth, the riches and rental fees from privateering missions had helped diminish 
Spanish wealth and power in the Atlantic.  If James lost these riches, only Spain would 
profit.  With that increased wealth once more, Raleigh warned about the certainty of 
another Enterprise of England.54  Instead of heeding the old privateer and politician’s 
warning, James sent him to the Tower.   
Spain understood the importance of the Indies to English negotiations as well.  
Despite the numerous studies existing on the Pax Hispanica and Anglo-Spanish 
negotiations in this period, few studies explore the importance of the Indies within these 
talks.  Historians generally ignore the significant of trade and navigation in the Indies as 
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an ever-present topic in these negotiations.  In many cases, the crown instructed Spanish 
councilors to avoid the topic if at all possible.  If councilors55 discussed the Indies, their 
instructions stated that they never mention the total exclusion of England from the 
Indies.56  Under Elizabeth, the Queen’s councilors57 had always made a point to find a 
way to discuss the Indies, thereby effectively delaying and often stopping all treaty 
negotiations.  Elizabeth remained eager to promote the lucrative Indies navigations.   
James proved much more willing to make peace between England and Spain 
despite some of his council’s resistance.58  James had experienced a lifetime of factional 
warfare and political intrigue growing up in Scotland.  His mother, the infamous Mary, 
Queen of Scots, murdered one husband, encouraged several riots and rebellions in 
Scotland and northern England, and plotted with English and Spanish to murder her 
cousin Queen Elizabeth.  James’ rocky upbringing played into his eagerness for peace as 
he ascended the throne of England.59  Spain, recognizing this willingness, attempted to 
broach the subject of suspending English trade to the Indies for the first time.  Philip III 
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did so by first ordering a fleet to remain just off the Western European coast to deter 
English shipping across the Atlantic.  This did not work as evidenced by the afore 
mentioned 1604 incursion.  That particular incident in June of 1604 forced a direct 
discussion of English Atlantic navigations.60  Spanish conditions allowed free commerce 
“in those places where it existed before the war,” noting that this meant expressly 
affected the Indies.61  Under James, this provision was generally upheld according to 
official practice.62  This treaty, however, did not apply to the number of English seamen 
that now operated in the Caribbean in exile thanks to James’ exclusionary maritime 
practices.   
Spanish officials first conceived of the Armada de la Guardia after Francis 
Drake’s continued raids throughout Central America prompted some of the first official 
recognition of need for a protective fleet in the Indies.  Coupled with the ever increasing 
number of pirates in the Spanish Caribbean, Drake’s raids proved the vulnerability of 
Spanish naval forces abroad.  In response, in 1595, the Council of the Indies pleaded for 
the creation of a permanent Caribbean fleet.  Alternately called the Armada del Mar del 
Sur or the Armada de Barlovento, the proposed fleet would prevent the English 
marauders from maintaining their own bases in the Carolinas from which they could 
more easily attack the Spanish islands trade.63  Much of the plans for this new Caribbean 
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61.  AGS Estado, 841:91, 16 July 1604; AGS Estado 841:100, 23 July 1604 
 
62.  See chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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fleet drew from the creation of the Armada of Flanders created to defend Spanish 
Netherlands interests in the English Channel.64  The experiences of the Armada of 
Flanders and the experience of war with England in the 1580s proved to the Spanish the 
need for a restructuring of the traditional Spanish Armada.  Dutch ships and sailing 
expertise quickly proved a serious threat to Spanish control around the world.  The 
“Invincible Armada” set out against England failed miserably, motivating Philip to listen 
more intently to his shipbuilders’ advice.  Pedro López de Soto, one such builder and 
inspector of the Lisbon fleet, warned Philip of the need for a completely redesigned fleet 
to keep up with the English.  López told the king that English superiority rested “solely” 
in the “speed and good design” of their ships, coupled with their “efficient artillery and 
marksmen.”65  
As too often happened, these plans never fully materialized.  By the end of Philip 
III’s reign in 1610, the number of Spanish vessels dropped below twenty.  The number of 
vessels did increase to fifty in the following two decades.66  The dearth of adequate 
sailing vessels for a nation with the majority of its possessions across the seas 
dramatically impacted Spain’s ability to hold those territories.  Don Diego Sarmiento de 
Acuña, conde de Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador in London from 1613-1622, 
expressed his concerns to Philip III over the continued growth of the English fleet.  
Acuña reminded Philip that only mastery on the seas secured mastery on land and that 
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Spain lagged far behind the competition.67  As further proof of this deficiency, in 1621 
English piratas once again skirted Spanish defenses and attacked Cartagena.  One of 
many continued attacks, the “well-armed” pirates absconded with one thousand bushels 
of maiz, more than six million pesos in gold and silver, and caused much damage to the 
ports and merchants operating there.68 
The damages done by such attacks continued to aid English naval plans while 
hampering Spain’s.  Unlike James VI/I, his son Charles I (1625-1649) did implement 
some ship-building programs in England.  Charles I moved England towards a more 
professional navy, building larger warships than England traditionally employed under 
his successors.  Charles’ naval plans paled in comparison to the succeeding revolutionary 
government under Cromwell and the Rump Parliament.  Cromwell’s biggest strength lay 
in his commanding and organizing of the New Model Navy while his Spanish enemy 
struggled to build and finance a navy across the empire.  At the start of the Civil War, in 
1649, the navy consisted of fifty warships and some other smaller vessels.69  Smaller 
vessels had been the staple of the English naval force for almost a century, but Charles 
continued to build larger ships, much like the Spanish had done.  When Parliament took 
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over, some of their first plans included building twenty-five new ships of a more agile 
and versatile design.70  The navy planned to add thirty more such ships by 1652.71   
In general, more of the lower classes supported the Roundhead movement than 
Charles I’s Cavalier followers.  (“Roundheads” was the name given to the Army and 
supporters of Cromwell and Parliament.  “Cavaliers” supported king.)  The Roundheads 
wanted to curb the excesses of the King and the pro-Catholic leanings that led him to 
favor traditional French and Spanish enemies at the expense of English concerns.  The 
navy, already consisting of more lower-class men looking for whatever employment they 
could find, sided with Cromwell and his Roundheads as the Stuart kings stripped the 
navy and held little respect for sailors.72  Even the Restoration diarist Samuel Pepys 
lamented the poor administration of the Navy under the Stuarts before and after the 
Interregnum (the period of Parliamentary and Cromwellian Commonwealth rule between 
the Civil War’s end in 1649 and the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660).  A 
Royalist supporter, Pepys still commended the revolutionaries for their naval policies.   
The maintenance of the Commonwealth army eventually drained the 
government’s resources, but the Commonwealth Navy benefited from well-managed 
finances and an incredible increase in ships.73  Over the course of the Interregnum, the 
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navy added over 200 ships to its force.74  Naval forces had made England great, defeating 
the Invincible Spanish Armada, and beginning the fight for New World dominance.  The 
Stuart kings readily constricted English maritime expeditions to the New World on the 
complaints of Spain, but Cromwell determined to make England a naval power once 
more. 
Under Cromwell, the navy once again held an important place in the operation of 
the state.  First and foremost, Cromwell realized that he needed to prove his might abroad 
as much as at home.  He did so through promotion of the New Model Navy.  Though 
scholars give most attention to the Roundhead Army for its unprecedented scale and 
professionalization at the time, they too often ignore the navy.  Control of the navy meant 
protection of English trade, blockading of efforts to aid Charles I and his Cavalier army, 
and a show of the might and right of the Roundhead cause to the rest of Europe.  
Cromwell’s navy effectively controlled the English coastlines, collecting enough customs 
to finance itself.75   
This show of strength alone served as a deterrent to most foreign powers to send 
aid to Charles I.  Though Charles did receive some foreign support, without control of the 
Navy, Charles could not effectively negotiate with other European crowns for 
intervention, as evidenced by the failure of Spanish alliance with the English King in 
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1642.76  Cromwell recognized this failure in his predecessor and made the navy the 
instrument of his imperial ambitions to solidify his place at the head of the English 
government, earning respect from his enemies.  Lord Clarendon wrote that Cromwell’s 
greatness abroad rivaled his power at home.77  While the European powers debated 
supporting the King or the Commonwealth, Cromwell definitely gave them reason to 
debate.  
In 1628, Charles made a final effort to revive the Committee on the Navy.  His 
use of “ship-money” taxes to expand dockyards and build his lumbering warships had 
contributed greatly to rising revolutionary arguments.  Charles had also forbidden the 
Navy to attack Spanish ships advancing on Scotland in the 1630s, as well as forbidding 
intervention against attacks by Barbary pirates.  Effectively tying the hands of the Navy 
and showing his concerns to please Spain to be greater than his concerns for England, 
Charles made it easy for men to see more promise in the Commonwealth Navy than in his 
own.  Even before the outbreak of Civil War, seamen abandoned their posts.  For 
example, in 1636, 220 of the 250 men aboard the St. Andrew simply vanished from its 
roster.78  Like other sailors before them, many of these repaired to the Caribbean where 
the New Model Navy came to recruit them just a few short years later.   
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Some men did desert back to the Royalists.  Many of the mariners who did so 
came from the corps of gentleman-captains.  In fact, no gentleman-captains remained and 
no captains remained that had commanded a man-of-war before 1637.79  The New Model 
Navy was now a proving ground for men who wished to raise their status in the corps and 
in society.   
Again repeating Elizabethan practice, Cromwell and the Commonwealth hired 
merchantmen and errant seamen to supplement naval forces.  Alongside these personnel 
practices, Cromwell once again encouraged privateering, especially against the Spanish 
as an inroad to naval service.  With these policies, the New Model Navy acquired over 
100 ships taken as prizes to add to its building program.80  The Venetian secretary in 
London in 1655 wrote that the navy brought Cromwell “friendship and repute in every 
part of the world.”81  At the start of the Restoration, the state still claimed 161 ships of 
impressive caliber.  Pepys called it “a naval force such as no English monarch had ever 
possessed.”82  In that same year, 1661, the French fleet only had twenty ships.83  Noted 
previously, Spain had fifty state-owned ships, less than half of the English fleet.  The 
English fleet owed its strength to the reinvigoration of naval policy and administration 
under Cromwell. 
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The decades of 1620-1650 remain marked for the intense and varied domestic 
wars that occupied England and Spain.  Under Philip III and Philip IV, Spain struggled 
with numerous European wars including wars in Italy, aside from the ongoing conflict in 
the Netherlands.  Philip III set a course for his son that demanded success in the 
“damnosa hereditas” Netherlands.84  Coupled with increasing imperial competition in the 
West Indies, these wars left Philip IV almost constantly at war.  England found itself 
entering into civil war in the 1640s.  Obviously, these events hold importance for this 
project.  The overstretching and overtaxing of Spanish resources made it possible for 
Englishmen to gain a foothold in America and the Caribbean, with little (or 
underfunded/uncoordinated) resistance from the Spanish.  Comparatively, the English 
government found itself consumed in an uprising that led to the end of the centuries-old 
monarchy and created an entirely new governmental structure.  Understandably, these 
domestic events affect the amount of focus these two nations could pay to their overseas 
colonies, no matter their importance.  In the case of the English, the new government’s 
need for support and resources created a renewed interest in the Atlantic World as a place 
to build a new republican empire. 
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CHAPTER V 
STUART EXILES, SPANISH JAMAICA, AND THE WESTERN DESIGN 
 
 
Despite the importance of Jamaica within Caribbean colonial history and within 
seventeenth-century European politics, modern scholars have largely overlooked this 
period of the island’s history.  Not since Francisco Morales Padrón’s masterful work, 
Spanish Jamaica, written half a century ago, have scholars explored the importance of 
the island before Cromwell’s Western Design.  Even the histories of the Western Design 
in Jamaica have largely failed to recognize the value of the island or its role in politics.  
For Spanish historians, Jamaica remained a backwater of little value.  For English 
historians, the Western Design remains a failure on all accounts.  Archival research 
shows that the need for a reevaluation of these traditional arguments.   
Spanish documents reveal that Spanish officials and settlers warned the 
government about the need for greater defense of the island citing the large number of 
pirates already operating there.  They further iterate how detrimental the loss of the island 
would be for the whole of Spanish America.  Padrón notes that early twentieth-century 
scholars also largely ignored the island, claiming that Jamaica’s role dwindled after the 
1523 conquest of Mexico.1  Spanish settlers did not establish a large-scale encomienda 
system on the island as in many of the empire’s other colonies.  Even so, Jamaica sat at a 
particularly strategic point of the Spanish trade routes, making it an important asset for 
the empire, albeit an overlooked one. 
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For a century, Spain failed to secure the island and Cromwell’s New Model Navy 
exploited that weakness.  The Western Design did not achieve its main objective of 
acquiring Hispaniola, however, after recruiting exiles from the neighboring islands, the 
Commonwealth forces easily overtook forces in Jamaica.  The exiles that the New Model 
Navy recruited drew from rover communities established in the Caribbean following 
James VI/I’s early seventeenth-century reversal of Elizabethan privateering policies.  
James’ proclamations cancelling Elizabethan letters of reprisal led to emigration of many 
Englishmen to the Caribbean and to the creation of rover communities throughout the 
Caribbean basin.2  Regretting his predecessor’s encouragement of the “surprising and 
taking” of Spanish ships at sea, James deplored the eagerness with which English 
mariners annoyed and spoiled Spanish shipping.3  James offered seamen one month to 
uphold his new peace treaty with Spain and to “stop going warlike to sea.”4  Any mariner 
not heeding James’ proclamations faced “being reputed and taken as Pirates,” having 
their goods and lands confiscated, and risked a death sentence.5  The language of this 
proclamation differed greatly from early Elizabethan “letter-transfer” legislation where 
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seamen need only switch out their licenses for a Tudor seal.  The new Stuart king, much 
more eager for peace with Spain, aimed to reverse all such Elizabethan maritime practice.   
English seamen first showed their disdain for this discontinuation by ignoring the 
proclamations.  Six months after his first proclamations, James lamented the continued 
depravity of English seamen.6  Facing increasing numbers of “rogues” and “incorrigible” 
attacks at home and abroad, James decided to expand his earlier decrees.  Should 
mariners continue their predations, James sentenced them to banishment in The New 
Found-land and the East and West Indies.7  In doing so, James unwittingly increased the 
very same piracy to which he objected.   
The men affected by these proclamations then created their own communities in 
the various islands of the Caribbean, setting the foundation for Cromwell’s success in the 
Caribbean.  The French and Dutch reminded James of the popular discontent with his 
policies, prompting the King to issue some of the first increases of piracy punishment 
statutes since Henry VIII.8  Showing mariners’ contempt for James, the Habsburg 
ambassador to the Netherlands related that English mariners resented the King’s attempts 
to curb prize acquisition and hinder what the mariners saw as a favorable war with 
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Spain.9  Englishmen seamen enjoyed the living they had made under the late Queen.  
Privateering had become an occupation.  Turning again to Shakespeare, who served as 
court playwright under Elizabeth and James, the character of Othello represents the 
conflicted position of privateers in James’ early reign.10  The figure of the brave sailor-
general fighting for honor and reputation, yet always seen as an outcast describes the 
attack on privateers’ identity and reputation in this period.11  Despite their service to the 
nation in the Armada campaigns, like Othello, privateers earned little to no praise from 
their king.12 
  James, hoping for peace at last with Spain, meant to change this but offered 
mariners little alternative but punishment for their occupations.  Within a year of James’ 
succession, the Admiralty Court executed more men for piracy than it had in almost four 
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decades.13  Spain, expectedly, applauded the changes made to piracy and admiralty law to 
uphold James’ new policies and the new peace with Spain.  Robert Cecil, the English 
Secretary of State from 1590-1612, remained wary of some of these new maritime 
provisions.14  Writing from Spain on a diplomatic trip, Cecil, the Earl of Salisbury, 
expressed his concerns over the future of English naval power.  Spain expected to pick up 
the pieces left as England stepped up its prosecution of pirates.  Officials expected to buy 
confiscated ships, seize more English ships coming into Spanish ports, and thereby 
expected the English navy to diminish in size and power.15  The navy did significantly 
decrease in terms of manpower.   
When James ordered English reprisal letters rescinded, many mariners took their 
skills to the Caribbean and the Mediterranean.  A number of these men operated as true 
pirates: not beholden to any one Crown and preying indiscriminately.  Others still gained 
letters of marque and merchant licenses from various foreign princes generally in the 
Italian or Ottoman states.  This phenomenon grew to such a point within such a short 
time that James began issuing Proclamations for revocation of Mariners from forreine 
services beginning in 1605.16  James issued versions of this proclamation again in 1609, 
1622, and 1623.  Just as Elizabeth could not effectively curb piracy during her early 
reign, James could not keep seamen loyal to England. 
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The exodus of “able and skillfull Mariners” from England went against the 
“allegieance and duty of a subject.”17  Even Shakespeare moved into the Caribbean with 
The Tempest, one his few non-European plays.  Drawing from the emigration of English 
seamen and from the numerous travel narratives appearing in England, Shakespeare once 
again mirrored English piracy policies in his plays.18  English seamen continued to reject 
these policies.  Making peace with Spain and changing decades-old maritime traditions 
constituted its own sort of betrayal to many English seamen.  Therefore, they felt that 
they owed little to a sovereign who did not take their concerns into account, especially 
when that sovereign resorted to more forceful punishments.  Increasing piracy 
punishments for the first time in almost a century, James also openly encouraged 
impressment of his own subjects.  James instructed port officials and naval officers to 
press into service any seamen found committing piracy or in the service of any prince but 
the King of England.19  For twenty years, many seamen refused to join James’ navy, 
prompting the King to allow impressment of men into service.  This did not help the 
loyalty issues already rampant between the King and his mariners, resulting in the 
continued exodus of seamen from English shores. 
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Both Spain and England extended their control over American territories during 
the seventeenth century, continuously clashing over the right to settle these lands.  
Spain’s inability to mount an effective defense against English marauders and England’s 
growing wealth and power from such attack allowed England gradually supplanted Spain 
in the New World—at least in North America and a number of Caribbean islands.  
European wars and internal strife constantly occupied these nations’ primary attention.  
The growing importance of the Americas and the Caribbean forced each nation to re-
evaluate their policies.   
In the 1650s, the Caribbean played a significant role in Anglo-Spanish politics 
and Jamaica stood at the forefront of this renewed focus.  During the reign of the first 
Stuart Kings of England, Jamaica served as a refuge for English mariners, pirates, and 
exiles, operating in and around the traditionally Spanish island.  The failure of the 
Spanish government to secure the island once they acknowledged its importance to the 
empire opened the door for a revolutionary English leader to take hold of the island and 
begin a new phase of English expansion, and ultimately, empire.  
Discovered by Columbus on his second voyage to the New World, Jamaica 
proved a crucial possession for further Spanish voyages into Mexico and north into Cuba 
and La Florida.  In 1514, King Ferdinand allowed settlers to the island to possess their 
own ships and trading vessels for use throughout the Caribbean.20  Several colonists 
wrote that Jamaica held numerous stores of livestock and other resources useful to the 
colonization efforts in nearby territories.  Francisco de Garay, the second Governor of the 
island, from 1514-1523, informed the king of the abundance of produce as well.  He 
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claimed that “the colonization of Terra Firma will not cease, because of a shortage of 
supplies” to come from his island.21  If the island had no other significance to the Crown, 
it did at least provide a steady supply of food and resources for the conquering armies.  
These supplies had also been “essential” for Vasco Nuñez de Balboa on his expedition to 
discover the South Sea.22  Occasionally, the government did recognize the importance of 
promoting settlement on the island.  One of these few promotional policies occurred in 
1521.  The Spanish crown waived custom duties on personal goods for any Spaniards 
who chose to settle in Jamaica.23  The scale of encouragement for such policy remained 
minimal until the English took the island over a century later.   
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, despite the strategic location of the 
island and the amount of resources there, only one fort existed on the island.  Especially 
with the regular crossings of the Vera Cruz Plate Fleets between Cuba and Jamaica, the 
island needed greater fortification.  The Admiral Ménez de Avilés and the Abbot Don 
Francisco Márquez de Villalobos informed the king once more of the island’s deficient 
security.  Numerous other accounts outline these fears.  Some of them speak to great loss 
of resources and trade security, and more still relate the constant appearance of piratas 
and corsarios.  Letters to the Spanish ambassador in London, Don Gerau Despes 
reiterated this fact by relating news of bienes robados of the English in 1570.24  Other 
letters to Despes related how pirates wait at the harbours to trade slaves and attack the 
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“five good ships” defending the island.25  The governor, Licado, also warned the king of 
the dangers of losing the island.  He asked for more defense measures and an end to the 
negligent rule of Columbus’ descendants.26  Some of the problems in constructing forts 
on the island stemmed from the mismanaged government on the island.  Columbus and 
his descendants had received numerous rights to the island resulting in an almost carte 
blanche management of the island.  Over the course of Jamaica’s history, these Columbus 
descendants, the King himself, various audiencias (courts), and still more governors or 
admirals gained charge of the island.  Few extended periods of time existed when the 
island had one efficient or effective hierarchy of government.27  This disorganization led 
to the government’s continued disregard of Jamaica.  The Spanish government did little 
to answer these complaints and send the requisite goods and men to defend the island for 
over a century.   
The location of the island, central to practically all Spanish-American trade, 
created an environment ripe for piracy.  A steady flow of contraband trade existed for 
most of the island’s history, participated in by settlers, pirates, and government officials 
alike.  The amount of traffic encircling the island further attested to its strategic 
importance.  Surprisingly, despite Padrón’s research and that of Irene Wright, very few 
scholars have promoted the importance of Jamaica within the colonial Caribbean.28  
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English historians of the early modern Caribbean deal with these works even less than 
Spanish historians.  Revisiting these documents and archives proves the need for a 
reevaluation of Jamaica’s place within early modern Caribbean history and within the 
larger imperial conflict for dominance in the New World. 
At the start of the seventeenth century, one Spanish Governor, Fernando 
Melgarejo Córdoba (1596-1606), did actively address the importance of defending 
Jamaica’s coastline.  He made plans to construct new forts and to create a small naval 
fleet to remain in the island.  The Armada de la Guardia de la carrerra de las Indias 
mentioned in the previous chapter sailed as protection to the Plate Fleets only.  The 
armada’s plans made no considerations for defending coastline forts in the Caribbean 
islands.  Melagrejo, moreso than the Spanish crown, realized that forts meant little if the 
sea remained open and free.29  Even though Melgarejo wrote up these plans, he never put 
them into motion.  Generally acknowledged as one of the more corrupt of a number of 
corrupt Jamaica governors, Melgarejo constantly undermined his own efforts.  Colonists 
reported how the governor sold gunpowder to passing ships no matter their nationality 
because of the inflated profit he could earn.  Melgarejo also dismissed the island’s 
official armsmaker leaving the island no resident manufacturer of munitions.30  
Therefore, even if Melgarejo followed through on his ambitious defense plans, the ships 
and forts had no readily available firepower.  As other nations, especially the English, 
recognized the situation in Jamaica, piracy steadily increased.  England had already 
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begun establishing supply bases in the Caribbean in places like Barbados and around the 
Carolina coast in the sixteenth century.   
Jamaica loomed as a new prize directly in the heart of Spanish trade to add to 
these existing possessions.  During the first half of the seventeenth century, since 
Melgarejo’s dismissal of the island’s armorer, the crown never assigned a replacement.  
While the militia suffered from this lack or arms, the Jamaican cabildo (Spanish colonial 
administrative council) claimed that at least the majority of settlers could help defend the 
island.  The cabildo iterated the hunting experience of the settlers saying that they 
“[were] skilled shots of such calibre that when flint pieces, gunlocks, and cocks were 
lacking, with gun barrel and stock in one hand, and a length of fuse in the other, there 
were [still] able to fire those arms.”31  When the English landed just a few years later, 
these skilled shots fell short. 
The increase in piratical attacks during the end of Melgarejo’s term prompted 
Phillip III to take some sort of action.  Philip III sent out a galleon fleet in 1608 that did 
little to stem the growing tide of piracy.32  The 1620s saw steady attacks by the English 
and Dutch primarily.  Some sources total the losses of this period at around 700,000 
ducats.33  In response, Philip IV also gave orders in 1627 for the creation of another fleet 
to sail to Jamaica and Santo Domingo.34  Padrón claims that “it was known and 
understood that the cure and the salvation [of the Empire as a whole] lay with the sea,” 
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but this does not seem to be the case.35  Even though the Spanish kings occasionally sent 
ships to the Jamaica, no continuous dedicated policy to do so existed throughout the 
seventeenth century.  When Philip IV finally sent a military engineer, Juan Bautista 
Antonelli, to the island in the 1630s, the report stated that Jamaica had too small a harbor 
for bigger ships and was therefore not likely to be as coveted an island,36 though much of 
the contemporary correspondence shows evidence to the contrary.  Antonelli did not 
address the existence of the smaller, lighter ships of the English pirates that navigated 
such harbors much more easily than Spanish galleons.  Unfortunately, an internal rivalry 
between the Cuban and Jamaican governors made moot Antonelli’s plans for and further 
consideration of Jamaica’s defenses.  Desiring the completion of his own new fort, the 
Cuban governor, Lorenzo de Cabrera y Corbera (1626-1630), detained Antonelli.37  
Without the supervision of one of Spain’s chief military engineers, little to nothing 
changed defensively in Jamaica for the next two decades. 
Losing the trade routes encircling the island could have devastating consequences 
for Spanish America.  Once lost, Jamaica would be practically impossible to recover.38  
Don Carlos de Ybarras, slated as the Captain of the Armada de la guardia de la carrera 
de las Indias, in 1634, related the amount of trade to the island, claiming that frigates 
brought three to four hundred people to Jamaica.  He estimated that within a year this 
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population would produce a revenue of at least ten thousand pesos.  As the enemy 
recognized the island as “an island of many provisions,” Ybarras entreated the King to 
recognize the need for protection of this wealth.  Ybarras referenced the continued need 
for an Armada de Barlovento to guard the island.39  Also in 1634, the Marquis de 
Cadereita tried to convince the King of the fertility of the island’s sugar and tobacco 
crops that easily enticed other nations to make attempts on Jamaica.40  Citing the ease in 
which enemies came and went from Negril Harbor, the Marquis asked again for 
protection of the island and the valuable wood and resources enemies gained there.41  
Letters to the King in 1638 became more concerned about the lack of protection afforded 
Jamaica.  Claiming that the government had done nothing to protect the island for two 
and a half years, letters reported how the island “would easily be overrun” by enemies 
who “will be owners” of the island if fortification plans did not proceed quickly.42  On 
various occasions, the Spanish Crown sent out directives to Cuba, Hispaniola, and other 
nearby islands to send supplies and support to Jamaica.  Rarely did the other governors 
actually follow such orders and rarely did the Crown enforce them.   
The governors of Santiago de Cuba, especially, showed an intense animosity 
towards their Jamaican neighbors.  Padrón claims that this “friction...was one of the most 
outstanding features” of seventeenth-century Caribbean governance.43  By the mid-
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seventeenth century, as the fragility of Jamaican defenses became a ticking bomb for 
Spanish power in the Caribbean, the King sent orders that the Greater Antilles turn all of 
their attention and efforts towards Jamaica.  The Cuban governor, for one, flatly 
refused.44  These disagreements only added to/amplified the powerlessness of the Crown 
in the Caribbean.   
Engineer Antonelli had tried to reassure Philip IV that the island had adequate 
artillery for defense in 1635, claiming that the island housed at least eight large 
cannons.45  Antonelli had barely even seen the Jamaican armaments as the Cuban 
governor kept him detained with Cuban fortification projects.  Contradicting Antonelli’s 
reports, the Duke de Veragua responded that the island had very few and “ill-preserved” 
muskets and cannons with little gunpowder to even use in them.  The Duke resorted to 
ordering Captain Jacinto Sedeño and Captain Albornoz to travel to Cartagena or Santo 
Domingo to purchase as much ammunition as possible, but reminded the King that 
gunpowder is “quite expensive.”46  As his predecessors noted, the lack of defense meant 
that pirates constantly interfered in the island’s trade and supplies, forcing inhabitants to 
resort to bartering amongst themselves.  Luckily, settlers found abundant fruit, fleeces, 
and meat to help sustain them despite their poverty of currency.  Veragua petitioned for a 
number of ships to regularly police the surrounding waters, citing the “well known need 
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to preserve this island,” its importance for Spanish colonial navigation, and the damage 
that would result from Jamaica’s loss.47    
Jamaica occupied a significant place within the Spanish Caribbean.  In 1643, 
Captain Juan de Arencibia noted that only one of these eight cannons fully functioned.48   
Misinformation and slow progress constantly plagued the defense of the island.  The 
King approved requests to send ships to Jamaica with war supplies in 1644.  By 1651, 
seven years later, the original petitioner, the Duke of Veragua, had not even procured the 
ship.49  The archives show a constant stream of correspondence in the 1630s and 1640s 
about the necessity of defending the island.  If the Crown questioned the importance of 
the island, these documents also repeatedly described the amount of foodstuffs and goods 
available there.  Simply because the government was preoccupied with other wars or 
favored islands like Cuba and Hispaniola, did not make Jamaica any less important to the 
supplying of the colonies, nor did it make Jamaica any less strategically placed amidst 
Spanish trade and therefore increasingly desirable to pirates and the expanding English 
empire (as well as to Dutch and French sailors looking to expand their trade and 
influence).  Already, in 1640, Spanish enemies occupied San Christobal, Dominica, and 
other coastlines within easy distance of Jamaica.  Officials, as always, wrote about the 
“known risk of losing the island” with the enemy ever close and better armed than much 
of Jamaica’s settlers.50 
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The lack of defense of Jamaica, or its fairly easy conquering by Cromwell 
eventually, has less to do with the “worthlessness” of the island than with the inefficient 
governance and supply of the island by the Spanish government.  The island deserved 
more attention simply because the loss of control in the surrounding trade routes would 
be even more detrimental than the island might be useful.  Still, despite this recognition 
and correspondence requesting support, little to nothing came to fruition.  As in the case 
of the famed Armada almost a century prior, the Spanish government remained mired in 
its own bureaucracy.  For twenty years, Jamaican governors, colonists, and the King 
himself had recognized the need to fortify and protect the island as it could be a valuable 
asset to the empire, but did little to follow through on those plans.   
  
English Civil War and a New ‘Design’ 
 
The missed opportunities for properly defending Jamaica against attack during the 
seventeenth-century “siesta of Spanish history”51 paved the way for English occupation 
of the island in the 1650s.  Even though Jamaican residents experienced pirate attacks for 
almost a century,52 the island remained inadequately fortified and, in 1654-1655, an 
official English fleet sailed west to capture the island and gain prestige for their new 
government.  That fleet, commanded by Army General Robert Venables and General-at-
                                                          
51.  Padrón, Spanish Jamaica, 216.  
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Sea William Penn, did not sail under royal flags, but rather under the flags of the 
revolutionary Interregnum regime led by Oliver Cromwell.   
Ending the English Civil War in 1649, Cromwell’s army toppled the Stuart 
monarchy and introduced England’s first Parliamentary government.  As with the leader 
of a new regime, especially a revolutionary one, Cromwell knew he must find a way to 
establish his new government’s authority and earn the official recognition of the 
European powers in order to make his revolution permanent and not just another 
rebellion.  With this goal in mind, Cromwell crafted his “Western Design” to found an 
official colony in the lucrative Caribbean while also striking at the heart of the mighty 
Spanish Empire, thus aiming to prove England’s dominance in the ongoing imperial 
competition for the New World. 
Before Cromwell turned his sights westward, he needed first to secure victory 
over the Charles I and his Cavalier supporters.  Stuart succession to the English throne in 
1603, under Charles’ father James VI/I, initially troubled Englishmen.  James VI of 
Scotland, the late Elizabeth’s cousin, had proved himself an adequate and peaceable king 
in Scotland.53  Englishmen did not vehemently challenge James’ succession, though 
neither did they take to the streets to celebrate it.  James’ alienation of many of his 
subjects, chiefly through his maritime policies and affinity for peace with Spain left his 
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reign filled with tension despite its superficial stability.  Constant compromise and 
negotiations both at home and abroad characterized James’s reign.  Furthermore, the 
mass emigration of valuable skilled mariners during his reign did little to curry favor 
within the realm.  At least under James, England remained fairly politically stable.  
Charles I managed to undo any domestic goodwill his father had worked to build.   
Within twenty years on the throne of England, Charles saw the country plunged 
into civil war and witnessed the end of the English monarchical state.  Other scholars 
have told the story of the English Civil War at length.  They explain the deepening of the 
internal political, religious, and social divisions of early seventeenth-century England and 
how those divisions led to greater Parliamentary power and the diminution of absolute 
monarchy in England.54  Charles incensed his subjects with his “Eleven Years Tyranny,” 
his period of personal rule when he rarely called Parliament into session.  Englishmen 
also took great offense to Charles’ skirting of tax policies by employing archaic duties on 
the use of the King’s forests, issuing illegal monopolies, and levying taxes like ship-
money without Parliamentary approval.  Englishmen did not oppose paying all taxes, 
even ship-money, but they objected the haphazard application of those taxes and the royal 
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imposition of them.55  Though Philip IV offered Charles little help, Spain was embroiled 
in its own series of provincial uprisings and internal turmoil.56  With no other recourse, 
Charles called the “Long Parliament” in 1640, which lasted until 1653 when the 
Roundhead army dismissed it.  In this Long Parliament, Charles’ desperation forced him 
to cede many royal rights and agree to Parliamentary demands, like regular Parliamentary 
sessions.57  The continued devolution of debate between Parliament and the King spread 
through the country and resulted in Scottish and Irish rebellions, and eventually turned 
into a full-blown Civil War.  Finally, in 1649, the Roundhead Army defeated the 
Royalists.  A tribunal tried and executed Charles I, beginning the Parliamentary rule of 
the Interregnum period lasting from 1649-1660. 
Colonists also felt the effects of the Civil War.  English Civil War scholars remain 
overwhelming Euro-centric, rarely mentioning how the war affected the colonies.58  Only 
recently have scholars begun to explore the dissemination of pamphlets abroad and 
colonists’ reactions to the war,59 despite the fact that only six of the 24 British colonies 
                                                          
55.  John Kenyon and Jane Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998), 11. 
56.  John Lynch, The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1598-1700, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 
1992), originally published in 1969; Stradling, Philip IV and the Government of Spain. 
57.  “Triennial Act,” in Statutes of the Realm, vol. 5: 1628-1680 (1819), 54-57. 
58.  McElligott claims that Roundhead scholars have been much apt to take up the mantle of an 
Atlantic history of the Civil War, whereas Royalist scholars have remained “doggedly Anglo-
centric.”  Jason McElligott, “Atlantic Royalism?  Polemic, Censorship and the Declaration and 
the Protestation of the Governour and Inhabitants of Virginia,” in McElligott and Smith, eds. 
Royalists and Royalism During the Interregnum, 214.  
59.  McElligott, Smith, and Pestana are some of the first scholars to extensively discuss the 
significance of the Civil War as it pertains the Caribbean.  McElligott and Smith, eds., Royalists 
and Royalism During the Interregnum; Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution. 
 119 
 
publicly declared for the king and rebelled against the Puritan regime.  The rebellious six 
were Antigua, Barbados, Bermuda, Maryland, Newfoundland, and Virginia.   
Most colonies, being so far detached from the mainland and so reliant on their 
neighbors in the smaller, tougher environment of colonial life, tempered their opinions 
about the Civil War.  Needing the mainland for trading and therefore survival, the 
colonies tended to accept the Commonwealth even if many inhabitants did not agree with 
it in principle.  The most vehement Royalist supporter, Virginia, joined the 
Commonwealth by the end of 1649.60  In Barbados, during 1649-1650, there existed a 
“Treaty of Turkey and Roast Pig” meant to keep peace among the settlers.  The treaty 
stated that “whosoever named the word Roundhead or Cavalier, should give to those that 
heard him a shot [young hog] and a turkey...to be eaten at his house who made the 
forfeiture...that they might enjoy the company of one another.”61  Though Barbados 
played host to a population with a majority of exiled Royalists and Cavalier supporters, 
many of them hesitated to declare for the King, favoring the “Treaty of Turkey and Roast 
Pig” for as long as it lasted.  Barbados, like Jamaica, welcomed exiles from either side of 
the fight.62  Even as divisions in the colony grew, Cavaliers and Roundheads alike 
continued to engage in friendly communication and cooperation for the sake of the 
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colony’s success.63  Any resistance to the Interregnum regime seemed to dissipate 
because, by 1652, the Commonwealth regained control of all the Caribbean islands.64 
The Commonwealth understood the importance of the colonies more so than the 
Stuarts.  Whereas James and Charles saw colonial possession more as their right in the 
expansion of their kingdom, the Commonwealth, and Cromwell in particular better 
understood the economic and political necessity of gaining control of the colonies.  An 
“Oath of Engagement” was required of all Englishmen departing for the Americas to 
ensure, at least nominally, the support of Englishmen in every corner of the realm.65  
Especially at the start of Commonwealth rule, the government monitored colonial 
correspondence and publications as much as possible.66  A united England meant further 
proof of the Commonwealth’s legitimacy to the rest of the world.  The scheme worked as 
Spain officially recognized the new “Republic of England” in 1650.67  France remained 
more skeptical of the new regime and kept up their engagement in the Dutch War until 
1654 in order to avoid the issue.  Cardinal Mazarin used the time to devise a scheme to 
divert an English-Spanish alliance by playing up the wealth of the Indies to Cromwell.68 
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Having already recognized the importance of the Caribbean, Cromwell began 
preparations to attack Spanish forces both for the wealth he expected from prizes and for 
the respect he expected to earn from other European governments.  By 1654, Cromwell 
and his army disbanded Parliament.  Cromwell ruled under the title of “Lord Protector.”  
Some of his councilors proposed attacking Spain proper, but Cromwell preferred to 
attack the Americas first and foremost.  Cromwell believed that a Caribbean island “of 
substantial size,” won under the name of the Commonwealth, “would come in more 
useful than Barbados where Royalist had previously been sent.”69  In the same vein of 
thinking as Elizabeth, Cromwell believed that striking at Spanish colonies in the 
Americas would help his new regime acquire necessary financial gains.  Unlike his 
General John Lambert, The Protector believed that Spain remained too distracted 
elsewhere in its empire to retaliate for an island attack as quickly and violently as General 
Lambert warned.70  Using this to his advantage in the Indies, Cromwell asserted his force 
as legitimate ruler of England, kept Spain distracted, and gained valuable resources to 
continue his imperial plans.   
In the Caribbean, Cromwell recycled Elizabethan privateering policies and 
diplomatic justifications for such endeavors and gained the valuable Atlantic colony he 
saw as crucial to the establishment of his new political rule.  Having kept the support of 
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the Navy throughout the Civil War, Cromwell had the full force of naval power at his 
disposal.71  During Christmas 1654, the Western Design fleet sailed for Barbados with 
sixty ships and four thousand soldiers where it picked up a dozen more ships and at least 
five thousand more soldiers from among the settlers, local militia, and the “unruly set” of 
exiled mariners that operated in the surrounding waters.72   General Venables recruited 
more “unruly” men in St. Kitts.  After failing to secure Hispaniola, the navy found 
success in Jamaica, thanks in part to the continued recruitment of exiles and pirates.  On 
28 November 1655, having won Jamaica, the Lord Protector issued a charter for the 
establishment of an official English city at Port Royal, Jamaica, to be the capitol of the 
new Commonwealth colony.  Cromwell further declared that “Within the tropics where 
there is never Peace, and without the tropics where Peace yet it, there shall now be War 
with Spain...We will maintain Jamaica, send reinforcement after reinforcement to it; we 
will try yet for the Spanish Plate Fleets...and have no peace with Spain.”73  With this 
expedition…and with the help of Caribbean pirates and exiles, Cromwell gained 
recognition and peace with France, proved his might against the Spanish foe, and set out 
to plant the foundations of one of England’s most lucrative colonies.   
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CHAPTER VI 
“SODOM OF THE NEW WORLD” AND THE EMPIRE:  
EXILE COMMUNITIES, ENGLISH POLITICS, AND PORT ROYAL, JAMAICA, 
1655-1692 
 
Cromwell’s Western Design represented the triumph of English imperial 
endeavors against their Spanish enemies.  The official chartering of the city of Port Royal 
and the establishment of Jamaica as an English colony was the culmination of a century-
long cycle of piracy legislation.  Cromwell’s forces conquered the island thanks in large 
part to the help of exiled mariners who continued their pirating ways in the area after 
Stuart rulers discontinued Elizabethan privateering policies.  For these mariners’ 
assistance, Cromwell offered them a way to rejoin the English state in settling the colony 
for the empire.  Having lived as exiles and pirates, many of these men did not exactly fit 
the ideal of an English “gentleman,” useful though they may have been to the expansion 
of the empire.  Cromwell himself further complicated the social makeup of the island by 
exporting Irish dissidents and other criminals to settle the island and work its developing 
plantations.  This social makeup quickly earned Port Royal the title of the “Sodom of the 
New World.”  A colonial capital, made up of barely legitimate citizens, yet integral to the 
development of an English Atlantic empire, Port Royal constitutes an ideal case-study for 
exploring the changing status of pirates and criminals in English politics and Caribbean 
settlement. 
In the latter half of the sixteenth century, the English began to expand their 
overseas influence.  By the seventeenth century, this influence developed into a push 
towards empire and permanent settlement of new lands in Africa, North America, and, 
most importantly for this study, the Caribbean.  One of the most fabled of these English 
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settlements lies on the central southern coast of the island of Jamaica—the city of Port 
Royal.  The politics of three English rulers shaped the development of this city.  
International politics and the profits from booming seventeenth-century trade further 
determined the importance of the city and determined what kind of men would come to 
reside in Port Royal.  A burgeoning buccaneer city even before its semi-destruction by an 
earthquake in 1692, Port Royal embodied the best and worst of life in the Caribbean and 
held an important place in seventeenth-century English New World policy.  
Not just a trading center, Port Royal and the island of Jamaica deserve study as 
places where European revolution and war intersect with the formation of a new Atlantic 
World and the emergence of a new, revived culture of piracy.  Surprisingly few studies 
exist that deal solely with the history of Port Royal.  Much of the scholarship on the city 
remains embedded in larger political histories of Anglo-Spanish conflict in the Caribbean 
or in social histories of seventeenth and eighteenth century piracy.  Most literature 
focusing chiefly on the city itself comes from archaeologists.  At Texas A&M University, 
in particular, the Underwater Archaeology Program has conducted one of the largest 
excavations of the sunken portions of the city, diligently mapping the city streets and 
houses and inventorying goods.1   
In the seventeenth century, European settlers and seamen saw Port Royal as an 
especially important city because of its easily accessible harbors, but also because of the 
protection of the port offered by several outlying barrier islands.  The island of Jamaica 
itself offered an ideal base for planning attacks on (largely Spanish) settlements in Cuba, 
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Hispaniola, Panama, Mexico, and other parts of Central and South America (see maps 
below).  Such a position put Jamaica in the  
 
 
Figure 1: Detail of Caribbean from Emmanuel Bowen, “A New and Accurate Chart of the West 
Indies.”  Found in John Harris, Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca [A Complete 
Collection of Voyages and Travels], 1748.  Courtesy of the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center at 
the Boston Public Library, http://maps.bpl.org 
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Figure 2: Detail of Port Royal from Nicolaum Visscher, “Jamaica,” 1680.  Courtesy of the 
Jamaica Parish Reference, http://prestwidge.com/river/jamaicanparishes.html 
  
middle of the most lucrative trade routes between the Americas and Europe making 
Jamaica a highly prized locale for pirate- and privateering-minded men and crowns. 
Some scholars claim that Jamaica may not have been particularly important by 
pointing out how little attention Spain gave to the island.2  Seeing Jamaica as a fever-
ridden backwater, Spain left behind minimal military forces on the island to defend it.  
While Jamaica did not produce the gold and silver that Spaniards had grown accustomed 
to finding throughout the rest of their American holdings, the island offered other 
advantages that growing numbers of pirates and eventually Spain’s enemies, chiefly the 
English, recognized and used to their ultimate advantage.  Even in the case of the English 
mission for Jamaica, during the Interregnum period of the 1650s, many people claimed 
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English efforts on the island were a failure, but the policies begun during this period 
would make Jamaica a rich and valued possession of the Restoration empire.3  Though 
the Interregnum and rule of Cromwell lasted less than a decade, the policies of the period 
in regards to Jamaican settlement requires re-examination.  The plantation schemes that 
flourished on the island into the eighteenth century started under Cromwell.  Without 
Cromwell’s recycling of Elizabethan privateering policy to incorporate wayward 
Caribbean mariners back into the governmental fold, England would not have settled Port 
Royal and the island would not have become the jewel of the Restoration colonies. 
Many English privateers and pirates left England for the Caribbean hoping to 
continue the lucrative lifestyle they had enjoyed for decades and escape the tyranny 
brewing under this new king.  With no other options left to them besides little pay and 
squalid conditions in the Royal Navy, as many as 10,000 Englishmen left the country by 
1615.4  As many as 300,000 Englishmen migrated to the Caribbean during the course of 
the seventeenth century.5  These numbers amount to sixty-eight percent of all Atlantic 
travelers that made the Caribbean their destination. 
 Once in the Caribbean, Englishmen created bases of operation and settlement 
much like the bases that existed along the English and Irish coastlines in the sixteenth 
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century.6  In these areas, Englishmen also joined with other seamen and exiled men from 
other European nations.  No longer working for a government, these men followed no 
restrictions as to who they could attack.  Without national ties, or, at least as national ties 
dissolved in favor of survival and prosperity, these men created international 
communities of what could now once again be termed “pirates.”  Over time, these 
settlements grew and many remained autonomous of any national government—at least 
for significant periods of time.   
 Imperial competition in the Caribbean made possible much of this autonomy.  
Spain and England dominated most of the Caribbean and the Americas, but the French 
and Dutch also entered the fray during the seventeenth century.  Cuba, Jamaica, 
Hispaniola, Bermuda, and Barbados were some of the few Caribbean islands under direct 
control of a European crown.  The French occupied Martinique, St. Kitts, and Saint 
Domingue.  The Dutch most notably occupied Curaçao, Tobago, and Aruba.  As 
evidence of the intense competition for these islands, St. Kitts, for one, came under 
control of the English, French, Spanish, and again the English in less than a decade from 
1623-1630.  In the absence of official crown control of many of these islands, exiles and 
pirates more easily established rover communities throughout the Caribbean. 
 Rover communities inhabited much of the island of Tortuga, for example, in 
1625.  Tortuga lay just off the north-western coast of Spanish Hispaniola.  Exiled seamen 
joined with the rebel and runaway indentured servants on the island.  These rebels lived 
off the land and managed to establish trade in cattle and hides with passing ships from 
various European nations.  On the island, the men adopted the indigenous method of 
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smoking meat called “buccan.”  In French, the term, “boucaine” and “boucanier” came to 
identify not just the meat-preparation method, but the men who practiced it.  By the time 
the English gained a foothold in the area, around 1630, the title of “buccaneer” extended 
to any pirate in the Caribbean.7  Most Englishmen stopping by the island did so on their 
way to the English colony at Providence Island though a number of them either stayed or 
returned to Tortuga when promises on Providence Island went unfulfilled.8 
 Providence Island, the other English Puritan colony, founded off the coast of 
Nicaragua in 1630, also had an impact on English Caribbean designs.  Planning a colony 
of the Puritan Massachusetts colony, the founders envisioned Providence Island as a new 
attempt at a godly society free of the corrupt control of England-based merchants that 
plagued the Massachusetts colony.9  Historians have largely argued that the venture 
failed, resorting to slave labor, falling into the same political corruption as its parent 
colony, and encouraging barely legal privateering.10  Despite the Puritans dislike of these 
criminals, the colonists received valuable geographic and navigational information from 
these men11 in the same way that the Western Design later made use of some of these 
very same men.  Many of the men involved in settling Providence Island, like Richard 
Pym, also served in the Civil War Parliament that overthrew the king and elevated 
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Cromwell.  In one of his speeches to Parliament, Pym claimed that “at least sixty 
thousand able persons of the Nation, many of them well armed, and their bodies seasoned 
to [the] Climate,” lived in the “rich and fruitful” Caribbean, just waiting for the 
government to help support their colonial endeavors.12  These settlers’ experience in the 
colony, and failure, taught them valuable lessons that Cromwell took care to note. 
 Despite the relatively small size of the island and its proximity to the larger island 
of Santo Domingo, both the French and the Spanish forces experienced great difficulty in 
wresting control of the island from the buccaneers that called it home.  During the 1630s 
and 1640s, Spanish officials took note of the growing lawlessness of Tortuga and sent 
expeditions to defeat the French and English settlement there.  In 1653, though Spanish 
forces finally won the battle, they abandoned the island after only eighteen months.  The 
financial constraints the empire experienced by the late seventeenth century affected 
Spanish defensive efforts and kept Spanish forces from mounting an offensive against the 
English military.  An English merchant named Elias Watts, coming from Jamaica, 
recognized an opportunity and created a trading center on the island with the blessing of 
the Jamaican governor.  Once there, Watts headed plans to begin attacking Spanish 
Hispaniola with the help of the Frenchmen left behind from their earlier defeat.  By 1660, 
the French regained Tortuga, but kept the island open to buccaneers of all nationalities.13  
Buccaneer culture began in early seventeenth-century Tortuga, but the island was soon 
overshadowed by the attention afforded its Jamaican neighbor. 
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Figure 3: Island of Jamaica and Isle de la Tortue (Island of Tortuga) from Nicolas de Fer, “L’Isle 
S. Domingue of Espagnole Decouverte l’an 1492” (The Island of Saint Domingue of Spain 
Discovered in the year 1492).  Paris, 1723.  Courtesy of John Carter Brown Library, Brown 
University 
 
Changing of the Guard: A Lord Protector and a New Colony 
 
 Development and settlement in the Caribbean drew special attention in the 
seventeenth century as the Caribbean became the staging place for continental European 
conflicts.  As mentioned earlier, English-sponsored privateering in the Caribbean allowed 
Elizabeth I to strike at Philip II of Spain without officially entering into war.  Anglo-
Spanish conflict in the Atlantic mirrored and played out diplomatic tensions from 
European courts.  The Atlantic also served as the proving ground for European leaders.  
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Just as Elizabeth used maritime policies to increase her royal prerogative, Oliver 
Cromwell looked to the Caribbean to establish himself as a strong leader when his 
Roundheads overthrew the English monarchy in 1649. 
 Jamaica and its flagship city of Port Royal became key for Cromwellian politics 
and continued to hold a significant place in English economics for a century to come.  
Though Adam Smith claimed in The Wealth of Nations (1776) that seventeenth-century 
Jamaica was useless and “an unwholesome desart, little inhabited and less cultivated,” 
contemporaries prized the island that sat “in the Spaniard’s bowels and in the heart of his 
trade.”14  Following the pattern of settlement of Bermuda in 1612 and the Bahamas in 
1648, Cromwell began plans for his own Caribbean colony.  Cromwell did so realizing 
that the future of Europe lay in controlling the Atlantic and that, as a revolutionary leader, 
he needed to solidify his place at the head of the English government through a show of 
might.   
Furthermore, Cromwell, like Elizabeth before him, was keenly aware of the lure 
of piracy.  Monetary gain and a degree of autonomy enticed men to engage in piracy.  If 
channeled/controlled, piracy afforded the government a great deal of profit with little 
expense.  As Elizabeth before him, Cromwell also needed to garner as much support for 
his regime as possible, from any group necessary.  Much of the navy sided with 
Cromwell and the Parliamentarians, but the navy always needed more skilled recruits.  
Many members of the New Model Navy resorted to piracy during the naval expeditions 
                                                          
14.  Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (1776) as 
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of the revolution and the existing communities of rebels at places like Tortuga and Port 
Royal allowed men an even easier entree into that life.15  As Richard Braithwaite wrote 
about the seventeenth-century mariner in 1631, “necessary instruments are they, and 
agents of main importance in that Hydrarchy wherein they live; for the walls of the state 
could not subsist without them.”16  If men willingly went to sea, Cromwell decided to 
make use of them.  The Caribbean also proved a useful place to deposit all of the new 
regime’s enemies and prisoners of war.  This exportation scheme caused its own 
problems, but Cromwell’s rule ended before those problems affected his rule in any 
dramatic way. 
Aside from establishing his authority in England proper, Cromwell hoped to 
solidify his power by adding an Atlantic colony of his own to the English empire.  
Cromwell also expected that by extending his rule into the Caribbean, showing his 
forces’ might to the other European empires, would force those governments to 
acknowledge the new Protectorate over the still-exiled Charles II.  Therefore, in 1655, 
Cromwell sent an expedition to capture the Spanish island of Santo Domingo, following 
in the wake of the Dutch seizure of Spanish Curaçao and French encroachments into 
Spanish Hispaniola.  The expedition picked up many of its crew from places like 
Tortuga.17  Cromwell and his officers knew that rover communities existed in the 
Caribbean and used them to their advantage to attack Spanish settlement.  Spanish 
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sources even spoke of the number of maroons inhabiting Santo Domingo and its 
neighboring islands, noting the “recruitment” of these maroons by Spain’s enemies.18  
Robert Venables, one of Cromwell’s top generals, notably recruited a “miscellany” of 
naval veterans, deserted Royalists, and other errant seamen from Barbados before setting 
off to Jamaica.19  Part of his “Western Design,” Cromwell expected the capture of Santo 
Domingo to once again assert English authority in the Atlantic.   
The Anglo-Spanish competition for Caribbean control during the Western Design 
resulted in England acquiring an important future sugar colony and presaged centuries of 
conflict and revolution in the Caribbean basin.20  Spain retained control of Santo 
Domingo failed, but England still managed to garner a victory from this mission.  Hoping 
to salvage their reputations after such a defeat, the fleet decided to sail to Jamaica before 
returning to face Cromwell.  The initial failure of the mission constituted the first military 
defeat of Cromwell’s career, however, the mission to the Caribbean did result in the 
acquirement of a much desired Caribbean colony—even if the benefits of that colony did 
not materialize immediately.   
The initial Western Design expedition took a toll on the Commonwealth forces.  
Despite the “immense droves of wild cattle,” hogs, and grain, the Jamaican climate did 
leave a number of soldiers ill or dead.  The Army suffered greatly in the Jamaican 
climate, but few sources note sailors suffering in the same way.  This serves to bolster 
arguments that many of them serving with the New Model Navy, and especially 
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supplementing the Western Design forces, already possessed notable experience in the 
Caribbean.  Having spent time living and operating in these islands made them much 
more adaptable to Jamaica, allowing the English to establish a considerable presence on 
the island despite the flagging Army. 
Research not only shows the importance of Jamaica and its port cities in the 
seventeenth century, but also offers a discussion of the maroon communities that 
inhabited the island.  One scholar calls the taking of Jamaica a “thinly veiled act of 
piracy,” but the battle was no different than any other over land in the Caribbean.21  
English ships moved quicker and easier through the ports of Jamaica.  Spanish forces 
could not match the English offensive, despite their efforts.  A number of scholars try to 
minimize the success of the English, but others chronicle the strong Spanish resistance to 
English forces, citing numerous documents from the Spanish archives.22  Well-known 
captain and privateer, William Jackson also operated out of the island.  Along with other 
former Providence Island commanders, Jackson’s reports from Jamaica about the 
vulnerability of the Spanish empire helped persuade Cromwell of the right and necessity 
of planting an English colony in the Spanish Caribbean.23     
Once again, privateers helped defeat Spanish forces.  Settlement at Port Royal 
looked promising.  Whatever the circumstances of the English occupation of the island, 
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once there, the English did establish an unprecedented state presence at Port Royal.  
Some scholars claim that Jamaica only drained the English treasury under Cromwell, but, 
militarily, the English fleet so impressed the Spanish governor of Florida that he issued 
pleas for massive fortifications at St. Augustine in response and called for local 
munitions-makers and militiamen to attend the fort.24  Cromwell re-instated Elizabethan 
policies of issuing letters of marque in order to encourage men to join his Jamaican 
endeavor.  After the English won the island, Cromwell continued those policies.   
 
“Sodom of the New World” 
 
 In 1655, Cromwell issued an official charter for the city of Port Royal and made 
Jamaica a state colony.  By bringing the city under state control, Cromwell offered 
protection and rights to the exiled men who inhabited the island, many of whom joined 
the English fleet against the Spanish defenses.  Englishmen did not jump at the chance to 
move into the city, however.  Elites in the early seventeenth century remained hostile to 
settler recruitment campaigns in England.25  The young American colonies could little 
spare settlers nor could the work-intensive colonies developing on islands like Barbados.  
With no new or legitimate colonizers arriving in Jamaica and Port Royal, its population 
remained that of new state citizen-mariners, New Model Navy officers, and migrants 
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looking for new beginnings like the early city chronicler, and migrant himself, John 
Taylor.26 
 English Caribbean colonies generally took the form of sugar plantation colonies 
and Cromwell did not wait long to remake Jamaica in that fashion.  The capture of the 
island increased the land available for cane production tenfold.27  Cromwell need only 
find men to work the land.  Indentured servitude helped populate North America and 
Cromwell employed the practice to populate Jamaica as well.  By the 1650s, he also 
began sending political dissidents and prisoners of war to the colony.  Nearly ten 
thousand Irish, Scottish, and English men found themselves “condemned to colonial 
servitude.”28  Arriving in the colony these men joined with the already present, rough-
and-tumble military men.  Mariners who had, and did, dabble in piracy rounded out the 
population.  Congregating around the capital and chief port of Port Royal, these men 
helped to earn the city the title of the “Wickedest City on Earth.” 
 By the end of the 1650s, Cromwell dismissed his Parliament and begun ruling 
England as a dictator.  He could do little to stem the growth of lawlessness and 
licentiousness in Port Royal.  Trying to hold on to the last shreds of his revolutionary 
empire, he allowed the city to remain amenable to pirates and other miscreants and 
migrants in the Caribbean.  He helped along the growth of that population.  Before the 
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House of Lords as early as 1646, a prison warden asked permission of the Lords to send 
his prisoners to the Atlantic colony.29  Not only did the government routinely ship rebels 
and delinquents to Jamaica, but one contemporary diarist also wrote that during the 
1650s, the government “took up many loose wenches at London, to send over to 
Jamaica.”30  Furthermore, during this time, in order to bring more trade and capitol into 
Port Royal, the English Colonel in the city, Edward Doyley, invited pirates from nearby 
Tortuga to make Jamaica their new base of operations.31 
 The presence of these marginal, outcast groups helped Port Royal gain the 
reputation of the “Sodom of the New World” by the 1660s.  The island’s population 
clearly divided between those attempting to make Jamaica a sugar colony, and those who 
were either merchants or the dregs of society that resided in the city.  When Charles 
Leslie wrote his New History of Jamaica in 1739, he described Port Royal as a place 
where “wine and women drained [men’s] wealth,” and a place where gambling and 
drunkenness became national pastimes.32  During the 1660s and 1670s, scholars estimate 
that Port Royal contained one tavern for every ten men in the city.  Of the two hundred 
buildings crammed onto only fifty-one acres of land, at least forty-four where taverns, 
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while the majority of the other buildings housed merchants and trading firms.33  
 
 
Figure 4: “Plan de la Ville de Port Royal” (Plan of the City of Port Royal) by J.N. Bellin, 
published in his “Le Petit Atlas  Maritime,” 1764.  Courtesy of the Jamaica Parish Reference, 
http://prestwidge.com/river/jamaicanparishes.html 
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Figure 5: Plan of Port Royal based on a pre-1692 map, with corrected scale by Donny Hamilton 
based on his excavations of the city.  Courtesy of Texas A&M University Nautical Archaeology 
Program, “The Port Royal Project.” 
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Little changed in Port Royal under the returning Stuart king, Charles II, who 
regained the throne during the Restoration of 1660.  Charles did nothing to overturn 
Cromwell’s colonial policies.  By 1683, John Taylor conveyed the propaganda 
circulating around England that the (Cromwellian) conquest of Jamaica actually occurred 
during the seventh year of “His Majestys Reign,” and that when the king “came to 
exercise His Royal Authority [he] was pleased to own what his Subjects had 
done…which was the same as if he had Commissioned them.”34  In exile, Charles 
claimed that continuous rule as King of England, but official Spanish, Dutch, and French 
diplomatic recognition of the Commonwealth proves otherwise.  Charles wisely 
continued the move towards the sugar plantation complex encouraged by the Lord 
Protector that eventually made Jamaica one of the wealthiest colonies in all of the 
seventeenth-century Caribbean.     
After facing initial defeat, gaining an island some considered worthless, Cromwell 
determined to reinforce the island, to keep after the Spanish Plate Fleets of the 
surrounding seas, and to “strive with the Spaniard for the mastery of all those seas.”35  
Cromwell’s recruitment policies, though they initially seemed like failures, also came to 
fruition.  In 1640, Charles I reigned over almost fifty thousand colonial subjects, but by 
1660, under Charles II, nearly two hundred thousand people resided in the British 
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Atlantic colonies.36  Cromwell’s expansionist policies precipitated the island’s population 
boom. 
Privateering, or piracy, depending on one’s national leanings, remained the order 
of the day in Port Royal.  Such men built the city and continued to run it despite 
government legislation throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century and into the 
early eighteenth century.  John Taylor never once questioned the legitimacy of 
privateering campaigns on the island.  Taylor’s beliefs represented the general 
assumption in Jamaica that such campaigns, especially against Spanish ships, “not only 
provided a prosperous trade, but [were] a thoroughly laudable policy.”37  Port Royal 
offered plenty of trade to entice such men and plenty of merchants to handle that trade. 
The proliferation of merchants mentioned prior amounted to almost half of the 
population of the city.  In the period from 1686-1692, nearly half of the probate 
inventories of Port Royal list the deceased as “merchant.”  Shipping registers from one of 
the busiest North American ports, Boston, from 1698-1714, listed only one in ten men as 
a merchant.38  Scholars assume that privateers or pirates would not be listed as 
“merchants” in their wills—if they left wills at all—but such evidence is hard to make 
any distinction.   
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Once again, this legitimate trade did not mean that veiled privateering missions 
and piracy lessened in any way.  Piracy generally follows busy trading routes.  The vast 
amount of trade available in and out of Jamaica, however, as well as the abundance of 
letters of marque issued under Cromwell and the general feeling of peace and 
contentment with the Restoration and the end of civil war in England did not encourage 
piracy in the Caribbean as existed earlier.  During the 1660s and 1670s though, reports of 
piracy dwindled.  Granted, when the English crown began issuing anti-piracy legislation 
once again in the 1680s, incidences of piracy increased.39  Contraband trade never 
dwindled, but piracy did for a time.  Even with a slight decrease in piracy, the character 
of seamen in the port city remained the same.  An official license did not a gentleman 
make. 
Privateering coupled with sugar production produced a dual economy in Jamaica 
that reversed the tide of envy from flowing towards Spain, to England.  Many 
unsuccessful trading ventures turned into “piratical assaults.”40  An official in the city 
claimed that “the damn’d privateering humour reigning so much in the minds of [the] 
people” kept them from seeing anything contradictory about their policies or commerce 
and/versus plunder.41  In 1690 alone, the fleet leaving Jamaica for England carried an 
estimated £100,000 in bullion.  The island’s sugar exports for 1689 only equaled 
£88,000.42  The amount of trade through Port Royal rivaled the traditional trade of the 
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English, and other Europeans, through Cadíz, Spain.43  For this reason, and because 
duties and laws were less strict in Port Royal, the Jamaican capital supplanted Cadíz as 
the favored trading port for many English merchants. 
Port Royal also rivaled North American ports.  In 1688, 102 ships came into 
Barbados, 226 to all of New England, and 213 came into Port Royal alone.44  From 1655 
to 1671, sugar works in Jamaica grew from only seven, to 57, and by 1685, maps of the 
island showed 246 sugar works.45  More and more ships came into the harbor and more 
men came to trade.  Between 1663 and 1670, the number of privateers in Port Royal grew 
exponentially from 15, to 2,000 men and over 20 vessels.46  This progress came as a 
result not of England pouring out her coffers, but out of an expansive contraband trade in 
the seventeenth-century Caribbean.  Location was certainly key in this and Charles II’s 
decision to leave much of Cromwell’s works in place also helped the city and its trade 
grow.  As the Laws of Jamaica stated, the English drained “the benefit of the Spanish 
gold and silver mines [without] the labour and expense” of working them.47  English 
Jamaica became a fully-actualized mercantilist state. 
 Even in the seventeenth century, the residents of Port Royal so tolerated piracy 
and privateers that Captain Henry Morgan, largely considered a pirate (though he 
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technically held license from the Crown), served as the lieutenant-governor of Jamaica 
for just over five years.48  Morgan, by some accounts, accompanied Venables’ Jamaican 
forces in 1655 and operated in and around the island for the next thirty years.49  As pirate, 
privateer, and governor during these years, Morgan witnessed the growth of Port Royal 
and Jamaica from rover communities into a “proper” town and plantation colony.  Port 
Royal’s population numbered between four and six thousand.50  Including the growing 
number of slaves brought in during the seventeenth century to work the new sugar 
plantations, the entire island claimed a population upwards of 350,000 by the turn of the 
eighteenth century, a population parallel to the city of London at the time.51  Port Royal 
remained a predominately pirate or buccaneer city, despite the influx of plantation 
workers and businessmen after 1655.  The city became famous equally for its wealth and 
its depravity.  In such a transient city as Port Royal remained, taverns and brothels 
abounded making it an excellent stopping-off point and hideout for such well-known 
pirates as Blackbeard by the turn of the eighteenth century.   
 Despite its storied past, Port Royal deserves mention for more than just its 
                                                          
48.  Stephan Talty, Empire of Blue Water: Captain Morgan’s Great Pirate Army, The Epic Battle 
for the Americas, and the Catastrophe that Ended the Outlaw’s Bloody Reign, (New York: 
Crown, 2007). 
 
49.  Tatly, Empire of Blue Water, 17-20. 
 
50.  Elliot, Games, Lane, and Zahedieh all have varying numbers, but it is a safe assumption to 
claim that Port Royal had least 4,000 inhabitants by 1692.  A 1680 census showed just over 3,000 
legal residents in the city.  This census material taken from “An Account of Both Masters and 
Servants of Port Royal Parish,” 26 May 1680, as found in Zahedieh, “Merchants of Port Royal,” 
570.  
 
51.  David Eltis' numbers are considered the most accurate.  Rise of African Slavery.  See also 
previous footnote. 
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colorful characters and grand legends.  The Caribbean gained great importance in 
European politics beginning in the sixteenth century.  Jamaica and its English capital at 
Port Royal represented the end result of those policies as well as a continuation of them.  
Elizabeth I sent men to settle Roanoke, North Carolina to serve as a base for pirate 
attacks against the Spanish Plate Fleets leaving Mexico and the Caribbean, but those 
expeditions failed until the establishment of Jamestown in 1607 under James VI/I.  The 
eventually successful colony at Jamestown, coupled with lessons learned from failed 
colonies like Providence Island, provided important foundations for later English 
settlements.  Cromwell, with much the same motivation as Elizabeth, tried to take 
Spanish Hispaniola and directly take over Spanish trade, but ended up with a strategic 
base for attack in Jamaica. 
 Cromwell’s policies and his plans for the island helped make Jamaica into a very 
wealthy colony by the end of the seventeenth century even though he did not live to see 
that development.  Instead, Charles II, the returned Stuart monarch, reaped the benefits 
until his domestic attentions drew him away from international politics.  In the absence of 
strong government, Port Royal reverted back to its licentious ways.  Perhaps as divine 
intervention, an earthquake leveled the city in 1692.  Thousands died in the initial quake 
and thousands more died from disease and injury in the months that followed.  Much of 
the city was rebuilt and Jamaica itself continued to be an extremely prosperous colony for 
the English through the nineteenth century, but Port Royal, with a third of the city 
underwater, never again reached the same heights in politics and culture. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study of early modern piracy encompasses discussions about the strictures of 
law and changing definitions of criminality in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
England, especially, expanded its Admiralty courts specifically to address the increase of 
piracy in this period.  The Crown began to recognize the profits made from piracy and 
developed legislation to help the government benefit from the practice.  For centuries, 
piracy, or at least contraband trade, remained a standard practice of war.  In England, the 
government not only accepted the existence of such illicit practices, but embraced 
transforming pirates into privateers.  These policies affected imperial competition in the 
Caribbean and the nature of English settlement in Jamaica. 
Piracy and Anglo-Spanish interaction in the Atlantic World coalesced to form a 
maelstrom of political and social unrest that transformed early modern European 
governance.  A striking cycle of English maritime legislation and social integration 
developed from Elizabeth I’s 1569 “Proclamation Against the Maintenance of Pyrates” to 
Cromwell’s 1655 chartering of the city of Port Royal, Jamaica.  Through the 1569 
proclamation and a series of Admiralty Court reforms in the 1580s, Elizabeth redefined 
domestic piracy to channel criminal behavior against English interests into 
internationally-focused, state-sponsored privateering.   
Realizing her own military and judicial weakness, Elizabeth encouraged piracy so 
long as it proceeded under pro-English guidelines.  Religious and political dissent at the 
beginning of Elizabeth’s reign hampered her government’s ability to police domestic 
piracy.  In search of money and support, Elizabeth expanded the granting of privateer 
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licenses to include a number of seamen once labeled as pirates.  Privateering exploits 
benefitted the government economically as the state and crown often shared in the profit 
of spoils acquired by raiding Spanish plate fleets and Atlantic trade routes.  Anglo-
Spanish tensions, predictably, deteriorated over these policies.  By integrating previously 
“criminal” men into the fold of government, Elizabeth expanded her royal prerogative 
and base of loyal subjects. 
James VI/I, in an effort to end a century of conflict between England and Spain, 
reversed many Elizabethan maritime policies.  His reversal of these policies, deference to 
Spain, and ultimate alienation of privateers prompted a significant emigration of English 
seamen.  Beginning in 1605, men who had become privateers found themselves once 
again labeled as pirates.  English mariners found themselves facing prosecution, possible 
execution, and loss of wealth and any title they may possess.  In response, thousands of 
English seamen refused James’ command to enter into naval service and fled to the 
Caribbean.  In exile, these men frequented the Caribbean and North American ports 
established during the privateering decades.  Charles I’s reign continued most of James’ 
policies.  England established a handful of colonies from Jamestown to the Caribbean 
under these rulers, but the government dealt with continued piracy and a loss of 
knowledgeable seamen for the realms’ navy.  The rover communities these men 
established in places like Jamaica gained strategic importance again during the 
Interregnum rule of Cromwell.   
Much like Elizabeth during her early reign, Cromwell needed to establish his 
prerogative and find military support to solidify his new rule against domestic and 
foreign opponents.  Offering legitimation of the rover community at Port Royal, Jamaica 
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in return for service and loyalty to the state, Cromwell made criminals into legitimate 
English citizens once again.  By the seventeenth century, the Atlantic World served as an 
important proving ground for European rulers.  European economies and industry grew 
ever more dependent on New World materials.  Procuring a Caribbean colony became 
essential for establishing wealth and prestige, forever changing the future development of 
the islands.  In this vein, Cromwell crafted his “Western Design” mission to conquer 
Spanish Hispaniola in 1653/54.  While Cromwell did not gain his initial object of Spanish 
Hispaniola, his men did win the battle for Jamaica.  With the plantation system started 
under Cromwell, the island grew into one of England’s most lucrative sugar colonies. 
To accommodate privateering, the state accorded the practice different powers at 
different stages: if a privateer armed with a mandate from a government attacked vessels 
of a rival nation for private purposes, he was considered an authorized privateer; without 
a mandate, he remained a pirate, though the attacks might be aimed at the same ships, in 
the same manner, and with the same results.  Because of their occasional incarnation as 
government agents, pirates often reflected the peculiar relationship between dominant 
and subordinate elements in early modern England.  Their changing roles serve as an 
indicator of the nation’s attitude toward imperialism, from its aggressive policy in the 
Elizabethan years, to its restrained posture during the reigns of Kings James VI/I and 
Charles I, and to a renewed fervor under Cromwell.  Violence and crime in the empire 
thus forced the formation of new definitions of identity and metropolitan imperial aims 
and administration. 
As the project moves forward, it will take into account discussions of social and 
national identity, exploring criminality within the state and the development of “English” 
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versus “Spanish” identity and the creation of new “Caribbean” identity.  Studies of the 
New World no longer focus solely on colonization and “local” politics, but have begun to 
encompass more connected studies of the worlds and governments on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  The Atlantic World was formed by interactions between various European 
countries and the peoples of the Americas, therefore, it seems only fitting that studies of 
the area naturally be composite and interrelational.  National histories also inform the 
study of Atlantic civilizations, or the study of the Atlantic often becomes a nationalistic 
tale of the home country’s colonizing efforts.  Recent trends have moved towards these 
national and even ethnic studies of Atlantic interaction, but also towards a separate 
Caribbean history within these emerging studies.1  The relationship of national and ethnic 
histories to this “new” Caribbean history raises questions about transatlantic government, 
identity formation, and colony-metropole relations.2  This argument, in turn, anticipates 
the work of scholars of the modern period who have shown how colonial engagements 
shaped social life and government reform in nineteenth-century England.3   
By looking at these relationships in early modern Caribbean, the project pushes 
colony-metropole arguments back into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, instead of 
                                                          
1.  Kenneth Steele claims that these studies have helped to “disintegrate” [sic] traditional colonial 
history “while providing valuable new comparisons that are interracial, intercolonial, 
transatlantic, and global,” while also making colonial history “more demanding, more diffuse, 
and more Atlantic.”  Kenneth Steele, “Exploding Colonial American History: Amerindian, 
Atlantic, and Global Perspectives,” Reviews in American History 26, no. 1 (1998): 73–74. 
2.  “Colony-metropole relations” is a common term used to describe the relationship between a 
colony and its ruling, or home, country.  
3.  Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–
1867 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2002).  Susan Amussen makes this argument in 
studying gender and identity between Jamaica and England in the late seventeenth century.  
Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society, 1640–1700 (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2007). 
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the traditional nineteenth- and twentieth-century focus of colony-metropole studies.4  To 
highlight this relationship, the project builds upon the transient soldier experience and 
incorporation of pirates and exiles rather than planter society.  The experience of the 
colony in Jamaica created new debates about social issues and government authority back 
home in England.  
The final years of the study, focusing on Port Royal, 1655-1670, begin to explore 
how the experience of this seventeenth-century colonial settlement mirrored and 
challenged European ideas about nationality and citizenship.  Recently published works 
have shown how Caribbean living influence “English” character and society.5  Men could 
not be good citizens if their true English character was corrupted by tropical living—an 
influential idea that continued into the twentieth century and formed a cornerstone of the 
European “civilizing mission” throughout the world.  It was the duty and right of all good 
men and good citizens to spread their ideas to all those world populations “less fortunate” 
than they.6 
                                                          
4.  This argument draws most notably from the work of Catherine Hall.  Informed by national and 
postcolonial studies, Hall’s Civilising Subjects takes as its theoretical framework the transition of 
thought and culture that occurred during the postcolonial moment.  She claims that this was a 
time when “the foundational histories” of both the metropole of England and her colonies “began 
to unravel” and “imperial legacies came to haunt” English identity.  In this moment, the ties, as 
well as the disjunctures, between the metropole and the colony became increasingly obvious.  The 
metropole and colony, and the identities of the people living in each, greatly influenced each 
other and deserved study within the same framework.  Though she sees colony-metropole 
relations as largely a study of power relations, Hall also understands that identity and 
governmentality figure into this discussion.  Hall, Civilising Subjects, 5-9. 
 
5.  Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges; Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western 
Design.”  
6.  See discussions of the “civilizing mission” in Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The 
Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Cooper, Frederick, and Ann Laura Stoler, eds., Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); David 
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Ideas about masculinity and “Englishness”, the domestic sphere, class, English 
rights and entitlement changed in Jamaica—largely because of the avenues provided by 
the political upheaval in England during the mid-seventeenth century.  Cromwell’s 
Western Design affected English character and “worthiness.”7  Though many people saw 
the Design as a failure, the control of Jamaica gave England their largest colony at the 
time.  The conditions on the island—climate and disease—made many an Englishmen on 
the island second-guess the worth of Jamaica.  In response, the government launched a 
rhetoric campaign about English masculinity and manhood.  English propaganda 
portrayed the failure to enact an “aggressive policy” in the Atlantic as “effeminacy.”  The 
failure of the soldiers and colonists to subdue and cultivate the island in its early years 
was seen as a “failure of manliness.”  No true Englishman would accept such failure and, 
therefore, questioned whether these men fit into English society if at all.8 
Life on the island of Jamaica offered a social mobility unattainable in England.  
Pirates and exiled privateers first settled the island, soldiers arrived to subdue the island, 
and for much of the Cromwellian regime, the English government deported thousands of 
prisoners and indentured servants to establish the sugar plantations on the island.9  As the 
sugar plantations became more successful, more genteel men wanted to speculate in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lambert and Alan Lester, eds., Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in 
the Long Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Levine, 
Philippa, ed., Gender and Empire, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
 
7.  Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” 3. 
8.  Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” 10–12. 
9.  Games, Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World, 322; Burnard, “European 
Migration to Jamaica.”  
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Jamaican enterprise.  Combining these various classes, on top of the social issues raised 
by slave interaction in the colony, caused a rift in traditional social structures.  Jamaica 
offered an “expectation of mobility” that “undercut the creation of a stable colonial ruling 
class.”10  By the turn of the eighteenth century, the elites on the island, as well as those 
men who had worked themselves up to plantation owners and “middle class” status, 
began voicing their discontent towards the state’s recruitment policies.11  Life in the 
colonies “[disrupted] the traditional class relations” of England with plantation mobility 
and direct power over “subject peoples.”12 
Debates about “true” citizenship soon emerged.  Colonial settlers felt as though 
the metropole did not recognize them as true English citizens.  They felt as though the 
arm of the state constantly strove to take away their basic “English” rights and liberties.  
Lower class Englishmen further used this language and the toppling of the crown to argue 
for more rights as well.  Citizenship, identity, and government intertwined.  Since 
Jamaica had no schools, Englishmen generally sent their children back to England for 
education.13  Writers, like Anthony Trollope in the nineteenth century, also travelled back 
and forth between the Jamaica and England.  The constant flow of goods, information, 
and people kept the metropole and colony in close contact.  Colonists knew of political 
events as they happened back home and vice versa.  Settlers saw themselves as 
                                                          
10.  Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges, 148. 
11.  Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 179. 
12.  Hall, Civilising Subjects, 65. 
13.  Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges, 217. 
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“extensions” of the mother country and expected to be treated the same whether in the 
Caribbean or in England.14 
The years of Civil War and Restoration created the largest opening for these sorts 
of debates for some time.  With the rise of the Protectorate, some of the rigidity of 
English class structure disappeared.  A “shared Englishness” took its place.  The settlers 
of the English Atlantic were redefining their relationship to the metropole (as distinctly 
Atlantic) while at the same time redefining their own place within metropolitan politics.15  
Proving how politically savvy they were, colonial planters used the language of the 
revolution, “the suppression of tyranny and the protection of liberty,” to their 
advantage.16  Planters in Jamaica argued that land ownership in the New World paralleled 
land claims in Ireland that carried titles for their owners.  Lower-class Englishmen 
holding land in the Caribbean argued for equal status and rights to their metropolitan 
brethren.17  Such claims and resultant debates challenged traditional English social and 
political views. 
English historians often gloss over sixteenth- and seventeenth-century colonial 
history if it does not concern the northern American colonies or slavery.  Both Spanish 
and English historiographies have long ignored the significance of Jamaica within this 
period of imperial competition.  Furthermore, English historians have staunchly refused 
to say anything positive about Oliver Cromwell and his rule and have almost completely 
                                                          
14.  Hall, Civilising Subjects, 15. 
15.  Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 158. 
16.  Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 158. 
17.  Pestana, English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 165. 
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ignored the Caribbean in regards to the English Civil War.  “Pirates, Exiles, and Empire” 
argues for a reexamination of the importance of Jamaica within Anglo-Spanish 
diplomacy and imperial competition.  Jamaica occupied a strategic place in a century of 
English and Spanish politics and social change as the site of imperial competition and 
integration of pirates and exiles as legitimate citizens. 
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